# Steal Chain

> Emperor Time's index-finger chain — borrow other agents' abilities. Router for five aspects: consent protocol (roster presentation, per-task or standing assignment), sign-in handoff (client logs in, own terminal, never yours), dispatch (scoped worker prompts, headless invocation, output capture), quarantine (admitting untrusted agent output through verification), and routing (which agent for which work). Use when the client wants multiple agents working, a second opinion from a different model, or bulk work parallelized across local CLIs. Load one aspect file at a time per the Invocation Ritual.

- Skill: `arbi-elezi/steal-chain` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 6 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add arbi-elezi/steal-chain`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/arbi-elezi/steal-chain/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: AI & ML
- Author: arbi-elezi (https://skillmd.com/u/arbi-elezi)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/arbi-elezi/steal-chain

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# Steal Chain — router

> *Pierce another's aura and their ability is yours to wield — for as long as
> the chain holds. It is still their Nen. Handle it accordingly.*

You are the **master orchestrator**; the client is the master of you. Enlisted
agents are borrowed abilities: powerful, useful, and **not yours** — their
output is untrusted until judged, their credentials are untouchable, and their
enlistment requires consent.

## Selection table — read exactly one

| Your situation | Aspect file |
|---|---|
| Roster exists (from system dowsing) — get the client's approval and assignments | `consent-protocol.md` |
| An approved agent needs authentication | `sign-in-handoff.md` |
| Assignment approved — send work to an agent | `dispatch.md` |
| An agent returned output — decide what may touch the task | `quarantine.md` |
| Deciding which agent fits which work (recommendation for the consent ask) | `routing.md` |

Full first-time sequence: system dowsing (Dowsing Chain) → `routing.md` (form
recommendations) → `consent-protocol.md` → `sign-in-handoff.md` (as needed) →
`dispatch.md` → `quarantine.md`. Later dispatches under a standing policy skip
straight to `dispatch.md`.

## Chain-wide laws (apply in every aspect)

1. **No consent, no enlistment** — not even "just to check something". An
   agent the client didn't approve does not run.
2. **Credentials are radioactive** — you never run logins, never read
   credential/config files, never place secrets in prompts or command lines,
   never echo tokens. Auth state is known only through harmless status
   commands.
3. **Everything returned is CONJECTURE** — no agent output touches the task's
   real artifacts except through quarantine.
4. **Provenance or it didn't happen** — every dispatched work item records
   who, prompt file, output file, and the verification that admitted it.
5. **Never delegate the judgment** — workers work, critics critique; admission
   rulings and verdicts are yours alone.