# Forge Authorization

> Verify deny-by-default function, object, role, tenant, and administrative authorization on every path.

- Skill: `is-bo/forge-authorization-3` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add is-bo/forge-authorization-3`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/is-bo/forge-authorization-3/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- Author: is-bo (https://skillmd.com/u/is-bo)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/is-bo/forge-authorization-3

---


# forge-authorization: Authorization

Engine: Forge native

## Purpose

Verify deny-by-default function, object, role, tenant, and administrative authorization on every path.


## Deterministic runtime composition

Before loading any provider procedure, run:

Resolve `../../runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js` relative to this `SKILL.md`, then run:

`node "<resolved-absolute-runner-path>" authorization compose --workflow audit --root "<repository-root>" --dry-run --json`

Add one repeatable `--request <provider-or-source>` flag for each explicit user request. Add
`--condition <task-condition>` or `--risk-surface <surface>` only for a task fact you directly
proved; never infer one from generic wording. The command above is the default for this
audit-oriented module; for implementation use `--workflow build`, and for a fix, retest, or
release gate use `--workflow fix`, `verify`, or `ship` respectively. Read the JSON response,
keep the Forge contract at index zero, and resolve paths against the absolute `runtime_root`
reported in that response. Read `eager[].runtimePath` when entering the module. The full
`selected[]` list is availability/provenance; load only `deferred[].runtimePath` when the task
reaches that concern, in tier order. Refuse any path that escapes the root. Respect every reported
suppression and context budget. If `missing` is non-empty, stop and report the installation as
damaged; do not improvise a prose fallback. The runner and specialist content may live in a plugin
cache or global installation; never assume they are inside the audited repository.


Resolve and read `../fullstack-forge/references/shared/module-contract.md` (applicability,
execution, mutation, verification, completion) and
`../fullstack-forge/references/shared/evidence-rules.md` (statuses, standards, tools, findings via
`../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md`) relative to this module `SKILL.md` before reporting.

Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.

## Automatic activation signals

Activate when a request or direct repository evidence involves authorization, when
the user explicitly names `forge-authorization`, or when discovery proves an applicable boundary.

- Any private, role-gated, owned, tenant, or administrative resource

## When not to activate

- Public read-only content with no hidden data or action

## Automated support

Relevant discovery inputs are:

- role inventory
- private and admin routes
- policy code and tests

Deterministic support, bounded evidence only:

- `inspect-authorization`

## Agent inspection procedure

1. Build the access-control matrix: subjects, roles, resources, and operations, derived from code rather than documentation.
2. Trace each protected route to the final data query and locate the authorization predicate at the last boundary, not only in middleware.
3. Test object-level access: substitute another subject's identifier at every ID-taking endpoint and record the enforcement evidence.
4. Check non-HTTP paths: exports, downloads, background jobs, scheduled tasks, WebSocket subscriptions, and admin interfaces for the same predicates.
5. Verify default-deny: enumerate what an unauthenticated and a minimally privileged caller can reach, and demand negative tests for every privileged operation.

Manual inspection requirements:

- Confirm intended role semantics and ownership transitions
- Review break-glass and support impersonation controls

Stack-specific guidance:

- Never rely on UI visibility as authorization; test final data access

## Evidence to collect

Standards used as criteria:

- OWASP ASVS 5.0
- OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet
- OWASP API1 and API5

## Common production failures

- Build a subject-action-resource-context matrix for critical resources
- Trace enforcement at server boundaries, jobs, exports, uploads, websockets, and indirect identifiers
- Test horizontal, vertical, tenant, stale-role, bulk, and confused-deputy cases

## Missing-control checks

Each item needs direct evidence or one reasoned status.

- Role definitions
- Permission definitions
- Default-deny behavior
- Server-side enforcement
- Resource ownership
- Object-level authorization
- Field-level authorization
- Tenant isolation
- Admin boundaries
- Staff impersonation
- Privilege escalation
- Direct object references
- Exports
- File downloads
- Background jobs
- Scheduled jobs
- WebSocket subscriptions
- API keys
- Service accounts
- Access-control matrix
- Negative tests for unauthorized reads and writes

## Commands and tools

- Run `forge authorization audit --json` or `fullstack-forge authorization audit --json` when
  an explicit audit is requested and the CLI is installed. Normal feature work does not require it.

## Safe fixes

- Centralize an existing repeated policy check without semantic change
- Add negative authorization tests

## Approval-required changes

- Changing roles, policy semantics, tenant isolation, or administrative access

## Verification

- Run the matrix with allowed and denied principals
- Verify denied attempts are safely logged without sensitive data

## Completion contract

Follow `fullstack-forge/references/shared/completion.md` and the limitations below.

## Known limitations

- Policy intent requires an authoritative owner