# Architectural Invariants

> Catalog of cross-cutting architectural invariants that code must respect. Use when designing, implementing, or reviewing features that involve shared resources, persistence, or I/O symmetry. Ask each catalog question against the change.

- Skill: `ms2sato/architectural-invariants` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add ms2sato/architectural-invariants`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/ms2sato/architectural-invariants/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- Author: ms2sato (https://skillmd.com/u/ms2sato)
- Updated: 2026-09-10
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/ms2sato/architectural-invariants

---


# Architectural Invariants

This skill is a catalog of **meta-invariants** — cross-cutting architectural rules whose violation produces a characteristic class of bugs. Each invariant is stated abstractly, then followed by detection heuristics, concrete examples, and resolution patterns.

## How to Use

1. **During design/implementation**: for each invariant, ask "does this change interact with this invariant?" If yes, verify the invariant holds.
2. **During review**: mechanically walk the catalog against the change. Any "maybe" is a question to raise with the author.
3. **In acceptance check**: the Orchestrator explicitly checks each applicable invariant before approving a PR.
4. **When evaluating Issue alternatives**: if the Issue offers multiple "acceptable" implementation choices, walk the catalog against EACH alternative — not just the chosen one. The walk may surface a structural reason to reject one alternative the Issue author considered acceptable. Stating "both acceptable" in an Issue is a hint to verify, not a license to skip the walk. (Sprint 2026-04-30 PR #738 — Issue #735 listed `|| echo` and `test -d .git &&` as both acceptable; an upfront I-7 Enumeration Exhaustiveness walk against alternative #2 found that `.git` is a *file* in linked worktrees, making `test -d` a silent skip — the alternative was rejected before implementation.)

The catalog is deliberately short. Each entry is a high-leverage pattern whose violation is easy for humans to miss and hard to catch with per-file review.

---

## I-1. I/O Addressing Symmetry

**Rule.** For any persistent resource that is both written and read, the functions that determine *where to write* and *where to read* must produce the same value for the same identity — or their divergence must be explicit and justified.

**Important caveat.** "Write address = read address" is the *common* case, but not universal. Legitimate asymmetric designs include:

- **Primary/replica databases** — writes go to the primary, reads can go to replicas. Convergence is eventual, bounded by replication lag. The asymmetry is a conscious durability/performance trade-off.
- **Write-through caches** — writes hit both cache and backing store; reads can come from either. Consistency is enforced by the write path.
- **CQRS / event sourcing** — the command side writes to an event log; the query side reads from a denormalized projection built from that log. The two storage shapes differ by design.
- **Append-only logs with index** — appends go to the log file; reads can use an index that points into the log. Two different physical structures, one logical resource.
- **Sharded / partitioned storage** — the identity is hashed to pick a shard for both write and read, but different identities go to different physical locations.

The invariant is not "address must be textually equal" — it is "**for the same identity, the read must find the data that was written, modulo the consistency model the design explicitly commits to**". Asymmetry is fine when documented and bounded. Accidental asymmetry is the bug.

**Why it matters.** If the write-address and read-address diverge for the same identity *without an explicit consistency model*, you get silent fragmentation: writes go to location A, reads come from location B. The system "works" on the write side (no error), but reads return stale or missing data. Every reconnection/restart amplifies the problem.

### Domains where this applies

| Domain | Write side | Read side |
|--------|-----------|----------|
| Filesystem | `writeFile(path)` | `readFile(path)` — paths must converge per identity |
| Database | `INSERT INTO table_a` | `SELECT FROM table_b` — table identity must match |
| Cache | cache write key | cache read key |
| Message queue | publish topic | subscribe topic |
| Distributed storage | write consistency level + target | read consistency level + target |
| Cookie/Auth | `Set-Cookie` domain/path | request cookie scope |
| Log aggregation | log sink | query source |
| URL scheme | redirect URL | receiver URL |
| Memory / mmap | write offset calculation | read offset calculation |

