# Independent Review

> Use when security, auth, billing, concurrency, data integrity, or another high-stakes artifact needs adversarial review by a provider other than its author.

- Skill: `lawzava/independent-review` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 2 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add lawzava/independent-review`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/lawzava/independent-review/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Security
- Author: lawzava (https://skillmd.com/u/lawzava)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/lawzava/independent-review

---


# Independent Review

Use model review for residual uncertainty after executable checks. State artifact
intent and acceptance boundary. Same-provider review provides context separation.
The lead owns remediation and reruns the oracle.

## Trusted review path

The operator supplies the reviewer family and exact command from the capability
registry or user instruction. Never guess. Inspect a file or immutable commit
range before any external call.
Set `review_tool` to the installed `scripts/megapowers-review.go` beside this `SKILL.md`, not a project copy.

```bash
reviewer_cmd='<reviewer CLI and arguments>'   # {prompt_file} and {scratch_dir} expand
go run "$review_tool" inspect --file path/to/file \
  --provider <reviewer-family> --provider-command "$reviewer_cmd"
go run "$review_tool" inspect --base <base-revision> --head <head-revision> \
  --provider <reviewer-family> --provider-command "$reviewer_cmd"
```

The inspection prints the binary path and hash, the command, each chunk's
package hash, and one `approval_token`. Check them, then approve only that
exact package, binary, and command with the author's family declared:

```bash
go run "$review_tool" review --file path/to/file \
  --provider <reviewer-family> --provider-command "$reviewer_cmd" \
  --author <author-family> --approve-external "$approval_token"
```

Author and provider labels must differ and name real vendor families. The
prompt arrives on stdin unless the command names `{prompt_file}`. Credentials
pass only through `--provider-env NAME`. Large ranges split into at most 16
directory-grouped chunks. A preflight probe fails fast on login, usage-limit,
or stall before any artifact bytes leave the machine.

External dispatch sends artifact bytes to another vendor. Confirm the user
authorized that egress for this artifact; a review mandate alone does not
authorize disclosure. A dispatch waiting on a permission prompt or provider
stall is blocked: surface it and ask; do not wait silently.

Any file or provider-binary change or command change requires a new inspection.
Pass `--approve-external` only after checking the disclosure's paths, bytes,
source identity, command, and hashes. Receipts are private and advisory, not an approval gate or
tamper-proof attestation. The transcript is not retained by default. Use
`--retain-transcript` only after a sensitive-data decision. Treat the review
verdict as a claim. Record credible findings, and explain dismissed findings
against the artifact intent. Fix as the single writer, then rerun the
artifact's acceptance tests after every material change.

Bound correction rounds. Review fixes and affected boundaries; repeat full
review only for new evidence. Join every requested review before completion.
Approval cannot settle a queued review.

The default receipt stays under private Git metadata. An explicit `--out` must
already exist as an absolute canonical directory outside the repository and may
not contain it.