# Ton Auditor > Security audit of TON/FunC/Tact smart contracts while you develop. Trigger on "audit", "check this contract", "review for security". Modes - default (full repo), DEEP (+ TON protocol analysis), or a specific filename. - Skill: `aibot88/ton-auditor` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 2 files) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add aibot88/ton-auditor` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/aibot88/ton-auditor/raw - Safety review: pending (external: skill-scanner PASS, skillspector PASS) - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Security - Author: aibot88 (https://skillmd.com/u/aibot88) - Updated: 2026-09-09 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/aibot88/ton-auditor --- # TON Smart Contract Security Audit You are the orchestrator of a parallelized TON smart contract security audit. ## Mode Selection **Exclude pattern:** skip directories `tests/`, `test/`, `build/`, `node_modules/`, `wrappers/`, `scripts/` and files matching `*_test.fc`, `*_test.tact`, `test_*.fc`, `test_*.tact`, `*.spec.ts`. - **Default** (no arguments): scan all `.fc`, `.func`, and `.tact` files using the exclude pattern. Use Bash `find` (not Glob). - **`$filename ...`**: scan the specified file(s) only. **Flags:** - `--file-output` (off by default): also write the report to a markdown file (path per `{resolved_path}/report-formatting.md`). Never write a report file unless explicitly passed. - `--deep`: same scope as default, but also spawns the TON protocol analysis agent (Agent 9) with `model: "opus"`. Use for thorough reviews. Slower and more costly. ## Orchestration **Turn 1 — Discover.** Print the banner, then make these parallel tool calls in one message: a. Bash `find` for in-scope `.fc`, `.func`, and `.tact` files per mode selection b. Glob for `**/references/attack-vectors/attack-vectors-1.md` — extract the `references/` directory (two levels up) as `{resolved_path}` c. ToolSearch `select:Agent` d. Read the local `VERSION` file from the same directory as this skill e. Bash `curl -sf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sanbir/ton-auditor-skills/main/ton-auditor/VERSION` f. Bash `mktemp -d /tmp/audit-XXXXXX` → store as `{bundle_dir}` If the remote VERSION fetch succeeds and differs from local, print `⚠️ You are not using the latest version. Please upgrade for best security coverage. See https://github.com/sanbir/ton-auditor-skills`. If it fails, skip silently. **Turn 2 — Prepare.** In one message, make parallel tool calls: (a) Read `{resolved_path}/report-formatting.md`, (b) Read `{resolved_path}/judging.md`. Then build all bundles in a single Bash command using `cat` (not shell variables or heredocs): 1. `{bundle_dir}/source.md` — ALL in-scope `.fc`, `.func`, and `.tact` files, each with a `### path` header and fenced code block. 2. Agent bundles = `source.md` + agent-specific files: | Bundle | Appended files (relative to `{resolved_path}`) | | -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `agent-1-bundle.md` | `attack-vectors/attack-vectors-1.md` + `attack-vectors/attack-vectors-2.md` + `attack-vectors/attack-vectors-3.md` + `attack-vectors/attack-vectors-4.md` + `hacking-agents/vector-scan-agent.md` + `hacking-agents/shared-rules.md` | | `agent-2-bundle.md` | `hacking-agents/math-precision-agent.md` + `hacking-agents/shared-rules.md` | | `agent-3-bundle.md` | `hacking-agents/access-control-agent.md` + `hacking-agents/shared-rules.md` | | `agent-4-bundle.md` | `hacking-agents/economic-security-agent.md` + `hacking-agents/shared-rules.md` | | `agent-5-bundle.md` | `hacking-agents/execution-trace-agent.md` + `hacking-agents/shared-rules.md` | | `agent-6-bundle.md` | `hacking-agents/invariant-agent.md` + `hacking-agents/shared-rules.md` | | `agent-7-bundle.md` | `hacking-agents/periphery-agent.md` + `hacking-agents/shared-rules.md` | | `agent-8-bundle.md` | `hacking-agents/first-principles-agent.md` + `hacking-agents/shared-rules.md` | Print line counts for every bundle and `source.md`. Do NOT inline file content into agent prompts. **Turn 3 — Spawn.** In one message, spawn all agents as parallel foreground Agent calls. Always spawn Agents 1–8 with `model: "sonnet"`. Prompt template (substitute real values): ``` Your bundle file is {bundle_dir}/agent-N-bundle.md (XXXX lines). The bundle contains all in-scope source code and your agent instructions. Read the bundle fully before producing findings. ``` If `--deep` is set, also spawn **Agent 9** (TON protocol analysis) with `model: "opus"`. Agent 9 receives the in-scope file paths and the instruction: your reference directory is `{resolved_path}`. Read `{resolved_path}/hacking-agents/ton-protocol-agent.md` for your full instructions. **Turn 4 — Deduplicate, validate & output.** Single-pass: deduplicate all agent results, gate-evaluate, and produce the final report in one turn. Do NOT print an intermediate dedup list — go straight to the report. 1. **Deduplicate.** Parse every FINDING and LEAD from all agents. Group by `group_key` field (format: `Contract | handler | bug-class`). Exact-match first; then merge synonymous bug_class tags sharing the same contract and handler. Keep the best version per group, number sequentially, annotate `[agents: N]`. Check for **composite chains**: if finding A's output feeds into B's precondition AND combined impact is strictly worse than either alone, add "Chain: [A] + [B]" at confidence = min(A, B). Most audits have 0–2. 2. **Gate evaluation.** Run each deduplicated finding through the four gates in `judging.md` (do not skip or reorder). Evaluate each finding exactly once — do not revisit after verdict. **Single-pass protocol:** evaluate every relevant code path ONCE in fixed order (initialization → admin handlers → recv_internal opcodes → recv_external → bounce handlers). One-line verdict per path: `BLOCKS`, `ALLOWS`, `IRRELEVANT`, or `UNCERTAIN`. Commit after all paths — do not re-examine. `UNCERTAIN` = `ALLOWS`. 3. **Lead promotion & rejection guardrails.** - Promote LEAD → FINDING (confidence 75) if: complete exploit chain traced in source, OR `[agents: 2+]` demoted (not rejected) the same issue. - `[agents: 2+]` does NOT override a concrete refutation — demote to LEAD if refutation is uncertain. - No deployer-intent reasoning — evaluate what the code _allows_, not how the deployer _might_ use it. 4. **Fix verification** (confidence ≥ 80 only): trace the attack with fix applied; verify no new DoS, state inconsistency, or broken invariants; list all locations if the pattern repeats. If no safe fix exists, omit it with a note. 5. **Format and print** per `report-formatting.md`. Exclude rejected items. If `--file-output`: also write to file. ## Banner Before doing anything else, print this exactly: ``` ████████╗ ██████╗ ███╗ ██╗ █████╗ ██╗ ██╗██████╗ ██╗████████╗ ██████╗ ██████╗ ╚══██╔══╝██╔═══██╗████╗ ██║ ██╔══██╗██║ ██║██╔══██╗██║╚══██╔══╝██╔═══██╗██╔══██╗ ██║ ██║ ██║██╔██╗ ██║ ███████║██║ ██║██║ ██║██║ ██║ ██║ ██║██████╔╝ ██║ ██║ ██║██║╚██╗██║ ██╔══██║██║ ██║██║ ██║██║ ██║ ██║ ██║██╔══██╗ ██║ ╚██████╔╝██║ ╚████║ ██║ ██║╚██████╔╝██████╔╝██║ ██║ ╚██████╔╝██║ ██║ ╚═╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝ ╚═══╝ ╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝ ╚═╝ ```