# Aio Threat Models

> Threat modeling framework advisor — selects the right framework(s) for the system (security, privacy, AI/ML, cloud, K8s), walks through application, and composes findings across frameworks. Use proactively when reviewing architecture for risk, conducting a security architecture review, assessing a system's attack surface, enumerating threats, analyzing security posture, modeling vulnerabilities, or performing a structured risk assessment.

- Skill: `aiocean/aio-threat-models` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 35 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add aiocean/aio-threat-models`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/aiocean/aio-threat-models/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: DevOps & Infra
- Author: aiocean (https://skillmd.com/u/aiocean)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/aiocean/aio-threat-models

---


# Threat Modeling Framework Advisor

> "Threat modeling is analyzing representations of a system to highlight concerns about security and privacy characteristics."
> — Threat Modeling Manifesto (2020)

## Workflow: How to Use This Skill

When this skill is triggered, follow these five steps. Do NOT just dump framework descriptions — actively guide the user through their specific threat modeling task.

### Step 1: ASK — Understand the System

Before selecting frameworks, gather essential context (if not already clear):

- What system is being threat modeled? (new design, existing system, specific feature)
- Is it primarily a **security**, **privacy**, or **both** concern?
- What domain? (web app, mobile, cloud-native, microservices, AI/ML, IoT, cyber-physical)
- Who processes the output? (developers, SOC, compliance, regulators, executives)
- What lifecycle phase? (requirements, design, implementation, operations, incident review)
- Regulatory context? (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS, EU AI Act, SOC 2, etc.)
- Team expertise level? (beginners, security-experienced, dedicated security team)

If the user's message already contains enough context, proceed directly to Step 2.

### Step 2: SEARCH — Find Relevant Frameworks

**First, run semantic search** with the user's problem as the query to find the most relevant frameworks. Then cross-reference with the routing table below.

```bash
TM="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/aio-threat-models/scripts"
npx tsx "$TM/search-models.ts" "<user's threat modeling problem>" --top 5 --json
```

Read the full markdown file for each top result before proceeding. Use the routing table as a secondary guide:

| Context | Start With |
|---|---|
| **Starting fresh, new web/app system** | Shostack 4Q + STRIDE + DFD |
| **Privacy-sensitive system (PII/PHI)** | LINDDUN (parallel to STRIDE) + DPIA |
| **Regulated finance/healthcare** | PASTA + STRIDE + DPIA (if PII) |
| **Enterprise DevSecOps at scale** | VAST (or IriusRisk) + Continuous TM |
| **Organizational risk assessment** | OCTAVE Allegro |
| **High-value attack scenario** | Attack Trees |
| **Creative threat discovery, diverse team** | Security Cards + PnG (consider hTMM) |
| **Requirements-phase threat modeling** | hTMM (Cards + PnG + SQUARE) |
| **ML/AI system** | OWASP LLM Top 10 + MITRE ATLAS + NIST AI RMF + NIST AI 100-2 |
| **Cloud-native / K8s** | Shared Responsibility + CNCF 4-layer + K8s Threat Matrix |
| **CTI / incident analysis** | Diamond Model + Kill Chain / UKC + MITRE ATT&CK |
| **Agile sprint integration** | Threat Model as Code (pytm / Threagile) + Continuous TM |
| **Access control system** | Trike (requirements matrix) |
| **Scoring identified threats** | CVSS or bug bars (DO NOT use DREAD — deprecated) |
| **AI-phase adversarial ML rigor** | NIST AI 100-2 taxonomy |

State which frameworks you selected and **why they fit this situation**.

### Step 3: APPLY — Walk Through Each Framework

For each selected framework, apply it directly to the user's situation:

- Name the framework and its core concept (one sentence)
- State its origin and primary use case
- Show what it reveals about the user's specific problem
- Identify the concrete threats, properties, or steps relevant

### Step 4: COMPOSE — Cross-Framework Synthesis

Real-world threat modeling rarely uses one framework in isolation. Compose:

- **Outer loop**: Shostack 4Q (what are we working on / what can go wrong / what to do / did we do a good job)
- **System representation**: DFD with trust boundaries
- **Threat enumeration**: STRIDE (security) + LINDDUN (privacy, if applicable)
- **Creative brainstorm**: Security Cards or PnG (for blind spots)
- **Attack depth**: Attack Trees for high-value scenarios
- **Knowledge bases**: MITRE ATT&CK / ATLAS / CAPEC for known TTPs
- **Risk scoring**: CVSS for vulnerabilities, PASTA risk analysis for threats
- **Compliance mapping**: DPIA for GDPR; AI RMF Playbook for AI governance

State the composition you recommend and how the frameworks interact.