### Detection heuristics

1. **Grep for pairs.** For every write-side call (`writeFile`, `INSERT`, `cache.set`, `publish`, etc.), find the corresponding read-side call (`readFile`, `SELECT`, `cache.get`, `subscribe`). Is the addressing function the same? If computed, do both compute identically?
2. **Silent fallback in addressing.** Any `?? defaultPath` or `|| fallbackKey` in the function that computes an address is a red flag — it means the address can differ based on runtime state.
3. **Multiple constructors for the same addresser.** If `new PathResolver(...)` or `new KeyBuilder(...)` appears in many places with different arguments, check that the arguments always resolve to the same value for the same identity.
4. **Divergence across restarts.** Does the addressing function depend on mutable runtime state (repo name, config, cache)? Across a server restart, does the *same identity* still yield the *same address*? If not — flag.
5. **Divergence across instances.** In multi-instance deployments, does the addressing function produce the same value on every instance for the same identity?

### Resolution patterns

- **Single source of truth.** One function (or module-level helper) computes the address. Everyone else calls it. No inline address construction.
- **Persist the address (or a stable key).** Don't recompute from possibly-drifting inputs on every access. Compute once at creation, persist, read forever.
- **Brand the type.** Use a type name that encodes the stability contract (e.g., `CanonicalOutputPath` vs generic `string`). Reviewers notice when that type is assembled by hand.
- **Explicit asymmetry.** If write and read addresses legitimately differ (primary/replica, write-through cache), make the asymmetry explicit in types and document the invariant that governs their convergence (eventual, bounded, etc.).

### Example: fragmentation bug caught by this invariant (static path)

Issue [#631](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/issues/631). Worker output files fragmented across three directories because `SessionDataPathResolver` re-looked up `repositoryName` on each construction, silently fell back to `_quick/` when the lookup returned undefined. Writes and reads both went through the resolver, but the resolver produced different paths depending on when it was called.

**Review question that would have caught it**: *"The `getOutputFilePath(sessionId)` function is called on both the write side (PTY output flush) and the read side (history reconnect). Does it always return the same value for the same sessionId, across server restarts?"*

The answer at the time was "no" — and that single question surfaces the entire class of bug.

### Example: offset semantic divergence (dynamic coordinate)

Issue [#762](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/issues/762) / [#769](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/issues/769), fixed in PR [#770](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/pull/770). Same path was used by both sides; both sides agreed on the resource. The asymmetry was in the **offset coordinate within the resource**:

- Server's `worker.outputOffset` counted **bytes since the current PTY activation** (cumulative-from-activation, reset to `0` on every revival).
- Client's IndexedDB cache persisted **file-absolute byte position** (the offset that the server had previously sent at the *previous* activation, before the counter reset).

On revival, the server counter restarted from 0, the client's next `request-history` fed back its persisted file-absolute offset, and the comparison `fromOffset > server.cumulative` triggered the "fresh fetch" path on the server — which line-limited-replayed ~87% of the file as a fake "history" payload. Symptom: the disguised 100% reload on session switch.

The fix aligned both sides on the **file-absolute** semantic at PTY activation time: revival paths seed `worker.outputOffset` from the persisted file size before spawning the PTY (`revived: boolean` flag threaded through `activateAgentWorkerPty` / `activateTerminalWorkerPty`).

**Review question that would have caught it**: *"The `outputOffset` value flows from server PTY output to client cache and back via `request-history`. Does the same numeric value mean the same byte position on both sides, after every PTY (re-)activation?"*

The answer at the time was "no" — and that single question surfaces the same class of bug as #631, just at the dynamic-coordinate layer rather than the static-path layer.

