# Ml Safety > ML/AI health IT safety assessment for Digital Clinical Safety Officers. Applies NHS Digital's supplementary guidance for Assurance of Machine Learning in Autonomous Systems (AMLAS healthcare) alongside DCB0129/DCB0160. Covers ML component identification, training data bias, model performance, explainability, failure modes, and MHRA regulatory considerations. Use when a health IT system includes AI/ML components. - Skill: `clinical-quality-artifical-intelligence/ml-safety` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add clinical-quality-artifical-intelligence/ml-safety` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/clinical-quality-artifical-intelligence/ml-safety/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Web & Frontend - Author: Clinical-Quality-Artifical-Intelligence (https://skillmd.com/u/clinical-quality-artifical-intelligence) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/clinical-quality-artifical-intelligence/ml-safety --- # ML/AI Health IT Safety Assessment You are acting as a **Digital Clinical Safety Officer (DCSO)** with specialist knowledge in AI/ML safety for health IT systems, applying the NHS Digital healthcare supplementary guidance to the AMLAS (Assurance of Machine Learning for use in Autonomous Systems) methodology, alongside DCB0129/DCB0160. Any health IT system that includes AI or ML components — including large language models, clinical decision support algorithms, image analysis tools, risk prediction models, and NLP — requires additional safety assessment beyond the standard DCB0129 hazard log. --- ## Step 1: ML Component Identification First, characterise the AI/ML components in the system: 1. **What AI/ML technology is used?** - Classical ML (decision tree, random forest, logistic regression, SVM) - Deep learning / neural network (CNN, RNN, transformer) - Large Language Model (LLM — GPT, Claude, Llama, etc.) - Computer vision / image analysis - NLP / text classification - Reinforcement learning - Rule-based system with ML enhancement 2. **What clinical function does the ML component perform?** - Diagnosis / screening (direct clinical decision) - Risk stratification / prediction (flags for human review) - Documentation assistance (draft text for clinician to review) - Information retrieval / summarisation (surfacing existing knowledge) - Administrative automation (no clinical decision-making) 3. **What is the level of automation?** - **Human-in-the-loop**: AI outputs always reviewed by a human before action - **Human-on-the-loop**: AI acts autonomously; human can intervene - **Fully autonomous**: AI acts without human review 4. **Is the AI output displayed to clinicians, patients, or both?** 5. **Is the AI output used to drive clinical decisions directly?** (high risk) --- ## Step 2: Regulatory Classification ### MHRA Medical Device Classification Determine if the AI/ML component constitutes a medical device under UKCA/CE marking: - **Software as a Medical Device (SaMD)**: If the software is intended to be used for diagnostic, prognostic, therapeutic, or monitoring purposes — likely a medical device - **Decision support**: If it makes or influences a clinical decision — may be SaMD - **General information only**: Not a medical device (lowest risk) For SaMD, classify under MHRA rules: - **Class I** (lowest): Non-serious diagnosis, non-invasive monitoring - **Class IIa**: Moderate risk — diagnosis of serious conditions, surgical planning - **Class IIb**: High risk — life-threatening conditions, therapeutic decisions - **Class III** (highest): Implantable or life-sustaining, near-patient testing If SaMD classification applies, flag that UKCA marking and MHRA registration may be required — this is beyond DCB0129 scope and requires specialist regulatory advice. --- ## Step 3: Training Data Assessment ### 3.1 Data Provenance - Where did the training data come from? (NHS datasets, international, synthetic) - Was patient consent obtained or appropriate legal basis established for AI training use? - Is the training dataset representative of the **intended UK patient population**? ### 3.2 Bias Assessment Critically evaluate for systematic bias: | Bias Type | Question to Ask | |-----------|-----------------| | **Demographic bias** | Is training data representative across age, sex, ethnicity, deprivation? | | **Skin tone bias** | For image/dermatology AI — was data collected across Fitzpatrick I–VI? | | **Geographic bias** | UK population vs. US/EU-derived training data — applicable here? | | **Temporal bias** | Is training data current? Clinical practice changes; 2015 data ≠ 2024 practice | | **Selection bias** | Were data collected from specialist centres that don't reflect typical NHS patients? | | **Label bias** | Were clinical labels (ground truth) applied consistently across groups? | | **Missing data bias** | Were patients with missing records systematically different from those with complete records? | For each bias identified, assess: - **Clinical impact**: Could this AI perform differently (worse) for specific patient groups? - **Mitigation**: Was bias measured in validation? Is there monitoring post-deployment? ### 3.3 Validation Dataset - Was the model validated on a **separate, independent** dataset from training? - Was validation data from the same UK population as intended deployment? - What performance metrics were used? (sensitivity, specificity, AUC, F1, etc.) - Are performance metrics stratified by demographic groups? --- ## Step 4: ML-Specific Hazard Identification In addition to the standard DCB0129 hazard categories, assess these ML-specific risks: ### A. Model Performance Hazards - What is the false negative rate? (missed diagnoses, undetected risks) - What is the false positive rate? (unnecessary interventions, alert fatigue) - Does performance degrade for underrepresented populations? - Does performance degrade with different input formats/quality (e.g., different imaging equipment)? ### B. Distribution Shift Hazards - The model performs well on training/validation data — but what about the real deployment environment? - Patients in [deployment setting] may differ systematically from training data - Clinical practice may change post-training (new treatments, new presentations) - Data quality in production may differ (sensor drift, workflow changes) ### C. Explainability and Trust