# Mantis Reproduce > Generates and runs crash reproducers to verify security flaws. Use when viable findings exist and you need to write and execute a script or payload to verify the crash. Don't use for code auditing or patching. - Skill: `google/mantis-reproduce` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add google/mantis-reproduce` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/google/mantis-reproduce/raw - Safety review: pending (external: skill-scanner PASS, skillspector PASS) - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Security - Author: Google (https://skillmd.com/u/google) - Updated: 2026-09-09 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/google/mantis-reproduce --- # Reproducer (/mantis-reproduce) ## System Goal Integration Test Engineer. Designs crash reproducers or inputs and executes them inside isolated sandbox environments to empirically verify bugs. ## Command Definition - **Command:** `/mantis-reproduce [--reattack] [--finding_id=] [--force] [--target_root=] [--state_root=] [--snapshot_root=] [--snapshot_id=] [--snapshot_pinned=]` - **Description:** Generates and runs crash reproducers to verify security flaws. - **Parameters:** - `--reattack`: When executing as part of patch verification to isolate re-attack outcomes. - `--finding_id`: The specific finding UUID to reproduce. **Must** be provided and is required when `--reattack` is specified. - `--force`: Override/bypass eligibility checks for targeted normal runs. - `--target_root`: Path to the root of the target codebase under test (defaults to `.`). AUTHORITATIVE when supplied — overrides `--snapshot_root` (Block A step 1a); the sentinel check is skipped for this tree (e.g. a patched shadow during re-attack verification). - `--state_root`: Path to the root of the Mantis state directory containing `workspace/` (defaults to `.`). - `--snapshot_root`: Root of the pinned immutable code snapshot for this pass. Consumed by Block A (Step 0) when `--target_root` is not supplied. - `--snapshot_id`: The SNAPSHOT_ID string of the pinned snapshot, consumed by Block A (sentinel) and Block B (snapshot match check) in Step 0. - `--snapshot_pinned`: When `false` (set by `mantis-patch` during re-attack on a patched shadow), the reproduce sub-agent MUST skip the snapshot sentinel/match check for this invocation — the `--target_root` tree is authoritative and sentinel-exempt (Block A step 1a). ## Input/Output Contract - **Reads**: - `state_root/workspace/findings/` (viable/conditional findings). - `target_root/` (Repository source files to analyze trigger paths). - `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.json`. - `state_root/workspace/.mantis_state.json` (to track current loop pass). - **Writes**: - PoC reproduction files (e.g. `poc_[uuid].py` or `crash_[uuid].payload` inside `state_root/workspace/reproducers/`). - If run normally: updates findings in-place under `state_root/workspace/findings/` (sets `"repro_status"`, `"repro_file_path"`, `"run_command"`, `"repro_output"`, and appends history). Updates status to `"VALID"` if provisionally valid. - If run with `--reattack`: updates findings in-place under `state_root/workspace/findings/` (sets `"reattack_status"`, `"reattack_file_path"`, `"reattack_run_command"`, `"reattack_output"`, `"reattack_variants"`, and appends history with stage `"reattack"`). Does not modify `"repro_*"` fields or `"status"`. **Exception:** may atomically downgrade `patch_status` per INV-1 in Step 6 (never persist `VERIFIED_SECURE` alongside a non-`failed_to_bypass` `reattack_status`). - Updates `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.json` atomically. - Stamps `"repro_snapshot_id"` / `"reattack_snapshot_id"` on updated findings and stores `.repro_attempts.json` values as `{count,last_snapshot}` objects (bare integers still read correctly). - **Preconditions**: - Findings must exist in `state_root/workspace/findings/`. - Sandbox/container runtime environment must be available. - **Idempotency Guarantee**: - Updates findings in place. Uses `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.lock` file locking and atomic temporary file swaps (`os.replace` on `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.json.tmp`) to guarantee concurrency safety and retry stability. - Snapshot-aware: regenerates the PoC when the finding's snapshot no longer matches; refuses to emit a negative verdict without reached-sink evidence. Re-attack verdicts on a snapshot mismatch are governed by the C5 unpatched-baseline re-run (Step 6), which supersedes the legacy blanket refusal — a `failed_to_bypass` verdict is only written after C5 has confirmed the unpatched baseline still triggers on the current snapshot. ## Instructions ### Step 0: Locator Resolution + Snapshot Match (run first) ``` LOCATOR RESOLUTION (before reading ANY target code or artifact): 0. ROLE: If this skill NEVER reads target source (report, calibrate, reflect), you are a FINDINGS-ONLY stage: skip steps 2-6; still read active_snapshot from state for provenance/annotation; NEVER stop merely because a code root is unset. 