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] For any persistent resource written and read in this change, the address used to write it with identity X matches the address used to read it back for the same X, across server restarts → integration test covering write → restart → read round-trip
- [ ] If the resource also has an internal coordinate (offset, index, sequence number) shared between sides, the numeric value at write time and read time references the same byte / position / record, across PTY (re-)activations and server restarts → integration test covering activate → write → reactivate → read round-trip

---

## I-2. Single Writer for Derived Values

**Rule.** If a value is computed from inputs via a rule, exactly one function implements that rule. All other code that needs the value calls that function — never reimplements the computation.

**Why it matters.** Duplicated computation drifts. Ten callers, ten subtly different copies of the logic → each evolves independently → silent behavior divergence. Especially dangerous when the computation involves path joining, key derivation, URL building, timestamp formatting, etc.

### Detection heuristics

1. **Grep for similar expressions.** If `path.join(config, 'subdir', id)` appears in 3+ places, someone is rolling their own copy of a computation.
2. **Inline `?? default` in computation.** If the default differs between call sites, the function is not canonical.
3. **Absence of an exported helper.** If no module exports `compute<Thing>(inputs)`, callers are duplicating.

### Resolution patterns

- **Extract a helper.** Name it what it computes (`computeSessionDataBaseDir`).
- **Make the helper the only writer.** Document it. Add a test. Add a grep-based invariant check to CI if the pattern is safety-critical.

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] The derived value (path/key/URL/ID) computed in this change is produced by exactly one exported helper; all callers import that helper rather than reconstructing the value inline → unit test plus repo-wide grep confirming no duplicate computation

---

## I-3. Identity Stability Across Time

**Rule.** A value that identifies a resource (sessionId, userId, filePath-from-identity, DB primary key) must remain stable across the resource's entire lifetime — including server restarts, process crashes, DB restores, and config migrations.

**Why it matters.** Identifiers are used in client caches, URL bookmarks, cross-system references. If the identifier changes for the same underlying resource, every consumer that cached the old identifier is broken.

### Detection heuristics

1. **Identifier computed from mutable state.** If `id = f(configRoot, userName, timestamp)` and any input can change, the identifier is not stable.
2. **Identifier derived from volatile runtime state.** Uptime, process PID, random number without persistence → not stable.
3. **Re-keying on rename.** Renaming a repository, user, or file should not change the identifier of things that reference it.

### Resolution patterns

- Generate identifiers at creation (UUID or similar), persist them, never recompute.
- Treat names/slugs as mutable aliases, identifiers as immutable keys.

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] Identifiers issued by this change remain resolvable after server restart, config migration, and renaming of any mutable aliases (names, slugs) → integration test asserting identifier survives the relevant lifecycle events

---

## I-4. State Persistence Survives Process Lifecycle

**Rule.** Any state the user expects to survive a server restart MUST be persisted to durable storage before the operation that produced it returns success.

**Why it matters.** In-memory state is lost on crash/restart. If a user sees "success" for an operation but the state was only in memory, they've been lied to.

### Detection heuristics

1. **Success returned before persistence commits.** The flow returns 2xx or resolves a Promise before the DB write or fsync.
2. **Fire-and-forget writes.** `void persist(data)` without awaiting the result.
3. **Buffered writes without flush-on-shutdown.** Write-through caches or write buffers that don't drain on SIGTERM.

### Resolution patterns

- Await persistence before returning success.
- Register shutdown handlers that drain buffers.
- Test the crash/restart round-trip explicitly.

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] The operation returns success only after its result is committed to durable storage (not merely enqueued or in-memory); a forced process kill immediately after success must not lose the data → unit test with forced I/O failure plus crash/restart round-trip test

---

## I-5. Server as Source of Truth

**Rule.** Application state that affects behavior visible to other users (session status, worker output, templates, memos, etc.) lives on the server. Client state is either a cache of server state or purely transient UI state (dark mode, scroll position).

**Why it matters.** When the client owns state that should be shared, multi-device/multi-session flows break. Refreshes lose data. Collaboration becomes impossible.

