# Snyk Scan Stub > Synthetic Snyk Code SARIF 2.1.0 producer for SDLC chain validation. Emits a fixed, realistically-shaped Snyk Code SARIF report under payload.sarif so a downstream triage agent has deterministic, real-format input. NOT a real scanner — replace with stage-snyk.yml when the real Snyk pipeline lands. - Skill: `epam/snyk-scan-stub` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add epam/snyk-scan-stub` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/epam/snyk-scan-stub/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: DevOps & Infra - Author: epam (https://skillmd.com/u/epam) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/epam/snyk-scan-stub --- # Synthetic Snyk-Scan Stub (chain-validation fixture, real SARIF shape) This is a **test fixture**, not a real scanner. Its job is to emit a deterministic report **in the real Snyk Code SARIF 2.1.0 shape** so the `snyk-triage` agent exercises actual SARIF parsing (ruleId→rule join, nested `locations`, `level`/`security-severity`, `codeFlows`) — not just an easy flat JSON. Do **not** read the diff, scan the repo, or invent findings. Ignore the working tree. Use the **`Write` tool** to save the JSON below **verbatim** to `stage-output.json` at the repo root. Copy it exactly — do not reformat, re-indent, summarize, or drop fields. The embedded `payload.sarif` object is what a real `snyk code test --sarif` run would produce (trimmed to two results). ```json { "stage": "snyk-scan-stub", "status": "passed_with_findings", "summary": "Synthetic Snyk Code SARIF (2.1.0): 2 results emitted under payload.sarif for triage-chain validation.", "payload": { "scanner": "snyk-code", "report_format": "sarif-2.1.0", "report_location": "payload.sarif", "sarif": { "$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/oasis-tcs/sarif-spec/master/Schemata/sarif-schema-2.1.0.json", "version": "2.1.0", "runs": [ { "tool": { "driver": { "name": "SnykCode", "semanticVersion": "1.0.0", "version": "1.0.0", "rules": [ { "id": "javascript/OpenRedirect", "name": "OpenRedirect", "shortDescription": { "text": "Open Redirect" }, "defaultConfiguration": { "level": "error" }, "help": { "markdown": "Unsanitized input flowing into a redirect target lets an attacker redirect users to an arbitrary site (phishing).", "text": "Unsanitized input flowing into a redirect target lets an attacker redirect users to an arbitrary site (phishing)." }, "properties": { "tags": ["javascript", "security", "CWE-601", "Security"], "categories": ["Security"], "precision": "very-high", "repoDatasetSize": 3211, "cwe": ["CWE-601"], "security-severity": "7.3" } }, { "id": "javascript/CodeInjection", "name": "CodeInjection", "shortDescription": { "text": "Code Injection" }, "defaultConfiguration": { "level": "error" }, "help": { "markdown": "Untrusted input passed to a dynamic evaluation sink (eval) allows arbitrary code execution.", "text": "Untrusted input passed to a dynamic evaluation sink (eval) allows arbitrary code execution." }, "properties": { "tags": ["javascript", "security", "CWE-94", "Security"], "categories": ["Security"], "precision": "very-high", "repoDatasetSize": 1894, "cwe": ["CWE-94"], "security-severity": "9.1" } } ] } }, "results": [ { "ruleId": "javascript/OpenRedirect", "ruleIndex": 0, "level": "error", "message": { "text": "Unsanitized input from the HTTP request (callbackUrl) flows into res.redirect, where it is used as a redirect target. This may result in an Open Redirect vulnerability." }, "locations": [ { "physicalLocation": { "artifactLocation": { "uri": "apps/chat-api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts", "uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%" }, "region": { "startLine": 315, "endLine": 315, "startColumn": 5, "endColumn": 25 } } } ], "fingerprints": { "0": "3d9f1c7a8b2e4f60a1c5d2e7b9043f18", "1": "openredirect.authcontroller.v1" }, "codeFlows": [ { "threadFlows": [ { "locations": [ { "location": { "physicalLocation": { "artifactLocation": { "uri": "apps/chat-api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts", "uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%" }, "region": { "startLine": 163, "endLine": 163, "startColumn": 5, "endColumn": 44 } } } }, { "location": { "physicalLocation": { "artifactLocation": { "uri": "apps/chat-api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts", "uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%" }, "region": { "startLine": 233, "endLine": 236, "startColumn": 5, "endColumn": 6 } } } }, { "location": { "physicalLocation": { "artifactLocation": { "uri": "apps/chat-api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts", "uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%" }, "region": { "startLine": 315, "endLine": 315, "startColumn": 5, "endColumn": 25 } } } } ] } ] } ], "properties": { "priorityScore": 720, "isAutofixable": false } }, { "ruleId": "javascript/CodeInjection", "ruleIndex": 1, "level": "error", "message": { "text": "Untrusted input is passed to eval(), allowing arbitrary code execution (CWE-94)." }, "locations": [ { "physicalLocation": { "artifactLocation": { "uri": "apps/chat-api/src/legacy/unsafe-eval.ts", "uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%" }, "region": { "startLine": 42, "endLine": 42, "startColumn": 3, "endColumn": 28 } } } ], "fingerprints": { "0": "a17be03c9d4422f15e8c6b07d3219ef4", "1": "codeinjection.legacyeval.v1" }, "codeFlows": [ { "threadFlows": [ { "locations": [ { "location": { "physicalLocation": { "artifactLocation": { "uri": "apps/chat-api/src/legacy/unsafe-eval.ts", "uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%" }, "region": { "startLine": 38, "endLine": 38, "startColumn": 3, "endColumn": 30 } } } }, { "location": { "physicalLocation": { "artifactLocation": { "uri": "apps/chat-api/src/legacy/unsafe-eval.ts", "uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%" }, "region": { "startLine": 42, "endLine": 42, "startColumn": 3, "endColumn": 28 } } } } ] } ] } ], "properties": { "priorityScore": 850, "isAutofixable": false } } ], "properties": { "coverage": [ { "files": 1, "isSuppressed": false, "lang": "TypeScript", "type": "SUPPORTED" } ] } } ] } } } ``` The two results are intentionally checkable against the repo: - **Result 1** (`javascript/OpenRedirect`, `auth.controller.ts:315`) points at a **real** sink whose redirect targets are allowlist-validated by `resolveCallbackUrl()` (the codeFlow even passes through line 233 where that validation happens). A correct triage verdict is **FALSE_POSITIVE**, citing that mitigation. - **Result 2** (`javascript/CodeInjection`, `legacy/unsafe-eval.ts:42`) points at a **non-existent** file. A correct verdict is **NOT_APPLICABLE** / **FALSE_POSITIVE** (the sink is not present in the repo). The point of the fixture is to exercise the chain plumbing **and** real-SARIF parsing; the verdicts above are the signal that triage parsed the SARIF and inspected the code.