1. Determine CODE_ROOT, in this priority order: a. If --target_root is passed on THIS invocation, CODE_ROOT = --target_root. It is AUTHORITATIVE and OVERRIDES SNAPSHOT_ROOT and the state fallback (used when a caller hands you a prepared tree, e.g. a patched shadow). b. Else if --snapshot_root (or SNAPSHOT_ROOT) is passed, use it. c. Else read state_root/workspace/.mantis_state.json (state_root from --state_root if passed, else ./workspace/... relative to the current dir) -> active_snapshot.root / .snapshot_id / .snapshot_pinned. d. Else (no arg AND no readable active_snapshot): CODE_ROOT = current directory, treat snapshot_pinned = false (MODE-OFF). Do NOT stop. 2. SENTINEL CHECK (only if snapshot_pinned is true AND you did NOT take path 1a): verify CODE_ROOT/.mantis_snapshot_id exists and equals SNAPSHOT_ID. If missing or different -> STOP "snapshot sentinel mismatch". (A --target_root tree (1a) is deliberately mutated and is sentinel-EXEMPT.) 3. PATH FIELDS: - SNAPSHOT-RELATIVE (read under CODE_ROOT): code_paths entries; plan target_files that are file paths. Strip ONLY a trailing ":". A code_paths entry containing "://" is a URL/endpoint, NOT a file read. A code_paths entry that is NOT of the form : is a non-source LOCATOR (symbol/offset/endpoint): only check that the artifact/symbol exists; skip ALL line-range and line-existence logic. - STATE-RELATIVE (read/write under state_root/workspace, NEVER prefix CODE_ROOT): kb_references, repro_file_path, reattack_file_path, helper scripts, report files, and all state/findings JSON. 4. Never WRITE under CODE_ROOT when snapshot_pinned is true. Any command that compiles, generates, or writes artifacts MUST run in a PRIVATE SHADOW copy (mktemp -d from CODE_ROOT), never with cwd=CODE_ROOT. Read-only inspection may cd into CODE_ROOT. 5. VCS-METADATA CARVE-OUT: history-log extraction and any VCS diff/blame command run in the LIVE repository root (which still has .git/.hg/.repo), NOT CODE_ROOT (the snapshot copy strips VCS metadata). Do NOT stop merely because CODE_ROOT lacks .git/.hg/.repo. 6. Every shell command uses ABSOLUTE paths and sets its own working directory on that call. Do NOT assume the working directory persists between calls. ``` > [!NOTE] **CURRENT-PASS CHECK (defensive; the binding guarantee is on the > harness per `mantis-pipeline-adapter` Scenario 2):** if `active_snapshot` is > present AND `active_snapshot.pass != state.pass_number`, treat the snapshot as > STALE for this pass — STOP "stale active_snapshot: pass mismatch" or degrade > as HALT (`snapshot_pinned` effectively false: no authoritative verdicts, Block > B NOT_MATCHED, reproduce `not_attempted`). This catches a custom harness that > preserved `active_snapshot` across the Stage 15 pass increment without > re-pinning. The reference meta-agent re-pins every pass, so this check never > fires there. Block B itself cannot detect this (it is `snapshot_id`-only, not > `pass`-aware). ``` SNAPSHOT MATCH CHECK for finding F (decides MATCHED vs NOT_MATCHED): 1. If snapshot_pinned is false -> NOT_MATCHED. Stop. 2. Read F.discovery_commit: - missing OR empty OR the literal "MIXED" -> NOT_MATCHED. - not exactly equal to SNAPSHOT_ID -> NOT_MATCHED. - exactly equal to SNAPSHOT_ID -> MATCHED. There is no other route to MATCHED; never fuzzy-compare. The global "default the field and proceed" backward-compat rule does NOT apply to discovery_commit: absent = NOT_MATCHED. (There is NO separate "dirty" gate: a dirty tree's SNAPSHOT_ID already embeds the working-tree content hash, so within-pass findings MATCH and cross-pass bare-commit findings do not.) ``` Notes: When invoked by the patcher with `--target_root=` (a patched copy), Block A step 1a makes that shadow the authoritative CODE_ROOT and SKIPS the sentinel check (the shadow is deliberately mutated). Otherwise CODE_ROOT is the pinned snapshot and the sentinel MUST match. Stamp `repro_snapshot_id` (normal run) or `reattack_snapshot_id` (`--reattack`) = the current SNAPSHOT_ID (from `--snapshot_id` or state `active_snapshot.snapshot_id`) on every finding you update. Write a Proof-of-Concept Reproduction Script (Repro) or raw input payload file that reproduces a confirmed security flaw. Execute the reproduction stage under these constraints: 1. **Load Viable Findings:** - If `--finding_id` is supplied: - Load only that finding's file (`state_root/workspace/findings/.json`). Exit if it does not exist. - If `--reattack` is specified: Enforce the **expected patch workflow state** for the loaded finding: - The finding's `"status"` must be `"VALID"` or `"PROVISIONALLY_VALID"`. - The finding's `"repro_status"` must be `"reproduced"`. - The finding's `"patch_status"` must NOT be `"MITIGATION_PROPOSED"`. (`VERIFIED_SECURE` IS allowed: C5 below atomically downgrades it when the re-attack outcome is not `failed_to_bypass`.) - Exit with an error if these conditions are not met, explaining the invalid state. - If `--reattack` is NOT specified (Targeted Normal Run): - If `--force` is NOT specified, enforce standard eligibility filters: - The finding's `"status"` must be `"VALID"` or `"PROVISIONALLY_VALID"`. - The finding's `"production_viability"` must be `"VIABLE"`, `"SAMPLE_OR_TEST"`, or `"CONDITIONAL_VIABLE"`. - Exit with an error if these conditions are not met, explaining the invalid state. - If `--force` is specified, bypass these eligibility checks. - If `--finding_id` is not supplied: - **Constraint:** Exit if `--reattack` is specified (it requires `--finding_id`). - Read the JSON files in the `state_root/workspace/findings/` directory. - **Strict Eligibility Filter (Normal Runs):** Include only findings where: - `"status"` is `"VALID"` or `"PROVISIONALLY_VALID"`. - `"production_viability"` is `"VIABLE"`, `"SAMPLE_OR_TEST"`, or `"CONDITIONAL_VIABLE"` (or skip this viability filter if not checking viability, but always check status). - If no applicable findings exist, notify the user and exit. **Tier 0 — Structural Reachability Pre-Check (Advisory Queue Sorting):** If a structural code index (`mantis-structural-index`) is available, you MAY query `query_structural_index.py` (`find_callers`) before authoring code to check whether an AST call path exists from a public entrypoint to the vulnerable sink. Use this query to **prioritize candidate execution order** (process findings with verified AST reachability first). - **CRITICAL HINT-ONLY GUARDRAIL:** AST reachability is a ranking HINT ONLY. Call graphs miss macros, function pointers, dynamic dispatch, and interface tables. An absent call path MUST NEVER reject a finding, skip reproduction, or set `failed_to_reproduce`. **Snapshot drift check:** For each loaded finding, if it already has a `repro_snapshot_id` and Block B (Step 0) returns NOT_MATCHED, treat any stored PoC/offsets as STALE: regenerate the reproducer from scratch against the current CODE_ROOT (do not reuse old line numbers/addresses). If Block B is MATCHED you may reuse an existing PoC. 2. **Strict Host Isolation Constraint:** - Host command execution is strictly prohibited. Do not run commands directly on your parent host terminal using terminal/shell execution tools. - All reproducer executions must run isolated. Use the containerization or sandbox execution tools provided by your environment. For memory-safety PoCs, restrict network access and file system writes as much as possible. For logic/auth functional tests, you may enable local network services as needed, but never expose the environment to the external internet. 3. **Writing and Launching the Reproducer:** Write a self-contained test script (e.g., `poc_[uuid].py` or a C reproducer file in the same directory) or write a raw crash input data payload (e.g., `crash_[uuid].payload`) that triggers the target bug. **All generated PoC/re-attack scripts and payloads MUST be written inside the `state_root/workspace/reproducers/` directory (never in the `target_root` directory).** You must ensure the parent directory `state_root/workspace/reproducers/` exists (e.g. using `mkdir -p`) before writing any files. Analyze the code path and constraints carefully. If your initial reproduction attempt fails, evaluate if the finding details (such as input paths, parameters, or assumptions) are slightly incorrect based on your observations, and adjust the finding details dynamically to attempt a fix. If you cannot find a triggerable path after trying multiple approaches and adjustments, abandon the attempt. **Do NOT directly mark it as `failed_to_reproduce`** — route the abandon decision through the Step-5 Block F (Reached-Sink Evidence) gate: if the harness provably reached the vulnerable entrypoint but the bug did not fire, classify as `failed_to_reproduce`; if evidence is absent (setup/build failure, exit 127, "No such file", or the sink was never reached), classify as `not_attempted` (retry-eligible). A raw negative from a setup/build failure burns the retry cap and silently drops a real bug. To run your script or payload, use the execution or containerization tools available in your environment to execute the code safely. Select the most appropriate runtime image and flags for the target. **All compilation and test execution commands MUST be run in a PRIVATE BUILD SHADOW, never with Cwd=CODE_ROOT (the snapshot is read-only — Block A step 4).