### Detection heuristics

1. **`localStorage.setItem` holding user-meaningful data.** Templates, drafts, session config → should be server-backed.
2. **Client-generated IDs that are never reconciled server-side.** Client creates a UUID, uses it, but the server doesn't know.
3. **Optimistic writes that never confirm.** No error path if the server rejects.

### Resolution patterns

- Server is the single source for user-meaningful state.
- Client caches are clearly labeled as such (invalidation, TTL, refetch logic).
- `localStorage` restricted to transient UI preferences.

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] User-meaningful state introduced by this change is persisted via a server API; reloading the browser, switching devices, or opening a second session shows the same state. `localStorage` is used only for transient UI preferences (if at all) → integration test covering reload/cross-session consistency

---

## I-6. Boundary Validation

**Rule.** Any value crossing a trust boundary (user input, external API response, job payload reconstructed after persistence, cross-process IPC) is validated before use.

**Why it matters.** Values from outside are not type-safe even if TypeScript says they are. A corrupted DB value can still type-check as `string`. A job payload from disk can contain any bytes. Trust the type system only for values that never left your process.

### Detection heuristics

1. **External data deserialized without a schema.** `JSON.parse(body)` used without `v.parse(Schema, ...)`.
2. **Filesystem paths derived from untrusted input without boundary check.** `path.join(userInput, ...)` can escape the intended directory.
3. **Numeric or enum fields read from DB without validation.** DB corruption silently becomes application state.

### Resolution patterns

- Validate with Valibot (or equivalent) at every trust boundary.
- For filesystem paths, resolve and then assert `startsWith(allowedRoot)`.
- For IDs coming from external sources, verify they exist in the expected registry.

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] Every value crossing a trust boundary in this change (user input, external API response, persisted-then-reread payload, cross-process IPC) is validated with a schema before use; invalid input is rejected with a clear error rather than poisoning downstream state → unit test with malformed/corrupted input asserting explicit rejection

---

## I-7. Enumeration Exhaustiveness

**Rule.** When a value has **multiple valid shapes or formats** (e.g. `org/repo` and `repo`, signed and unsigned identifiers, optional-prefix URLs, nullable and non-nullable variants of the same concept), every code path — validation, persistence, serialization, rendering, round-trip — covers ALL shapes, and every shape is exercised by at least one test.

**Why it matters.** When the "default" shape is the one developers think about, the other shapes silently take the else branch. The else branch is often wrong (unhandled), but there is no error because the code type-checks and runs. The only signal is a user reporting "this feature doesn't work for my case." That is often discovered long after the code ships.

### Domains where this applies

| Situation | Shape 1 | Shape 2 (often forgotten) |
|-----------|---------|---------------------------|
| Repository name (this project) | `org/repo` | `repo` (local-only) |
| User identifier | internal UUID | external-provider ID |
| URL | `https://` | `//` (protocol-relative) or `wss://` |
| Timestamp | unix ms | ISO string |
| Path | absolute | relative |
| Session type | `worktree` | `quick` |
| Enumeration with DEFAULT | known cases | unknown/future case (`default:` branch) |

### Detection heuristics

1. **Domain model mentions "or"** — if a concept is described as "A or B", every code path touching it needs both branches. Grep for "or" / "either" / "depending on" in design docs.
2. **Optional-slash or optional-prefix regex** — `/^[a-z]+(\/[a-z]+)?$/` implies two shapes. Every call site consuming the matched value must handle both.
3. **Test fixtures use only one shape** — if every test uses `"org/repo"`, the `"repo"` shape is uncovered.
4. **Migration / persistence mapping forgets a case** — a backfill that handles `type='worktree'` must also handle `type='quick'`.

### Resolution patterns

- **Discriminated unions in types.** Force exhaustive handling at compile time; the `never` check in a `default` catches missed shapes.
- **Table-driven tests.** One test table, one row per shape. Missing rows are visible.
- **Shape documented alongside the type.** If a schema or type allows multiple shapes, the documentation lists them explicitly and says which is preferred / default.
- **Grep-based invariant at review time.** For fields with known shape variety, reviewers walk each shape against each call site.