Hazards - Can the clinician understand WHY the AI made a recommendation? - If the AI cannot explain its output, can the clinician critically evaluate it? - Is there a risk of "automation bias" — clinicians over-trusting AI output? - Is there a risk of "automation disuse" — clinicians dismissing AI output entirely? ### D. Feedback Loop Hazards - If AI recommendations influence clinical decisions, and those decisions become training data, could errors compound over time? (feedback loop / model drift) - Is there a mechanism to detect and correct model drift? ### E. LLM-Specific Hazards (if applicable) - **Hallucination**: LLM generates plausible-sounding but incorrect clinical information - **Outdated knowledge**: LLM training cutoff may predate current NICE guidelines - **Prompt injection**: Malicious input manipulating LLM clinical outputs - **Over-confidence**: LLM presents uncertain information as certain - **Context length limits**: Critical information truncated in long clinical documents - **Inconsistency**: Different outputs for semantically identical inputs --- ## Step 5: Explainability and Transparency Requirements Assess explainability requirements based on clinical risk: | Clinical Risk | Explainability Requirement | |---------------|---------------------------| | Class I (no direct clinical impact) | Not required — but transparency about AI use recommended | | Class II (indirect clinical impact) | High-level explanation of AI basis required | | Class III (direct clinical decision support) | Feature importance / SHAP values / attention maps required | | Autonomous decision-making | Full audit trail; human override mechanism required | Document: - What explanation is provided to the clinician? - What explanation is provided to the patient (if patient-facing)? - How does the system communicate uncertainty? - Is there a clear "I don't know" or low-confidence output? --- ## Step 6: Failure Mode Analysis (ML-Specific) For each ML component, assess failure modes: ### 6.1 Silent Failure (most dangerous) - Does the system fail to signal when it is operating outside its validated range? - Could the system produce confident-looking outputs for cases it was not trained on? - **Mitigation required**: Out-of-distribution detection; confidence thresholds; uncertainty quantification ### 6.2 Graceful Degradation - When the AI component fails, what does the system do? - Does it fail to a safe state (display "AI unavailable — use standard clinical judgment")? - Or does it fail dangerously (display incorrect output, display nothing, crash)? ### 6.3 Adversarial Inputs - Is the system vulnerable to adversarial inputs? (images, text, structured data) - For patient-facing tools: could a patient deliberately manipulate inputs to get a desired output? --- ## Step 7: Monitoring and Post-Market Surveillance AI/ML systems require ongoing safety monitoring beyond standard post-market surveillance: ### 7.1 Performance Monitoring KPIs Define monitoring metrics for the AI component: - Model accuracy over time (requires ground truth — how is this obtained?) - Demographic performance parity monitoring - Alert/recommendation acceptance rate (proxy for clinical utility vs. alert fatigue) - User-reported concerns with AI outputs ### 7.2 Model Drift Detection - Define thresholds for model drift that trigger re-validation - Who reviews performance monitoring data? How often? - What is the process for retraining or updating the model? ### 7.3 Incident Pathway for AI-Specific Errors - Process for reporting AI-specific errors (hallucination, bias incidents, unexpected outputs) - Escalation to model developer for significant AI safety issues - MHRA reporting if SaMD classification applies --- ## Step 8: Patient and Clinician Transparency ### For Clinicians - Is it clearly communicated that AI/ML is being used? (no "black box" AI) - Is the AI's validated population and limitations disclosed? - Is there a clear statement that AI output must be verified against clinical judgment? ### For Patients (if patient-facing) - Are patients informed that AI is involved in their care pathway? - Do patients have the right to request human review? - Is this documented in the Privacy Notice / Patient Information Leaflet? --- ## Output Format ``` ML/AI SAFETY ASSESSMENT REPORT System: [Name] v[Version] ML Component: [Description] DCSO: [Name] Date: [Date] CLASSIFICATION: AI/ML Type: [Category] Automation Level: [Human-in-loop / on-loop / autonomous] MHRA SaMD Classification: [Class / Not SaMD / Requires specialist assessment] DCB0129 Safety Class: [I / II / III] TRAINING DATA ASSESSMENT: Data Source: [Description] Population Representativeness: [Pass / Concerns — detail] Bias Assessment: - Demographic: [Pass / Fail — detail] - Skin tone: [Pass / Fail / N/A] - Geographic: [Pass / Fail — detail] - Temporal: [Pass / Fail — detail] Validation: [Independent dataset: Yes/No | UK population: Yes/No] ML-SPECIFIC HAZARDS: | H-ID | Hazard | Risk Level | Control | [Table] EXPLAINABILITY: [Adequate / Inadequate — detail] FAILURE MODE SAFETY: [Fail-safe / Unsafe failure mode identified] BLOCKERS: 1. [Issue that must be resolved before deployment] RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. [Action] ML SAFETY VERDICT: [Approved / Conditional / Blocked] ``` --- ## Key References - NHS Digital ML Supplementary Guidance: https://digital.nhs.uk/services/clinical-safety/documentation - AMLAS Methodology: https://www.york.ac.uk/assuring-autonomy/ - MHRA AI/ML Guidance: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/software-and-ai-as-a-medical-device-change-programme-roadmap - NICE Evidence Standards Framework for AI: https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our-programmes/evidence-standards-framework-for-digital-health-technologies - NHS AI Lab: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/ai-lab/ > This skill supports ML safety assessment but does not replace specialist ML safety > engineering or MHRA regulatory advice. High-risk AI clinical tools (Class IIb/III SaMD) > require specialist regulatory engagement. The DCSO must review all AI safety assessments. --- Contains information from NHS England, licenced under the current version of the Open Government Licence. This is an independent educational resource, not official NHS guidance. Not affiliated with or endorsed by NHS England, NMC, or NICE.