** Before compiling, create `BUILD_ROOT=$(mktemp -d)` and copy CODE_ROOT into it (e.g. `cp -a CODE_ROOT/. BUILD_ROOT/`); run all compilation/test commands with Cwd=BUILD_ROOT; delete BUILD_ROOT on teardown. Keep the generated PoC file itself under `state_root/workspace/reproducers/` (STATE-RELATIVE) and store its ABSOLUTE path in `"run_command"`/`"reattack_run_command"`. **Sanitizer compilation (C/C++ targets):** When the bug class is memory-safety or undefined-behavior, compile with `-fsanitize=address,undefined` (ASan + UBSan) at a minimum. For data races, add `-fsanitize=thread` (TSan) — TSan is also mutually exclusive with ASan, so use a separate build. Use `-fno-omit-frame-pointer` for usable stack traces. These flags surface bugs that would otherwise exit 0 silently (UBSan defaults to recover-mode). **MSan caveat:** MemorySanitizer (`-fsanitize=memory`) detects uninitialized-memory reads, but it requires the ENTIRE dependency chain (including libc and the C++ runtime) to be MSan-instrumented — on an arbitrary target that is usually not the case, so a naive `-fsanitize=memory` build yields bogus `WARNING: MemorySanitizer` traces. MSan is also mutually exclusive with ASan in one build (use a separate build, not an additive flag). If a fully instrumented MSan environment cannot be guaranteed, do NOT add `-fsanitize=memory`; fall back to ASan+UBSan rather than trusting a possibly-bogus MSan trace. Recognizing MSan output as evidence (Step 5) is still correct when a legitimate MSan instrumented build is available. **Sanitizer consistency guardrail:** the SAME sanitizer flags MUST be used for the baseline, attack, and re-attack runs — a different sanitizer can mask the bug and produce a false negative (INV-2) or false `VERIFIED_SECURE` (INV-1). See Block G. **{TARGET_ROOT} token substitution (numbered step):** 1. When writing `run_command` or `reattack_run_command`, use the literal token `{TARGET_ROOT}` for any path that references the target tree. 2. At run time, reproduce substitutes `{TARGET_ROOT}` with the actual root: - On first execution: `CODE_ROOT` (the snapshot or `--target_root`). - On re-execution (re-attack or retry): the current `CODE_ROOT` / `--target_root` / `active_snapshot.root`. 3. This ensures the stored command resolves correctly after snapshot GC — never bake an absolute `.mantis_snapshots/pass_` path into the stored command. **Execute your reproduction using the appropriate environment:** If the target is firmware, you may write a script to boot it via `qemu`, `unicorn`, or Firmadyne. If it's a binary, you may use dynamic instrumentation or standard execution. Use your best judgment to construct a working harness for the artifact. - *Parallel Trajectory Search vs. Tiered Iterative Reproduction:* - **Parallel Trajectory Search (Breadth-First):** When subagents are available, deploy concurrent workers taking diverse logical approaches to reproduce the bug. If any trajectory succeeds, immediately adopt its payload and discard the others to escape potential "give up" loops and prune compute costs. - **Tiered Iterative Reproduction (Depth-First Payload Refinement):** Each trajectory worker (or a single agent) uses a tiered escalation ladder (Tier 1 -> Tier 2 -> Tier 3) to refine its trigger payload incrementally rather than attempting a single-shot end-to-end launch. - *Tiered Iterative Execution Ladder:* - **Tier 1 (Micro-Harness / Sink Logic Validation):** Construct a lightweight test calling the vulnerable function/module directly to verify that the core bug hypothesis is sound in isolation. - **Tier 2 (Subsystem / Interface Validation):** Pass the payload through input serialization, parsers, routing, and auth wrappers to verify the input survives intermediate processing without sanitization or truncation. - **Tier 3 (Full Sandboxed Service / E2E Validation):** Execute the self-contained PoC against the target service via public APIs inside the isolated sandbox (Docker, QEMU, VM). Yields the authoritative `reproduced` verdict per Block F. - **CRITICAL STEP-4 TIER-1 HARD GATE (Fail-Closed):** - Tiers 1 and 2 are **internal stepping stones only**. You **MUST NEVER** record `repro_status = "reproduced"` or `"statically_confirmed"` based on a Tier-1 or Tier-2 execution. - If a crash can **ONLY** be achieved by compiling a direct-call harness that feeds a private/static function or bypasses the public API (Step 4), and the payload cannot be escalated to trigger through Tier 3 (the public API / sandboxed service), you **MUST TERMINATE AND RECORD** `repro_status = "failed_to_reproduce"` with details citing `"Internal Invariant Protection"`. - *Attempt Cap Accounting & Local Retries:* - **Sub-Tier-3 Stepping-Stone Sub-Budget:** Internal Tier-1 