# Forge Security > Perform a threat-informed audit of trust boundaries, injection, secrets, browser controls, dependencies, and abuse cases. - Skill: `is-bo/forge-security-3` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add is-bo/forge-security-3` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/is-bo/forge-security-3/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Security - Author: is-bo (https://skillmd.com/u/is-bo) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/is-bo/forge-security-3 --- # forge-security: Application security Engine: Hybrid — Forge + Addy Osmani Agent Skills, Google ## Purpose Perform a threat-informed audit of trust boundaries, injection, secrets, browser controls, dependencies, and abuse cases. ## Deterministic runtime composition Before loading any provider procedure, run: Resolve `../../runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js` relative to this `SKILL.md`, then run: `node "" security compose --workflow audit --root "" --dry-run --json` Add one repeatable `--request ` flag for each explicit user request. Add `--condition ` or `--risk-surface ` only for a task fact you directly proved; never infer one from generic wording. The command above is the default for this audit-oriented module; for implementation use `--workflow build`, and for a fix, retest, or release gate use `--workflow fix`, `verify`, or `ship` respectively. Read the JSON response, keep the Forge contract at index zero, and resolve paths against the absolute `runtime_root` reported in that response. Read `eager[].runtimePath` when entering the module. The full `selected[]` list is availability/provenance; load only `deferred[].runtimePath` when the task reaches that concern, in tier order. Refuse any path that escapes the root. Respect every reported suppression and context budget. If `missing` is non-empty, stop and report the installation as damaged; do not improvise a prose fallback. The runner and specialist content may live in a plugin cache or global installation; never assume they are inside the audited repository. Resolve and read `../fullstack-forge/references/shared/module-contract.md` (applicability, execution, mutation, verification, completion) and `../fullstack-forge/references/shared/evidence-rules.md` (statuses, standards, tools, findings via `../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md`) relative to this module `SKILL.md` before reporting. Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not. ## Automatic activation signals Activate when a request or direct repository evidence involves application security, when the user explicitly names `forge-security`, or when discovery proves an applicable boundary. - Every production-bound application - Security-sensitive changes ## When not to activate - No exemption; scope may be reduced for non-executable documentation ## Automated support Relevant discovery inputs are: - project and architecture profile - trust boundaries - dependency and secret scan outputs Deterministic support, bounded evidence only: - `scan-secret-patterns` - `inspect-routes` - `inspect-auth-boundaries` - `inspect-authorization` - `inspect-dependencies` ## Agent inspection procedure 1. Model the attack surface from discovery: entry points, trust boundaries, secrets, and the assets behind each. 2. Trace untrusted input from every entry point to execution sinks (SQL, shell, template, deserialization, HTTP clients, file paths), recording interpolation versus binding at each sink. 3. Inspect browser-boundary controls: output encoding, CSRF protection, CORS policy, security headers, and cookie flags on the actual responses. 4. Search for secrets in code, configuration, templates, and history; verify error responses and logs do not leak internals or sensitive data. 5. Run available dependency, static, and secret scanners, separating confirmed findings from pattern matches, and check rate limiting and abuse controls on expensive or state-changing operations. Manual inspection requirements: - Review business-logic abuse and chained attack paths - Validate production-only controls with operators Stack-specific guidance: - Use framework-native escaping and query parameterization at the final sink ## Evidence to collect Standards used as criteria: - OWASP ASVS 5.0 - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - NIST SSDF ## Common production failures - Model assets, actors, entry points, trust boundaries, abuse cases, and mitigations - Inspect injection, XSS, CSRF, SSRF, deserialization, path handling, redirects, headers, CORS, secrets, logging, and denial-of-service limits - Run available dependency, static, and secret checks while distinguishing confirmed evidence from pattern matches ## Missing-control checks Each item needs direct evidence or one reasoned status. - SQL injection - NoSQL injection - OS command injection - Template injection - Expression-language injection - Header injection - CRLF injection - Log injection - CSV and formula injection - HTML injection - JavaScript injection - Cross-site scripting - CSRF - SSRF - Path traversal - Unsafe redirects - Unsafe deserialization - Request smuggling risks - CORS - Security headers - Secret exposure - Weak cryptography - Hard-coded credentials - Sensitive logging - Error leakage - Rate limiting - Denial-of-service exposure - Business-logic abuse - Authentication weaknesses - Authorization weaknesses - Admin endpoints - Debug endpoints - Internal endpoints - Dependency risks - Prompt injection - Unsafe shell execution - Race conditions - Mass assignment - Prototype pollution - ReDoS - Session attacks - OWASP ASVS, OWASP API Security, and NIST SSDF evidence ## Commands and tools - Run `forge security audit --json` or `fullstack-forge security audit --json` when an explicit audit is requested and the CLI is installed. Normal feature work does not require it. ## Safe fixes - Parameterize known trust-boundary inputs, redact secrets, and add straightforward security headers - Add allowlists and explicit size limits ## Approval-required changes - Disabling controls, rotating secrets, or changing authentication, network, or production infrastructure ## Verification - Re-run scanners and targeted exploit regression tests - Confirm every PASS has direct evidence ## Completion contract Follow `fullstack-forge/references/shared/completion.md` and the limitations below. ## Known limitations - This audit is not a penetration test and must not be represented as one