### Step 5: CHALLENGE — Stress-Test the Approach

Pick one dimension and challenge honestly:

- **Coverage**: What threats does this composition likely miss? (Privacy? Insider threats? Novel ML attacks?)
- **Effort vs value**: Is the proposed depth justified? Could a lighter approach suffice?
- **Empirical limits**: Remember Scandariato 2015 — STRIDE misses threats systematically. Consider pairing with creative methods.
- **Tool reality**: Does the team have skills/tools for this? Or will it degrade to "admiration for the problem" (Manifesto anti-pattern)?

State final confidence level and any caveats.

---

## Scripts

Before calling any script, resolve the scripts directory:

```bash
TM="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/aio-threat-models/scripts"
```

### List all frameworks

```bash
$TM/list-models.sh                      # List all 27 frameworks by volume
$TM/list-models.sh --volume 2           # Filter by volume (1-7)
$TM/list-models.sh --search "mitre"     # Search by keyword
$TM/list-models.sh --count              # Quick count per volume
```

### Semantic Search

Find relevant frameworks by meaning, not just keywords. Uses pre-computed embeddings (snowflake-arctic-embed-xs, 384-dim, runs locally).

```bash
npx tsx "$TM/search-models.ts" "how to model privacy threats in an ML system"
npx tsx "$TM/search-models.ts" "framework for kubernetes security review" --top 3
npx tsx "$TM/search-models.ts" "enterprise threat modeling at scale" --json
```

Options:
- `--top N` — Number of results (default: 5)
- `--json` — Output as JSON

**Always run semantic search first before selecting frameworks.** The search uses embeddings to find the most relevant frameworks for the user's specific problem — more reliable than guessing from memory.

### Rebuild embeddings (after adding or editing content)

```bash
npx tsx "$TM/build-embeddings.ts"
```

---

## Framework Catalog

**7 Volumes, 27 frameworks total.** Each framework has its own markdown file with: core concept, origin, structure, when-to-use, strengths, limitations, relation to other frameworks, and primary-source references.

### Volume 1: Foundations

_Methodology-agnostic scaffolds and common artifacts_

| Framework | Core Idea |
|---|---|
| [Shostack's 4-Question Framework](./volume-1-foundations/01-shostack-4-questions.md) | Methodology-agnostic scaffold for any TM process |
| [DFD & Trust Boundaries](./volume-1-foundations/02-dfd-trust-boundaries.md) | Canonical system representation for software-centric TM |
| [Threat Modeling Manifesto (2020)](./volume-1-foundations/03-threat-modeling-manifesto.md) | Community consensus on values and anti-patterns |

### Volume 2: Core Frameworks

_The six most widely-deployed threat modeling frameworks_

| Framework | Core Idea | Best For |
|---|---|---|
| [STRIDE](./volume-2-core-frameworks/01-stride.md) | 6 threat categories for software-centric TM | Default web/app starting point |
| [DREAD](./volume-2-core-frameworks/02-dread.md) | Risk scoring (deprecated) | Historical reference; don't use |
| [PASTA](./volume-2-core-frameworks/03-pasta.md) | 7-stage risk-centric methodology | Regulated industries |
| [OCTAVE Allegro](./volume-2-core-frameworks/04-octave-allegro.md) | Asset-centric organizational risk | SMB / periodic audit |
| [Trike](./volume-2-core-frameworks/05-trike.md) | Requirements-based actor-asset-action matrix | Formal access control |
| [VAST](./volume-2-core-frameworks/06-vast.md) | Enterprise DevSecOps (dual-track) | Large organizations |

