# Compliance Mapping > A high-level conceptual mapping from Active Directory attack techniques to the compliance controls they touch. Kerberoasting relates to authentication and logging, so it brushes ENS op.acc.5 / op.exp.8, NIS2 Art.21(2)(h), DORA RTS Art.9 / Art.21. Use this when a reader wants to understand which regulatory control an AD finding relates to, or to add an orientation note to a technical finding. This is a conceptual, orientative mapping only; it is NOT an auditor-defensible, curated, ID-by-ID control matrix. Covers ENS (op.acc.*, op.exp.*), NIS2 (Directive 2022/2555 Art.21), and DORA (RTS 2024/1774). - Skill: `adscanpro/compliance-mapping` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add adscanpro/compliance-mapping` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/adscanpro/compliance-mapping/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Coding & Dev Tools - Author: ADScanPro (https://skillmd.com/u/adscanpro) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/adscanpro/compliance-mapping --- # AD Technique → Compliance Control (Conceptual Mapping) > **Disclaimer, read first.** This is a *conceptual, orientative* mapping. It shows, at a > high level, which family of controls an AD attack technique relates to, so a practitioner > can point a finding in the right regulatory direction. **It is not an auditor-defensible > control matrix.** A defensible mapping (one an auditor accepts, cross-referenced ID by ID > to the exact control text, scoped to your organization's applicability statement, with > evidence per control) is a curated product, not something you infer from a technique name. > ADscan (free and source-available) produces that curated, ID-by-ID matrix as part of its > report. Use this skill to orient a finding; do not present it to an auditor as compliance > evidence. ## How to read this An AD technique succeeds because a control is weak or absent. Kerberoasting works because service-account authentication is weak and the requests are not monitored, so it *relates to* the authentication and logging control families. That relationship is conceptual: it tells a reader where in a framework to look, not that the finding satisfies or violates a specific control clause. The mapping direction is always technique → control family → representative article, and it stops there. ## The frameworks, briefly - **ENS** (Esquema Nacional de Seguridad, Spain): control families used here: - **op.acc.1** Identificación - **op.acc.4** Proceso de gestión de derechos de acceso - **op.acc.5** Mecanismo de autenticación (usuarios externos) - **op.acc.6** Mecanismo de autenticación (usuarios de la organización) - **op.exp.2** Configuración de seguridad - **op.exp.8** Registro de la actividad - **op.exp.10** Protección de claves criptográficas - **NIS2** (Directive (EU) 2022/2555): Art.21(2) cybersecurity risk-management measures: - **(g)** basic cyber hygiene and training - **(h)** cryptography and encryption - **(i)** human resources security, access control policies, asset management - **(j)** multi-factor authentication, secured communications - **DORA** (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) with **RTS (EU) 2024/1774** on ICT risk management: - **Art.20**: identity management - **Art.21**: access control (management of access rights) - **Art.9** (DORA level-1, protection and prevention) is the parent duty the RTS details --- ## The mapping ### Kerberoasting / AS-REP roasting Weak service-account or pre-auth-disabled credentials cracked offline. Touches **authentication strength** and **activity logging** (the ticket requests should be monitored). - ENS: op.acc.5 / op.acc.6 (authentication mechanism), op.exp.8 (activity logging) - NIS2: Art.21(2)(h) cryptography, Art.21(2)(i) access-control policy - DORA: RTS Art.21 access control, Art.9 (protection/prevention parent) ### DCSync Replication of the credential database using directory-replication rights. Touches **access-rights management** (who holds Get-Changes) and **logging**. - ENS: op.acc.4 (access-rights management), op.acc.1 (identification), op.exp.8 (logging) - NIS2: Art.21(2)(i) access control, Art.21(2)(j) secured communications - DORA: RTS Art.20 identity management, Art.21 access control ### ACL abuse (GenericAll / WriteDACL / WriteOwner) Excessive or misconfigured object permissions used to escalate. Touches **access-rights management** and **secure configuration**. - ENS: op.acc.4 (access-rights management), op.exp.2 (security configuration) - NIS2: Art.21(2)(i) access control and asset management - DORA: RTS Art.21 access control ### AD CS abuse (ESC1-ESC17) Certificate-template and PKI misconfiguration leading to authentication as another principal. Touches **cryptographic-key protection**, **secure configuration**, and **authentication**. - ENS: op.exp.10 (cryptographic-key protection), op.exp.2 (configuration), op.acc.5/op.acc.6 - NIS2: Art.21(2)(h) cryptography, Art.21(2)(i) access control - DORA: RTS Art.21 access control, Art.9 (protection/prevention) ### Kerberos delegation abuse (unconstrained / constrained / RBCD) Delegation misconfiguration used to impersonate. Touches **access-rights management** and **secure configuration**. - ENS: op.acc.4 (access-rights management), op.exp.2 (configuration) - NIS2: Art.21(2)(i) access control - DORA: RTS Art.21 access control ### Coercion + NTLM relay Forced authentication relayed to escalate; weak signing/channel-binding configuration. Touches **secured communications** and **secure configuration**. - ENS: op.exp.2 (security configuration), op.acc.5/op.acc.6 (authentication) - NIS2: Art.21(2)(j) secured communications, Art.21(2)(h) cryptography - DORA: RTS Art.21 access control, Art.9 (protection/prevention) ### Password spraying / weak-credential findings Weak or reused passwords and missing MFA. Touches **authentication** and **cyber hygiene**. - ENS: op.acc.5/op.acc.6 (authentication mechanism), op.acc.1 (identification) - NIS2: Art.21(2)(j) MFA, Art.21(2)(g) cyber hygiene - DORA: RTS Art.20 identity management, Art.21 access control ### Credential exposure (GPP passwords, LDAP descriptions, shares) Secrets left in SYSVOL, object attributes, or file shares. Touches **cryptographic-key / secret protection** and **secure configuration**. - ENS: op.exp.10 (key protection), op.exp.2 (configuration), op.acc.4 (access-rights) - NIS2: Art.21(2)(h) cryptography, Art.21(2)(i) asset management - DORA: RTS Art.21 access control --- ## Using this in a report Attach one line of orientation to a finding, such as "relates to ENS op.acc.5 and NIS2 Art.21(2)(h)", so the reader knows the regulatory neighbourhood. Then stop. Do not stretch a conceptual relationship into a compliance verdict, do not claim the finding proves non-compliance with a specific clause, and do not present this as the control matrix an auditor signs off on. That curated, evidence-backed, ID-by-ID matrix is a separate, deliberate piece of work.