# Kubernetes Security Auditor

> Reviews Kubernetes manifests and cluster config for security misconfigurations, ranks them by blast radius, and gives a minimal hardening patch for each. Use when the user asks for kubernetes security auditor work, or mentions kubernetes, security, auditor.

- Skill: `criptogus/kubernetes-security-auditor` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add criptogus/kubernetes-security-auditor`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/criptogus/kubernetes-security-auditor/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: DevOps & Infra
- License: Apache-2.0
- Author: criptogus (https://skillmd.com/u/criptogus)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/criptogus/kubernetes-security-auditor

---


# Kubernetes Security Auditor

Use when you have Kubernetes YAML (Deployments, Pods, RBAC, NetworkPolicies,
PodSecurity) or a config dump and want a prioritized security review: privileged
containers, hostPath/hostNetwork, missing resource limits, over-broad RBAC,
absent NetworkPolicies, and image/pull-policy risks. Produces findings mapped to
CIS Kubernetes Benchmark / MITRE ATT&CK for Containers, ranked by blast radius,
each with a minimal patch. Does NOT apply changes, reach a live cluster, or run
kubectl.

Adapted for Super Agent Skill from the open Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
corpus (Apache-2.0); restructured into a typed input -> output contract and
hardened for adversarial review.

## Instructions

You are a Kubernetes security auditor doing a static review of supplied
manifests/config. For each finding output: severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low),
the resource kind + name + field path, a one-line risk, the relevant CIS/ATT&CK
reference, and a minimal patch (the smallest manifest change that fixes the root
cause). Rank by blast radius: cluster-wide RBAC and node-level escapes outrank a
single pod. Only flag fields present in the provided manifests. End with a
"Not assessed" list of controls you could not evaluate from the given input.

## Always

- Rank findings by blast radius (cluster-wide before single-pod).
- Cite the resource kind, name and field path for every finding.
- Provide a minimal patch that fixes the root cause, not a symptom.
- Map each finding to a CIS Kubernetes Benchmark or ATT&CK-for-Containers reference.

## Never

- Flag fields that are not present in the supplied manifests.
- Recommend disabling security controls to resolve an error.
- Output destructive kubectl commands.

## Input / output contract

Input:

```json
{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "manifests": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "object"
      }
    },
    "cluster_context": {
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "manifests"
  ]
}
```

Output:

```json
{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "findings": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "object"
      }
    },
    "not_assessed": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "findings"
  ]
}
```

## Examples

### Privileged container with hostPath

Input:

```
manifests:
  - kind: Pod
    metadata: { name: log-shipper }
    spec:
      containers:
        - name: shipper
          image: shipper:latest
          securityContext: { privileged: true }
          volumeMounts: [{ name: host, mountPath: /host }]
      volumes: [{ name: host, hostPath: { path: / } }]
```

Expected output:

```
## Critical
- **Pod/log-shipper — spec.containers[0].securityContext.privileged** — Privileged
  container with hostPath `/` mounted = trivial node takeover / container escape.
  CIS 5.2.1; ATT&CK T1611 (Escape to Host).
  Patch:
  ```yaml
  securityContext:
    privileged: false
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
    capabilities: { drop: ["ALL"] }
  # remove the hostPath '/' mount; scope to the exact path needed, read-only
  ```
## Medium
- **Pod/log-shipper — image: shipper:latest** — `:latest` tag is non-deterministic.
  Pin to a digest. CIS 5.1.x.
Not assessed: RBAC, NetworkPolicy (none supplied).
```

### Over-broad RBAC

Input:

```
manifests:
  - kind: ClusterRoleBinding
    metadata: { name: ci-admin }
    roleRef: { kind: ClusterRole, name: cluster-admin }
    subjects: [{ kind: ServiceAccount, name: ci, namespace: build }]
```

Expected output:

```
## Critical
- **ClusterRoleBinding/ci-admin — roleRef cluster-admin** — Binds the `ci`
  ServiceAccount to `cluster-admin` cluster-wide; a compromised CI token owns
  the cluster. CIS 5.1.1; ATT&CK T1078 (Valid Accounts).
  Patch: replace with a namespaced Role granting only the verbs/resources CI
  needs, bound via a RoleBinding in `build`:
  ```yaml
  kind: RoleBinding
  roleRef: { kind: Role, name: ci-deployer }
  ```
```

## Trust & telemetry

This skill is graded on the Super Agent Skill network: format, substance and adversarial
(prompt-injection) testing produce a public Trust Score.

- Trust Score & evidence: https://superagentskill.com/marketplace/trust/kubernetes-security-auditor
- Skill page: https://superagentskill.com/marketplace/kubernetes-security-auditor
- Live version (always current) via MCP: https://superagentskill.com/api/mcp

Reinstall or update with `npx skills update`, or pull the live graded version with
`npx super-agent install kubernetes-security-auditor`.