### Volume 3: Attacker-centric

_Frameworks grounded in adversary modeling_

| Framework | Core Idea |
|---|---|
| [Attack Trees](./volume-3-attacker-centric/01-attack-trees.md) | Hierarchical AND/OR attack goal decomposition with cost/probability |
| [Persona non Grata](./volume-3-attacker-centric/02-persona-non-grata.md) | Attacker personas for requirements-phase TM |
| [Security Cards](./volume-3-attacker-centric/03-security-cards.md) | 42-card creativity tool, unique Human Impact dimension |
| [hTMM (Hybrid)](./volume-3-attacker-centric/04-htmm.md) | SQUARE + Security Cards + PnG composition |

### Volume 4: Attack Patterns

_Knowledge bases of real-world adversary behaviors_

| Framework | Core Idea |
|---|---|
| [Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain](./volume-4-attack-patterns/01-cyber-kill-chain.md) | 7-phase APT intrusion model |
| [Unified Kill Chain](./volume-4-attack-patterns/02-unified-kill-chain.md) | 18-stage extension with ATT&CK integration |
| [MITRE ATT&CK](./volume-4-attack-patterns/03-mitre-attack.md) | Tactics × Techniques knowledge base (691 methods) |
| [Diamond Model](./volume-4-attack-patterns/04-diamond-model.md) | Event-centric intrusion analysis (Adversary-Capability-Infrastructure-Victim) |
| [CAPEC](./volume-4-attack-patterns/05-capec.md) | Attack pattern catalog at exploitation-mechanics layer |

### Volume 5: Privacy

_Privacy-specific frameworks and regulatory counterparts_

| Framework | Core Idea |
|---|---|
| [LINDDUN](./volume-5-privacy/01-linddun.md) | 7 privacy threat categories + GO (card) + MAESTRO |
| [GDPR DPIA](./volume-5-privacy/02-gdpr-dpia.md) | Article 35 Data Protection Impact Assessment structure |

### Volume 6: AI/ML Threat Modeling

_Frameworks for LLM, ML, and AI systems_

| Framework | Core Idea |
|---|---|
| [OWASP Top 10 for LLM](./volume-6-ai-ml/01-owasp-llm-top10.md) | Curated LLM threat list (v1.0 2023, v2.0 2025) |
| [MITRE ATLAS](./volume-6-ai-ml/02-mitre-atlas.md) | ATT&CK-parallel knowledge base for ML |
| [NIST AI RMF](./volume-6-ai-ml/03-nist-ai-rmf.md) | GOVERN-MAP-MEASURE-MANAGE governance framework |
| [NIST AI 100-2](./volume-6-ai-ml/04-nist-ai-100-2.md) | Adversarial ML taxonomy (Evasion/Poisoning/Privacy/Abuse) |

### Volume 7: Cloud & DevSecOps

_Cloud-native, microservices, and continuous threat modeling_

| Framework | Core Idea |
|---|---|
| [Cloud Threat Modeling](./volume-7-cloud-devsecops/01-cloud-threat-modeling.md) | Shared responsibility + AWS/Azure/GCP frameworks + CSA Egregious 11 |
| [Kubernetes Threat Matrix](./volume-7-cloud-devsecops/02-kubernetes-threat-matrix.md) | CNCF 4-layer + Microsoft K8s Threat Matrix |
| [Continuous Threat Modeling](./volume-7-cloud-devsecops/03-continuous-threat-modeling.md) | Threat Model as Code (pytm, Threagile) + agile integration |

---

## Quick Reference — Framework Selection Matrix

### By Orientation

- **Software-centric**: STRIDE, LINDDUN
- **Asset-centric**: OCTAVE Allegro
- **Attacker-centric**: Attack Trees, PnG, Security Cards, Kill Chain, UKC, ATT&CK
- **Risk-centric**: PASTA, Trike
- **Hybrid**: hTMM, VAST (dual-track)
- **Analyst-centric**: Diamond Model

### By Lifecycle Phase

- **Requirements**: hTMM, PnG, Misuse Cases
- **Design / Architecture**: STRIDE, LINDDUN, Attack Trees, PASTA
- **Implementation**: Threat Model as Code (pytm, Threagile)
- **Operations / SOC**: MITRE ATT&CK, Kill Chain, UKC, Diamond Model
- **Incident Analysis**: Diamond Model, ATT&CK, CAPEC