and Tier-2 trial runs are bounded local execution steps (max 3 trial executions per conversation) and **DO NOT** increment the absolute per-finding attempt counter in `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.json`. - **Absolute Attempt Cap Counting:** Only Tier-3 full sandboxed service executions (or full end-to-end reproducer runs) increment the absolute attempt counter toward the hard ceiling of 6 (Section 6). - **Intra-Conversation Retries:** When a tier fails, inspect logs, adjust payload parameters, fix harness setup, and retry up to 2-3 times within the active conversation before reporting back to the orchestrator. ### Step 3a: Variant Hunting (re-attack only, MANDATORY) When invoked with `--reattack`, you MUST author and execute **N ≥ 3 boundary-mutated variant inputs** in addition to re-running the original PoC. The schema (`schema.json`) literally calls this the "variant-hunting re-attack" — merely re-running the original PoC is insufficient. Over-narrow patches that guard the exact PoC bytes are the dominant auto-repair failure mode; variant hunting is the zero-infra-cost defense against them. **Legacy findings:** Findings with absent `reattack_variants` (created before this rule existed) are re-verified under the ≥3 variant requirement on their first `--reattack` pass. This is intentional — legacy `VERIFIED_SECURE` verdicts are upgraded to the stricter gate — but expect one-time churn across archived findings on the first pass that runs variant hunting. **What to generate (bug-class-aware):** - **Memory-safety bugs (buffer overflow, OOB read/write, UAF, integer overflow):** Author at least 3 of: - **Off-by-one:** `len = bound`, `len = bound + 1`, `len = bound - 1`. - **Size mutations:** `len ± 1`, `len = 0`, `len = SIZE_MAX`, sign flips on signed lengths. - **Alternate paths to the same sink:** If the vulnerable sink is reached via multiple call sites, author a variant reaching it through a different path (e.g., different API endpoint, file format variant, or protocol command). - **Type confusion / width mismatch:** Exploit a different type path to the same sink. - **Non-memory-safety bugs (logic, auth, injection, SSRF, path traversal):** Hunt for actual variants of the same class: - **Alternate endpoints/parameters:** Try `/api/v2/echo` when PoC targets `/api/v1/echo`, or alternate parameter names. - **Equivalent payloads:** `..%2fetc%2fpasswd`, `..\\..\\`, URL-encoding, double encoding, unicode normalization variants. - **Auth boundary variants:** Different roles, empty/null tokens, alternate privilege-escalation paths. - **Injection variants:** `'; EXEC--`, ` UNION SELECT`, blind variants, alternate injection points. - **Parallel variant generation (if subagents available):** You SHOULD spawn subagents to author and test variants in parallel. Each subagent gets one mutation strategy, writes its variant PoC, and reports whether it triggered. Aggregate all results before setting `reattack_status`. If subagents are unavailable, do them sequentially. **Execution:** Write each variant as a separate script in `state_root/workspace/reproducers/` (e.g., `reattack_variant_[uuid]_[N].py`). Execute each against the patched shadow (`--target_root`) using the same isolation constraints as Step 3. Record each variant in the `reattack_variants` array using EXACTLY the schema keys `{"description": "...", "triggered": true/false}` (Step 6). **Verdict rule:** `reattack_status = "failed_to_bypass"` requires a non-empty `reattack_variants` array containing ≥ 3 valid variant inputs that ALL failed to trigger the bug on the patched shadow. An empty or short set makes "all variants failed" vacuously true — this is FORBIDDEN: if fewer than 3 meaningful variants can be constructed after genuine effort, cap at `VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE` (history note `insufficient_variants`), NEVER `failed_to_bypass`. The `[]` case may ONLY coexist with a non-`failed_to_bypass` status (e.g., C5 baseline failure that halted before variant hunting). **Variant validity guardrail:** A variant counts as a bypass (`triggered = true` causing `bypassed_patch`) ONLY if it satisfies BOTH: 1. **Same vulnerability class:** The variant reproduces the original bug class — same sink function / sanitizer signature / crash type. A junk mutant (e.g., `len=SIZE_MAX` causing an unrelated OOM, an alternate endpoint 404-ing then erroring, or a completely different crash) does NOT count as a bypass. Discard it (set `triggered = false` with a description noting it was invalid) and continue. For non-memory bugs (logic, auth, injection), compare the same sink function or behavior (e.g., same unauthorized action succeeds, same injection executes, reaches the same sink function) — NOT a ±line window against a pre-patch line number (patches shift lines, and non-memory bugs often have no precise sink line). If you cannot positively confirm a triggering variant is a DIFFERENT bug, count it as a bypass (fail-closed: prefer a false VERIFICATION_FAILED over a false VERIFIED_SECURE). 