### Example: caught by this invariant

During Sprint 2026-04-17, Issue #638 introduced `data_scope_slug` with grammar `^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+(\/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+)?$` — permitting both `org/repo` and `repo` shapes. Initial acceptance check did not explicitly confirm both shapes. Owner asked "does this handle repo-only names too?" which prompted explicit verification. Tests did cover both shapes (good), but the orchestrator did not self-initiate that question. If I-7 had been in the catalog at acceptance-check time, the question would have been posed mechanically.

**Review question that would have surfaced it mechanically:** *"What is the full enumeration of valid shapes for this value? For each shape, is there a test? For each call site, does it handle all shapes?"*

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] The value shapes introduced or touched by this change are enumerated explicitly in the PR description; each shape has at least one test exercising it; all consumer call sites handle each shape — no silent fallback to the "default" one → unit/integration test per shape

---

## I-8. Shared-Resource Artifact Lifetime

**Rule.** When code writes an artifact (symlink, config file, registered handler, hook, daemon registration, package metadata) whose readers outlive the writer's invocation context, every embedded reference inside the artifact must resolve via an anchor whose lifetime is at least as long as the longest reader's lifetime.

If any embedded reference resolves to an ephemeral context (the install-time `cwd`, a temp directory, a worktree that may be removed, a per-session ID), the artifact silently breaks when that context disappears.

**Why it matters.** The failure mode is **silent**. The artifact stays in place; the OS / git / package manager does not error on dangling references; the next reader simply sees nothing or skips the artifact. The only signal is the absence of expected behavior, often noticed long after the disappearance.

This is distinct from I-3 (Identity Stability): I-3 asks whether an *identifier value* keeps pointing to the same resource across time; I-8 asks whether an *embedded reference* inside a written artifact remains *reachable* under context teardown.

### Domains where this applies

| Domain | Artifact (persistent) | Embedded reference (must outlive readers) |
|---|---|---|
| Git hooks | symlink/copy in `<common-dir>/hooks/` | source path the symlink targets |
| Daemon registration | systemd / launchd unit file | absolute path to the binary, working dir, env files |
| Package manager | `package.json` `bin` field, lock file | absolute paths to bundled scripts |
| Log forwarder config | aggregator config | absolute paths to log files / sockets |
| OS-level integration | URL handlers, cron entries | paths to executables they invoke |

### Detection heuristics

1. **Trace `path.resolve(<relative>)` and `process.cwd()` to a write site.** If the resolved path ever flows into a `writeFile` / `symlinkSync` / config-file write that targets a location whose readers outlive the writer, the resolved path becomes a *stored* reference. Stored references must not be cwd-bound.
2. **`path.resolve(<relative>)` is cwd-anchored.** Any helper using `path.resolve(<relative>)` produces a value tied to the running process's cwd at call time. If that value is then written into a persistent artifact, the artifact captures the cwd at install time.
3. **Lifetime ≤ comparison.** For each embedded reference, classify it: `cwd-anchored` (process lifetime), `worktree-anchored` (until that worktree is removed), `globally-stable` (until the repo / system is uninstalled). Confirm: `embedded-reference lifetime ≥ artifact lifetime ≥ longest-reader lifetime`.

### Resolution patterns

- **Resolve via canonical helper.** Replace `resolve(<relative>)` with a helper that resolves against a stable canonical anchor (e.g., `git rev-parse --git-common-dir` then `dirname` for git, `os.homedir()` for user-level installs, `__dirname` of a checked-in script for monorepo-relative anchoring).
- **Self-contained copy fallback.** If the artifact must be self-contained, copy the source content into the artifact rather than embedding a path.
- **Lazy resolution.** Write the artifact with a placeholder (e.g., `${REPO_ROOT}` token) that the reader expands at read time against its own context.
- **Relative reference where the shared location is stable.** A relative reference inside the artifact is correct iff the location's containing path is itself stable across the embedded reference's resolution context.

