# Backoffice

> Adding, modifying, or guarding staff-only `/backoffice` features — cross-organisation admin tools gated behind `users.role === "admin"`.

- Skill: `latitude-dev/backoffice` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add latitude-dev/backoffice`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/latitude-dev/backoffice/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- Author: latitude-dev (https://skillmd.com/u/latitude-dev)
- Updated: 2026-09-10
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/latitude-dev/backoffice

---


# Backoffice (staff-only admin area)

**When to use:** Adding, modifying, or guarding staff-only `/backoffice` features — cross-organisation admin tools gated behind `users.role === "admin"`. The backoffice is where platform staff reproduce customer-reported bugs, spot-check data across tenants, and (future) impersonate users for support.

## Absolute security invariant

Non-admin users — authenticated or not — **MUST NOT** be able to access, enumerate, or fingerprint the backoffice surface. Every response is indistinguishable from hitting a random 404. This is enforced by **three independent guards**; every guard is ship-blocking on its own.

## The three guards

### 1. Route loader guard (UI layer)

`apps/web/src/routes/backoffice/route.tsx` asserts `user.role === "admin"` in `beforeLoad` and `loader`, throwing `notFound()` (**not** `redirect` or 403 — those leak the path) on failure. TanStack Start code-splitting means non-admins never fetch the backoffice chunk.

### 2. Server-function guard (RPC layer)

Every backoffice `createServerFn` handler **MUST** attach `adminMiddleware` from `apps/web/src/server/admin-middleware.ts`. The middleware fetches the session with Better Auth's cookie cache bypassed (so DB-level role demotions take effect on the next request, not 5 minutes later), rejects non-admins with `NotFoundError` (**not** 401/403 — the error shape must not fingerprint the admin surface), and injects `context.adminUserId` + `context.user` so handlers have admin identity available without re-fetching.

```ts
export const adminThing = createServerFn({ method: "GET" })
  .middleware([adminMiddleware])                    // GUARD, before input validation
  .inputValidator(inputSchema)
  .handler(async ({ data, context }): Promise<ThingDto> => {
    const client = getAdminPostgresClient()
    const result = await Effect.runPromise(
      thingUseCase(data).pipe(
        withPostgres(ThingRepositoryLive, client),  // org defaults to "system" → RLS off
        withTracing,
      ),
    )
    return toDto(result)
  })
```

Middleware runs **before** `inputValidator`, so abusive payloads get rejected one step earlier (no Zod parse overhead on non-admin probes).

**The sole exception is `stopImpersonating`**, which uses `impersonatingMiddleware` (from the same file) instead. During an active impersonation the current session's `user.role` is the *target's* role (usually `"user"`), so an admin-role check would reject the very call the admin needs to exit impersonation. `impersonatingMiddleware` gates on `session.impersonatedBy` being set and injects both `context.adminUserId` (recovered before Better Auth swaps the cookie back) and `context.targetUserId` for the audit event.

**Do not** wrap `createServerFn` in a factory (e.g. `createBackofficeServerFn = (opts) => createServerFn(opts).middleware([...])`). TanStack Start's Vite plugin detects server functions by pattern-matching the literal `createServerFn(...).handler(inlineFn)` chain at the call site — a factory hides those tokens behind a different name, the compiler skips the file, and Node-only module-level imports (`withTracing`, `getAdminPostgresClient`, …) leak into the browser bundle, breaking `pnpm build` with `MISSING_EXPORT` errors against `@repo/observability/browser.ts`. Keep `createServerFn` literal at every call site and attach the middleware there; the `.middleware(…)` method is part of the chain the compiler recognises. Attaching at each call site also keeps the "which guard does this endpoint use?" decision visible in the handler body — important because `stopImpersonating` uses a different middleware than the rest.

The route loader in `routes/backoffice/route.tsx` cannot use `createServerFn` middleware (route loaders aren't server functions). It calls `requireAdminSession()` from `admin-auth.ts` instead — same underlying fresh-session + role check, just exposed as a plain async helper. Both helpers share `assertAdminUser` and `getFreshSession`.

### 3. Database access guard

Admin queries run through `getAdminPostgresClient()` (`apps/web/src/server/clients.ts`), a pool on the separate `LAT_ADMIN_DATABASE_URL` superuser secret. `withPostgres` defaults the organisation scope to `OrganizationId("system")`, which is the only sanctioned signal to skip the RLS `set_config('app.current_organization_id', …)` call (see `packages/platform/db-postgres/src/sql-client.ts`). Admin handlers have **no organisation context** — passing one into `withPostgres` from a backoffice handler is a bug.

## Package layout

```
@domain/admin
  src/
    <feature>/                   # one folder per feature (search, users, ...)
      *-result.ts | entity.ts    # Zod schemas + types
      *-repository.ts            # port (class … extends ServiceMap.Service<…>)
      *.ts                       # use-case(s)
      *.test.ts                  # pure use-case tests with fake ports
      index.ts                   # feature barrel
    index.ts                     # re-exports every feature
```

Keep `@domain/admin` as **one** package with feature folders — do **not** split into `@domain/admin-search`, `@domain/admin-users`, etc. Features share enough scaffolding (policy, audit, RLS-bypass) that splitting causes churn without benefit.

Web-app per-feature split mirrors the package:

```
apps/web/src/domains/admin/
  <feature>.functions.ts         # createServerFn handler(s) + DTOs (guard = first line)
  <feature>.functions.test.ts    # input-schema tests
```

Routes live at `apps/web/src/routes/backoffice/<feature>/` (using `route.tsx` / `index.tsx`, **not** `_layout.tsx` — the `_` prefix contributes no URL segment and would collide with `_authenticated/index.tsx` on `/`).

## Adapter discipline

Admin repository adapters (e.g. `AdminSearchRepositoryLive` in `@platform/db-postgres`) run queries **without** an `organization_id` filter. This is only safe because the admin client + `"system"` scope bypasses RLS. Every admin adapter source file carries a header warning explaining the wiring contract — copy that pattern when adding new adapters.

## Error discipline

- `NotFoundError`, **not** `UnauthorizedError`, for every admin guard failure.
- No 401/403/redirect responses anywhere — all refusals look identical to a 404.
- Don't log messages that mention "admin" or "role" at the error path — error shapes/messages fingerprint the surface.

## Roles

- **`users.role`** is the global platform-staff flag (`"user" | "admin"`). DBA-only (Better Auth `additionalFields.role` declares `input: false`).
- **`members.role`** is per-organisation (`"owner" | "admin" | "member"`). **Different concept.** A user who is `members.role = "admin"` of their own org has **zero** backoffice access.

## Tests

- **Use-case tests** (`@domain/admin`): pure functions + fake ports via `Layer.succeed(Port, stubImpl)`. No DB.
- **Adapter tests** (`@platform/db-postgres`): PGlite via `setupTestPostgres()`; drive through `withPostgres(Live, pg.adminPostgresClient)` to match production admin wiring.
- **Guard tests** (`apps/web/src/server/admin-auth.test.ts`): cover admin / user / null / undefined / missing-role, and assert the error shape does not fingerprint the admin surface.
- **Server-function tests**: exercise the exported input schema, not the RPC runtime. The guard is already covered by `admin-auth.test.ts` — don't reassert it per handler.