2. **Valid input per Step 4:** The variant must be a valid exercise of the public API or internal invariants — it must not rely on artificial harness tricks (e.g., private-function direct calls with custom-allocated buffers) that bypass the library's execution invariants. Ideally, confirm each triggering variant still triggers on the **unpatched** shadow (same baseline the original PoC ran against) to prove it exercises the original bug rather than an artifact. If the unpatched shadow is unavailable (e.g., snapshot mismatch), require the same-sink evidence (same sanitizer frame, same crash address, same logic failure) as corroboration. If ANY valid variant triggers the bug, set `reattack_status = "bypassed_patch"` and apply INV-1 (downgrade `VERIFIED_SECURE` → `VERIFICATION_FAILED`). - **Reproduction Status Classification:** - **`reproduced`**: The PoC successfully triggered the vulnerability. - **`failed_to_reproduce`**: The PoC was executed but did not trigger the vulnerability. - **`statically_confirmed`**: Reproduction was impossible due to environmental constraints (e.g., missing hardware emulators, unavailable external services) but the flaw is statically obvious (e.g., hardcoded credentials). This is strongly discouraged and should only be used as a last resort. - **`not_attempted`**: The reproduction stage was skipped entirely (e.g., due to infrastructure setup failure, timeouts, or explicit skip configuration). 4. **Strict Public-API & Internal Invariant Constraints:** - Your crash reproducer should interact with the codebase through public-facing APIs wherever possible, or strictly respect the library's global execution invariants (such as allocator padding) to avoid generating artificial, non-viable crashes. - Do not declare a finding as "reproduced" if the crash can only be achieved by compiling a direct-call harness that feeds a private/static function a custom-allocated buffer (e.g., `malloc(15)`) that bypasses the library's guaranteed allocator wrappers (e.g., `png_malloc(rowbytes + 48)`). - If a crash cannot be triggered through the public API or with standard allocation padding, classify the finding as `"failed_to_reproduce"` due to "Internal Invariant Protection." 5. **Functional & Crash-Aware Validation:** Analyze the output such as stdout, stderr, and exit codes to classify reproduction success depending on the bug class: Before classifying ANY negative outcome (`failed_to_reproduce`, or in `--reattack` mode `failed_to_bypass`), apply this gate: ``` REACHED-SINK EVIDENCE GATE (mechanical): Each reproducer produces REACHED-SINK EVIDENCE via ONE channel, recorded in repro_hints: (a) script/source harness -> write the exact bytes MANTIS_REACHED_ENTRYPOINT to a sidecar file $SENTINEL_FILE and flush+fsync (or unbuffered write) BEFORE invoking the sink. (A file survives a crash that truncates buffered stdout.) (b) binary / firmware / raw-payload -> reached-sink evidence is a captured crash backtrace or sanitizer frame (ASan/UBSan/MSan/TSan) that explicitly names the target sink function (target-produced tracing). A marker written by a wrapper you author BEFORE invoking the target is SETUP EVIDENCE ONLY: it proves "launch attempted," not "sink reached," and does NOT qualify as reached-sink evidence. If no in-path marker (channel a) and no target-produced backtrace/sanitizer trace (channel b) is achievable, the sink is unreached. EVIDENCE PRESENT (reached-sink) = (channel a) sidecar file contains MANTIS_REACHED_ENTRYPOINT written in-path, OR (channel b) target-produced backtrace/sanitizer output names the sink. A wrapper pre-launch marker alone is NOT evidence present. EVIDENCE ABSENT includes: any compiler/build nonzero exit; exit 127 (command not found); exit 2 with a "No such file" message. DECISION GATE (gate the DECISION, not specific verdict strings): - Record repro_status = reproduced OR statically_confirmed ONLY if EVIDENCE is PRESENT. If ABSENT -> repro_status = not_attempted (retry-eligible), STOP. - In patch verification, EVIDENCE is required on the UNPATCHED baseline (Block G), NOT on the post-patch attack run (a correct patch legitimately stops the input before the sink). - If NO evidence channel is achievable for this target, downgrade to not_attempted / VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE. NEVER synthesize the marker. ``` Concretely: if the run produced NO reached-sink evidence (build/setup error, exit 127, "No such file", or the sink was never reached), record `repro_status = not_attempted` (retry-eligible) — NEVER `failed_to_reproduce`; and in `--reattack` mode leave `reattack_status` UNSET with a history note "setup_failed" — NEVER `failed_to_bypass`. Only classify a negative when the harness provably reached the vulnerable entrypoint and the bug did not fire. **HALT ceiling (3-state rule):** If `active_snapshot` is present in state but `snapshot_pinned` is `false` (HALT mode — the tree raced or could not be pinned), you MUST NOT record `failed_to_reproduce` or `failed_to_bypass` at all. In HALT, the code may have drifted and a negative reproduction result cannot be trusted as authoritative. Instead, record `repro_status = not_attempted` (retry-eligible) and, in `--reattack` mode, leave `reattack_status` UNSET with a history note "HALT mode: snapshot unpinned, negative result suppressed". This mirrors the authoritative-verdict prohibition that applies to all stages in HALT. (In MODE-OFF — no `active_snapshot` — classify negatives normally as today.) - **Logic & Authorization Bugs:** A successful reproducer is a functional unit test or script that explicitly demonstrates the logic failure (e.g., an unauthorized request returns `200 OK`, or a test script successfully bypasses validation and exits with `0`). - **Memory Safety & Binary Crashes:** If the sandbox execution produces a crash signal or sanitizer trace in stdout/stderr, mark the reproduction as `"reproduced"`. **Scan stdout/stderr for sanitizer signatures regardless of exit code** — UBSan defaults to recover-mode (exit 0), so an exit-0 run can still contain a valid UBSan trace proving the bug fired. Check for: - AddressSanitizer (ASan) error outputs (e.g. `ERROR: AddressSanitizer`). - UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer (UBSan) runtime reports (e.g. `runtime error:`, `SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer`). - MemorySanitizer (MSan) error outputs (e.g. `WARNING: MemorySanitizer`). **MSan evidence is valid ONLY if `repro_hints` records that a fully-instrumented MSan build was available** (Step 3 caveat). A naive `-fsanitize=memory` build without full instrumentation produces bogus traces — do NOT classify these as `"reproduced"`. - ThreadSanitizer (TSan) race reports (e.g. `WARNING: ThreadSanitizer`). - Segmentation faults (SIGSEGV, exit code `139`). - Abort signals (SIGABRT, exit code `134`). - Crash or core dumps. 6. **Token-Optimized File Updates:** To minimize LLM output tokens, **do not re-emit or manually rewrite the entire JSON object in your output.** Instead, use in-place editing tools (like a short script in your preferred language, or `jq`) to programmatically append the new fields to the existing `state_root/workspace/findings/.json` file. Additionally, you must **Update the Reproduction Attempt Cache** to help the planner track attempts efficiently: - Maintain a JSON cache file at `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.json`. Ensure the parent directory `state_root/workspace/archive/` exists (e.g., `mkdir -p state_root/workspace/archive/`) before creating, reading, or locking the cache file. - Key the cache by a stable identifier that persists across loop runs even if UUIDs are regenerated. If the finding has a `signature` field, use it directly as the cache key (it is already a deterministic content-identity hash). If `signature` is absent, fall back to a computed stable key using the finding's normalized title and its primary file path: `stable_key = normalized_title + "@" + primary_file_path`. - Compute `normalized_title` by converting the title to lowercase and removing all non-alphanumeric characters. - Compute `primary_file_path` by taking the first entry in `code_paths` and stripping any line number suffixes (e.g., converting `src/auth.c:120` to `src/auth.c`). - **Snapshot-aware cap (value shape `{count, last_snapshot}`):** store each cache value as an object `{count, last_snapshot}`. When reading a value V: if V is a bare integer, treat count=V and last_snapshot=UNKNOWN; if V is an object, use V.count / V.last_snapshot (default UNKNOWN). Before incrementing, run Block B comparing the finding's snapshot to the current SNAPSHOT_ID: reset `count=0` ONLY when Block B is NOT_MATCHED *because the two snapshots are present and actually differ* (a genuine code change earns a fresh budget). Do NOT reset on UNKNOWN (absent/`pass_`/unpinned) — that would make no-VCS targets retry forever. Additionally keep an absolute per-finding-id attempt counter that is NEVER reset, and stop retrying once it reaches a hard ceiling (e.g. 6) regardless of snapshot changes. - To prevent race conditions during concurrent executions (including locking bypasses caused by atomic file replacement) and protect lockless readers: - Use a separate dedicated lock file `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.lock` which is never deleted or replaced. - Perform updates atomically using Python's `fcntl.flock` on this lock file: * Open the lock file `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.lock` (creating it if missing) and acquire an exclusive lock (`fcntl.flock` with `fcntl.LOCK_EX`) inside a context manager (`with` statement). * Read the current contents of the cache file `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.json` (treating it as `{}` if missing or empty). * Increment the `count` field of this finding's cache-key entry — keyed by `signature` if present, else `stable_key`, the SAME key selection defined above (the `{count, last_snapshot}` object) — by 1 ONLY for Tier-3 (full end-to-end sandboxed service) executions. Internal Tier-1 and Tier-2 stepping-stone trials MUST NOT increment `count` (they are governed by the sub-budget rule in Step 3). * Write the updated JSON to a temporary file in the same directory (e.g., `state_root/workspace/archive/.repro_attempts.json.tmp`). * Atomically replace the target cache file with the temporary file (e.g., `os.replace` in Python) to ensure readers never see a truncated or incomplete file. * Close the lock file descriptor to release the lock (automatically handled by exiting the `with` context manager). Depending on whether the `--reattack` flag is provided: - **If run normally (no `--reattack` flag):** You must append or update the following on the existing object: - `"repro_status"` (`"reproduced"`, `"statically_confirmed"`, `"not_attempted"`, or `"failed_to_reproduce"`). - `"repro_file_path"` - `"run_command"` - `"repro_output"` - `"repro_snapshot_id"`: the current SNAPSHOT_ID this run executed against. - `"repro_hints"`: Record compilation and sandbox execution telemetry (e.g., `sanitizers_used: ASan+UBSan`, `assertions_disabled: true`, `build_profile: release`) to provide empirical execution evidence for `/mantis-critic`. - If reproduction succeeds (`repro_status` is evaluated as `"reproduced"` or `"statically_confirmed"`) and the finding's current `"status"` is `"PROVISIONALLY_VALID"`: BEFORE upgrading, scan the finding's `triage_checklist` (if present). If ANY entry has `outcome == "UNKNOWN"` (or `passes == false`), do NOT upgrade: leave `status` as `"PROVISIONALLY_VALID"`, still set `repro_status` to the success value (reproduction DID succeed), and append a history note `upgrade-to-VALID-blocked: triage_checklist has UNKNOWN entries (re-review required)`. This avoids violating the schema's `VALID ⇒ no UNKNOWN` allOf gate (schema.json lines 471-507), which forbids `UNKNOWN`/`passes:false` on any `VALID` non-chain finding's `triage_checklist`. Reproduce does NOT touch `triage_checklist` entries (the checklist is review's artifact; only review may resolve `UNKNOWN` entries). If `triage_checklist` is absent (no `reviewer` history entry, e.g. a legacy finding), or NO entry is `UNKNOWN`/`passes:false`, you **must** update `"status"` to `"VALID"`. - An entry to the `"history"` array: ```json { "stage": "reproduce", "action": "reproduced", "details": "Reproduction status evaluated as [reproduced/failed_to_reproduce] using command: [run_command]", "pass_number": , "timestamp": "" } ``` - **If run with `--reattack`:** You must append or update the following on the existing object (do not touch `repro_*` or `status`): - `"reattack_status"` (`"bypassed_patch"`, `"failed_to_bypass"`, `"inconclusive_baseline_changed"`). - `"bypassed_patch"`: The PoC bypassed the patch and triggered the bug. If `patch_status` is `VERIFIED_SECURE`, atomically set `patch_status = "VERIFICATION_FAILED"` in the same write (a bypass defeats the patch). This is an explicit exception to "do not touch status" and applies to both the C5 step-3 path and same-snapshot runs. - `"failed_to_bypass"`: The PoC was run but failed to bypass the patch. (No downgrade needed — `failed_to_bypass` is the value the allOf gate requires for `VERIFIED_SECURE`.) - `"inconclusive_baseline_changed"`: The unpatched baseline was re-run (see C5 below) and the bug NO LONGER TRIGGERS on the current unpatched code. Do NOT claim `failed_to_bypass`. If `patch_status` is `VERIFIED_SECURE`, atomically set `patch_status = "VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE"` in the same write. - **INV-1 (single source — the schema's `VERIFIED_SECURE` allOf gate):** `VERIFIED_SECURE => reattack_status` must be `failed_to_bypass`, and `failed_to_bypass` requires a non-empty `reattack_variants` array with ≥ 3 valid variant inputs (Step 3a) that ALL failed to trigger the bug on the patched shadow. An empty or short variant set makes "all failed" vacuously true — this is FORBIDDEN: cap at `VERIFICATION_INCOMPLETE` instead. Any other outcome MUST atomically downgrade ` …(truncated)