### Example: caught by this invariant

PR [#725](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/pull/725) introduced `scripts/install-hooks.mjs` which wrote a symlink into `<common-dir>/hooks/commit-msg`. The symlink target was computed via `path.resolve(SOURCE_REL)` — cwd-anchored. When agents ran `bun run hooks:install` from inside their per-task linked worktree, the symlink target embedded that worktree's path. After merge the worktree was removed; the symlink became dangling and **git silently skips broken hooks**. The language gate the hook enforced was disabled with no error signal.

Issue [#728](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/issues/728) surfaced the bug. PR [#729](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/pull/729) fixed it via `git rev-parse --git-common-dir`. PR [#738](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/pull/738) reinforced the invariant by wiring `bun install` postinstall + worktree-aware setup so the artifact installs from the main worktree consistently.

**Review question that would have caught it mechanically:** *"For each path / handle / identifier embedded inside this artifact, what is its lifetime? Is it ≥ the artifact's longest-lived reader?"*

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] For every artifact written to a location whose readers outlive this PR's invocation context, the embedded references resolve via globally-stable anchors (not cwd-bound or worktree-anchored); a teardown of the install-time context must not break the artifact → integration test exercising install → install-context-teardown → read-from-different-context

---

## I-9. No Silent Drop of Pre-Attach Events

**Rule.** Data or events that arrive while no handler/listener is attached yet must be **buffered** (bounded, flushed on first attach) or **fail loudly** (throw, ERROR log). A guard that silently discards them — `if (listener) { deliver } // else: nothing` — is prohibited.

**Why it matters.** The failure mode is **silent and timing-sensitive**. The guard looks defensive when written; in reality it converts an early event into an unobservable non-event. The code works in every environment where the producer is slower than the consumer's attach (slow spawn chains, loaded machines, synthetic tests that emit after attaching), and fails only where the producer is fast (a direct spawn emitting within milliseconds) — presenting as "the event never happened" with zero diagnostic signal. No error is logged, nothing crashes, downstream state simply never advances.

Two structural traps make this worse than an ordinary race:

1. **A synchronous JS span cannot close the window when the callback is registered natively.** If the callback is passed as an argument to the creation call itself (`Bun.spawn({ terminal: { data } })`, a constructor option, an FFI registration), the native side holds it *before the creation call returns*, while the wrapper object the callback consults is assigned only *after*. "There are no awaits between spawn and attach" is then an argument about the wrong window — its safety rests on an unverifiable assumption about when the native layer may invoke the callback (`os-environment-coupling.md`'s forbidden should-work reasoning).
2. **The correct implementation often already exists for a sibling event on the same object.** One event type gets late-attach replay because a hang was noticed; another gets the silent guard because a drop was not. The asymmetry hides in plain sight.

### Domains where this applies

| Domain | Producer | Pre-attach window |
|---|---|---|
| PTY / subprocess output | native `data` callback | between spawn and adapter/listener attach |
| Process exit events | `exited` promise / exit callback | between exit and `onExit` attach (the solved sibling — replay pattern) |
| WebSocket / socket messages | `message` events | between open and `onmessage` attach |
| Event emitters with replace semantics | single-listener `on*` setters | between construction and first setter call |
| Queue / stream consumers | delivery callbacks | between subscribe-at-create and handler wiring |

### Detection heuristics

1. **Grep the guard shape.** `if (listener)` / `if (handler)` / `handler?.(...)` inside a delivery callback, with no else-branch that stores the payload, is the signature. Ask: where does the payload go when the guard is false?
2. **Callback-as-creation-argument.** Any callback passed into the creating call itself is live before your wrapper exists. Trace what it consults, and what happens while that is still null/undefined.
3. **Sibling-event comparison (the discovery path that found the incident below).** For every event type on the same object (`data` / `exit` / `error` / `close`), compare their late-attach handling side by side — `grep` sibling call sites in the same file. One replaying while another drops is the bug, and the replaying one is your in-file reference implementation for the fix.
4. **"Works on the slow path, fails on the fast path" reports.** An environment asymmetry where the failing configuration has the *shorter* producer startup (direct vs elevated spawn, local vs remote, warm vs cold) is this invariant's field signature.

