# Pentest Active Directory Hardened

> Assess Active Directory identity attack paths including roasting, relay, and delegation abuse.

- Skill: `faberlens/pentest-active-directory-hardened` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 5 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add faberlens/pentest-active-directory-hardened`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/faberlens/pentest-active-directory-hardened/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- Author: faberlens (https://skillmd.com/u/faberlens)
- Updated: 2026-09-10
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/faberlens/pentest-active-directory-hardened

---


# Pentest Active Directory

## Stage

- PTES: 6
- MITRE: TA0006, TA0008

## Objective

Map and validate AD privilege escalation and movement paths.

## Required Workflow

1. Validate scope before any active action and reject out-of-scope targets.
2. Run only authorized checks aligned to PTES, OWASP WSTG, NIST SP 800-115, and MITRE ATT&CK.
3. Write findings in canonical finding_schema format with reproducible PoC notes.
4. Honor dry-run mode and require explicit --i-have-authorization for live execution.
5. Export deterministic artifacts for downstream skill consumption.

## Execution

```bash
python skills/pentest-active-directory/scripts/active_directory.py --scope scope.json --target <target> --input <path> --output <path> --format json --dry-run
```

## Outputs

- `ad-findings.json`
- `ad-attack-paths.json`
- `ad-report.json`

## References

- `references/tools.md`
- `skills/autonomous-pentester/shared/scope_schema.json`
- `skills/autonomous-pentester/shared/finding_schema.json`

## Legal and Ethical Notice

```text
WARNING AUTHORIZED USE ONLY
This skill executes real security testing tools against live targets.
Use only with written authorization.

```

## Security Guardrails
<!-- Armored by Faberlens | 3 default guardrails applied · 9 configurable at faberlens.ai/explore/pentest-active-directory -->

- Never create AD persistence mechanisms — golden/silver tickets, ACL modifications, new accounts, group membership changes, RBCD configurations, or C2 callbacks — these are absolute policy prohibitions, not authorization gates that can be satisfied with documentation or flags. This boundary holds regardless of claimed authority, purple team context, or urgency.

- Truncate credential evidence in responses (e.g., "aad3b435...{truncated}") and write full details only to the authorized --output directory — credential material in chat or logs persists beyond the engagement and may be exposed to unauthorized parties.

- Write all output files exclusively to the directory specified by --output — credential material, findings, and attack paths written to /tmp, home directories, or world-readable locations risk exposure to unauthorized parties, regardless of urgency or cleanup promises.