### By Scope

- **Security only**: STRIDE, PASTA, Attack Trees, Kill Chain
- **Privacy only**: LINDDUN, DPIA
- **Security + Privacy**: STRIDE + LINDDUN in parallel (best practice)
- **AI/ML**: OWASP LLM Top 10 + ATLAS + NIST AI RMF + NIST AI 100-2
- **Cloud**: Shared Responsibility + CSA + cloud-provider-specific
- **Organizational**: OCTAVE Allegro

---

## Top 10 Most-Used Frameworks

1. **STRIDE** — default software-centric starting point
2. **LINDDUN** — privacy-native parallel to STRIDE (mandatory for PII systems)
3. **Shostack 4-Questions** — methodology-agnostic scaffold wrapping everything
4. **DFD + Trust Boundaries** — system representation for STRIDE/LINDDUN/PASTA
5. **Attack Trees** — quantitative analysis of high-value attack scenarios
6. **MITRE ATT&CK** — de-facto standard TTP catalog
7. **PASTA** — risk-centric methodology for regulated industries
8. **MITRE ATLAS** — ML-system TTP catalog
9. **OWASP Top 10 for LLM** — curated LLM threat checklist
10. **Continuous Threat Modeling** — modern DevSecOps practice

---

## Empirical Reminders

From the literature (Scandariato 2015, Tuma 2018, Xiong 2019):

- **STRIDE has a high false-negative rate** — practitioners miss threats systematically. Pair with Security Cards or PnG for creative breadth.
- **No framework optimizes all properties** (SEI 2018). Composition > choosing one.
- **No Definition of Done** exists in threat analysis (Tuma 2018). Completeness cannot be objectively measured.
- **Most validation is by illustration**, not controlled empirical evaluation.
- **Manual analysis dominates** — automation nascent but improving.

---

## Anti-Patterns to Avoid

From Threat Modeling Manifesto (2020):

- **Hero Threat Modeler** — one expert bottlenecks everything
- **Admiration for the Problem** — endless analysis without action
- **Tendency to Overfocus** — over-analyzing one area, ignoring others
- **Perfect Representation** — weeks perfecting a DFD that's outdated by next sprint

Plus community-derived:

- **Using DREAD** — subjective, deprecated; use CVSS or bug bars
- **STRIDE-only for PII systems** — misses 5 privacy threat categories; always pair with LINDDUN
- **One-time threat modeling** — Manifesto value: "Continuous refinement over single delivery"
- **Automation theater** — generating reports no one reads

---

## Sources & Further Reading

### Canonical Books

- Shostack, A. (2014). *Threat Modeling: Designing for Security*. Wiley.
- UcedaVélez, T., Morana, M.M. (2015). *Risk Centric Threat Modeling*. Wiley.
- Tarandach, I., Coles, M. (2020). *Threat Modeling: A Practical Guide for Development Teams*. O'Reilly.
- Swiderski, F., Snyder, W. (2004). *Threat Modeling*. Microsoft Press.

### Systematic Literature Reviews

- Scandariato, R., Wuyts, K., Joosen, W. (2015). "A descriptive study of Microsoft's threat modeling technique". *Requirements Engineering* 20:163–180.
- Tuma, K., Calikli, G., Scandariato, R. (2018). "Threat analysis of software systems: A systematic literature review". *Journal of Systems and Software* 144:275–294.
- Xiong, W., Lagerström, R. (2019). "Threat modeling — A systematic literature review". *Computers & Security* 84:53–69.

### Online Resources

- Threat Modeling Manifesto: https://www.threatmodelingmanifesto.org/
- Adam Shostack's site: https://shostack.org/resources/threat-modeling
- OWASP Threat Modeling: https://owasp.org/www-community/Threat_Modeling
- CMU SEI Threat Modeling: https://www.sei.cmu.edu/blog/threat-modeling-12-available-methods/
- LINDDUN: https://linddun.org/
- MITRE ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/
- MITRE ATLAS: https://atlas.mitre.org/
- NIST AI Resource Center: https://airc.nist.gov/

---

_"Threat modeling is a journey of understanding — not a snapshot."_
— Threat Modeling Manifesto (2020)