### Resolution patterns

- **Bounded buffer, flush on first attach.** A capped buffer (keep the FIRST bytes — early data is usually the valuable data — count what is dropped past the cap) shared by every window, flushed in arrival order through the same decode path as live data on the first attach only; freed on flush and on dispose. **Copy payloads at buffer time** if the producer may reuse its callback buffer (`.slice()`, not `.subarray()` — a view can be corrupted before flush).
- **Synchronous replay-on-attach** for one-shot events (exit): if the event already fired, invoke the newly attached listener immediately, with a double-fire guard.
- **Loud failure** where buffering is genuinely wrong: throw or ERROR-log so the drop is observable.
- **Watchdog for the residual.** Where downstream silently waits on the event (a gate that swallows output until a sentinel), add a bounded timer that converts indefinite silence into an ERROR carrying delivery diagnostics.

### Example: caught (late) by this invariant

Issue [#1242](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/issues/1242), fixed in PR [#1243](https://github.com/ms2sato/agent-console/pull/1243). The default PTY provider's `data` callback (passed as a `Bun.spawn` argument — trap 1) dropped chunks while `adapter === null`, and the adapter's `_emitData` dropped them again while `dataListener === null`. The same adapter's `onExit` **already implemented late-attach replay with a double-fire guard** — the correct pattern for the sibling event lived in the same file (trap 2), found by the sibling-grep heuristic. Production symptom: MCP `delegate_to_worktree` on macOS created every resource but the agent never started — the login-shell sentinel was emitted within milliseconds on the direct spawn path and lost in the pre-attach window, leaving a 0-byte output log with no error anywhere. The same code passed 3/3 on Ubuntu, where the elevated spawn chain's login-shell init delays the sentinel past every window. Fix: a shared bounded pre-attach buffer created *before* `Bun.spawn` (closing both windows with one flush), copy-on-push after a review round found the buffered views could alias the producer's reusable buffer, plus a sentinel watchdog. The owner-environment checkpoint confirmed the windows were the cause.

**Review question that would have caught it mechanically:** *"For every event callback this change registers or consumes: what happens to an event that fires before the first handler is attached — buffered, replayed, or silently dropped? Do all sibling events on the same object answer the same way?"*

### Suggested acceptance criterion template

- [ ] For each event/data callback introduced or consumed, pre-attach delivery is either buffered (bounded, copy-on-push, flush-on-first-attach, freed on dispose) or loudly rejected — never silently dropped; a deterministic test emits before attach and asserts byte-identical delivery after attach (and fails against a silently-dropping implementation); sibling events on the same object are audited for late-attach symmetry

---

## How to Add New Invariants

A new entry to this catalog should satisfy all of:

1. **Cross-cutting.** Applies across files, packages, or domains — not specific to one feature.
2. **High-leverage detection.** Knowing the pattern transforms "how would I even notice this?" into a mechanical check.
3. **Named failure mode.** You can describe the bug class in one sentence.
4. **At least one concrete past incident.** A real bug (from this project or common knowledge) that the invariant would have caught.

Format: `I-<N>. <Short name>`, followed by rule, why, detection heuristics, resolution patterns, concrete example.

## Integration With Other Skills

- `code-quality-standards` — per-code-unit quality (SRP, readability, etc.). Complementary: this skill is about cross-unit invariants.
- `test-standards` — how to test. Complementary: this skill names what MUST be tested (e.g., identity stability across restart).
- `orchestrator/acceptance-check.js` — runs this catalog as a required question during acceptance.
- `orchestrator/delegation-prompt.js` — injects relevant invariants into the agent's task prompt based on Issue content.