# Lisa Sentry Access > Vendor-neutral access layer for Sentry. Sentry-oriented skills MUST delegate through this skill rather than calling Sentry MCP tools, sentry-cli, or REST directly. Per the credential-substrate-precedence contract, resolves SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN (REST, or sentry-cli authenticated from the same token) first when present and identity-matched to the configured org/project, then falls back to the Sentry MCP. - Skill: `codyswanngt/lisa-sentry-access` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 2 files) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add codyswanngt/lisa-sentry-access` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/codyswanngt/lisa-sentry-access/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: AI & ML - Author: codyswanngt (https://skillmd.com/u/codyswanngt) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/codyswanngt/lisa-sentry-access --- # Sentry Access: $ARGUMENTS Single chokepoint for Sentry operations. Caller skills MUST NOT call `mcp__sentry__*`, `sentry-cli`, or `https://sentry.io/api/` directly. ## Invocation Contract ```text operation: list-issues org: project: query: [environment:] operation: get-issue issue_id: operation: events org: project: query: operation: releases org: project: ``` Return parsed JSON in a `` block. ## Substrate Selection Probe in order — the ordering is the shared `credential-substrate-precedence` contract, not a Sentry-local choice. The first tier that is ready **and** identity-matches the configured org/project is used; a substrate authenticated against a different org is skipped, never used. 1. **Tier 1 — configured-provider substrate: `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`** bearer token against Sentry REST, resolved through `lisa-secrets-access`. 2. **Tier 1a — `sentry-cli`**, if installed and authenticated to the requested org/project from that same token (the CLI arm of the provider substrate). 3. **Tier 2 — interactive MCP fallback: Sentry MCP**, if available and authenticated. Used when tier 1 is genuinely unavailable: no `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`, no REST/CLI adapter for the operation, or a Sentry outage. Sentry documents API auth tokens for REST API calls, and the same token works interactively and headlessly — which is why it leads. The REST tier uses: ```bash # Resolve the token through the chokepoint before giving up on the environment. # `$SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` is the documented fallback, not the only rung: without # this, a project that keeps its credentials in Bitwarden, Doppler, or AWS has # no tier 1 path at all and silently resolves through the interactive MCP — # the exact divergence `credential-substrate-precedence` exists to remove. # Mirrors `linear-access`, `atlassian-access`, and `notion-access`. read_sentry_token() { [ -n "${SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN:-}" ] && { echo "$SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"; return; } # # Ordered across trusted machine-managed substrates, ending at the installed # package. Checkout-local paths are deliberately absent: a familiar generated # destination is still repository-controlled executable code. The plugin # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed. # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them. # Execute only machine-managed plugin/package resolvers. Checkout-local # candidates are repository-controlled code, not trusted merely by path. local candidates=() if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs") fi if [ -n "${PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then candidates+=("$PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs") fi # Last rung deliberately needs no environment variable: an agent that was # never handed a plugin root still has the installed package to fall back on. candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs) local resolver local tried=() for resolver in "${candidates[@]}"; do tried+=("$resolver") if [ -f "$resolver" ]; then local via_lisa via_lisa=$(node "$resolver" get SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN 2>/dev/null) \ && [ -n "$via_lisa" ] && { echo "$via_lisa"; return; } # Empty/error means this substrate had no answer; try the next trusted one. fi done # Name every path. A bare `return 1` sends the next reader hunting for a # resolver they cannot see the absence of; the enumeration turns that into a # seconds-long diagnosis. Paths and store coordinates only — never any # resolved value, on any path. echo "Error: could not resolve SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN through lisa-secrets-access." >&2 echo "Tried, in order (relative paths are from $PWD):" >&2 printf ' %s\n' "${tried[@]}" >&2 return 1 } sentry_api() { local path="$1" local token token=$(read_sentry_token) || { echo "Error: no Sentry auth token. Set SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN, or store it as" >&2 echo "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN in this project's secrets provider." >&2 return 1 } curl -sS "https://sentry.io/api/0${path}" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $token" } ``` Tier 1a authenticates `sentry-cli` from the **same resolved token** (`SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN=$(read_sentry_token) sentry-cli …`) — never from a second credential store, and never from an interactive `sentry-cli login` keychain. If neither tier works, fail with: ```text Error: no Sentry access substrate available. Authenticate Sentry MCP/CLI or set SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN. ``` ## Mutation boundary Every operation in the Invocation Contract is **read-only** — issue, event, and release retrieval. So the `credential-substrate-precedence` guarded fallback for mutating operations (write, read back, assert the tenant from the response, roll back on mismatch) is not engaged here, and a failed tier is simply skipped. Any future operation that mutates Sentry state — resolving an issue, editing a release — is a write and MUST reconcile by read-back under that protocol before any retry; do not add one to the contract without it. ## Invariants - Tier order is `credential-substrate-precedence`: `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` first, the Sentry MCP as a preserved first-class fallback. Identity-match against the configured org/project is mandatory on every tier. - The token is resolved through `lisa-secrets-access`, with the bare `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` environment variable as the documented fallback. Never read a second credential store (OS keychain, `~/.sentryclirc` token) directly — the one-store rule lives at the chokepoint. - Org/project come from `.sentryclirc`, `.lisa.config.json`, or explicit operation args; never infer by searching all accessible orgs. - Consumer skills do not embed Sentry REST paths.