# hunting-advanced-persistent-threats

> Proactively hunts for Advanced Persistent Threat activity using hypothesis-driven searches across endpoint telemetry, network logs, and memory artifacts.

- Skill: `mukul975/hunting-advanced-persistent-threats` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 4 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds add mukul975/hunting-advanced-persistent-threats`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/mukul975/hunting-advanced-persistent-threats/raw
- Safety review: CAUTION (external: skill-scanner PASS, skillspector PASS)
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Security, Incident Response
- Tags: Apt, Mitre Attack, Osquery, Sigma, Splunk, Threat Hunting, Velociraptor, Zeek
- License: Apache-2.0
- Author: mukul975 (https://skillmd.com/u/mukul975)
- Updated: 2026-07-06
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/mukul975/hunting-advanced-persistent-threats

---

# Hunting Advanced Persistent Threats

## When to Use

Use this skill when:
- Conducting proactive threat hunting sprints (typically 2–4 week cycles) based on newly published APT intelligence
- A UEBA alert or anomaly detection system flags behavioral deviations warranting deeper investigation
- A peer organization or ISAC sharing partner reports active APT compromise and you need to validate your own exposure

**Do not use** this skill as a substitute for incident response when a confirmed breach is in progress — escalate to IR procedures (NIST SP 800-61).

## Prerequisites

- EDR platform with telemetry retention (CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, or SentinelOne) covering 30+ days
- Access to MITRE ATT&CK Navigator for hypothesis development
- Network flow data (NetFlow, Zeek, or Suricata logs) in a queryable SIEM
- Threat hunting platform or query interface (Velociraptor, osquery fleet, or Splunk ES)

## Workflow

### Step 1: Develop Hunt Hypothesis

Select a threat actor relevant to your sector using MITRE ATT&CK Groups (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/). Review the group's known TTPs mapped to ATT&CK techniques. Example hypothesis: "APT29 (Cozy Bear) uses spearphishing with ISO attachments (T1566.001) and living-off-the-land binaries (T1218) — test for unusual mshta.exe and rundll32.exe parent-child relationships."

Document hypothesis using the Threat Hunting Loop framework: hypothesis → data collection → pattern analysis → response.

### Step 2: Identify Required Data Sources

Map each ATT&CK technique to required log sources using the ATT&CK Data Sources taxonomy:
- Process creation (T1059): Windows Security Event 4688 or Sysmon Event ID 1
- Network connections (T1071): Zeek conn.log, NetFlow, EDR network telemetry
- Registry modifications (T1547): Sysmon Event ID 13, Windows Security 4657
- Memory injection (T1055): EDR memory scan telemetry, Volatility output

Verify log coverage using ATT&CK Coverage Calculator or a custom data source matrix.

### Step 3: Execute Hunts with Velociraptor or osquery

**Velociraptor VQL hunt** for unusual PowerShell execution:
```vql
SELECT Pid, Ppid, Name, CommandLine, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ "powershell.exe"
AND CommandLine =~ "-enc|-nop|-w hidden"
```

**osquery** for persistence via scheduled tasks:
```sql
SELECT name, action, enabled, path
FROM scheduled_tasks
WHERE action NOT LIKE '%System32%'
AND enabled = 1;
```

**Splunk SPL** for lateral movement via PsExec:
```spl
index=windows EventCode=7045 ServiceFileName="*PSEXESVC*"
| stats count by ComputerName, ServiceName, ServiceFileName
```

### Step 4: Analyze Results and Pivot

For each anomaly identified, pivot across dimensions:
- Temporal: Did this occur before or after known IOC timestamps?
- Host: How many endpoints exhibit this behavior?
- User: Is the associated account a service account, privileged user, or regular user?
- Network: Does the host communicate with external IPs not in baseline?

Apply the Diamond Model (adversary, capability, infrastructure, victim) to structure findings.

### Step 5: Document and Operationalize Findings

If hunting reveals confirmed malicious activity, activate IR procedures. If hunting reveals a gap (hunt found nothing but data coverage was insufficient), document the coverage gap and remediate.

Convert successful hunt queries into SIEM detection rules using Sigma format for portability across platforms.

## Key Concepts

| Term | Definition |
|------|-----------|
| **TTP** | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures — adversary behavioral patterns as defined in MITRE ATT&CK |
| **Diamond Model** | Analytical framework with four vertices (adversary, capability, infrastructure, victim) used to structure intrusion analysis |
| **Living-off-the-Land (LotL)** | Attacker technique using legitimate OS tools (PowerShell, WMI, certutil) to evade detection |
| **UEBA** | User and Entity Behavior Analytics — ML-based detection of anomalous behavior baselines |
| **Sigma** | Open standard for SIEM-agnostic detection rule format, analogous to YARA for network/log detection |
| **Hunt Hypothesis** | A testable prediction about adversary presence based on threat intelligence and environmental knowledge |

## Tools & Systems

- **Velociraptor**: Open-source DFIR platform with VQL query language for scalable endpoint hunting across thousands of systems
- **osquery**: SQL-based OS instrumentation framework for real-time endpoint telemetry queries
- **MITRE ATT&CK Navigator**: Web-based tool for visualizing ATT&CK coverage and technique prioritization
- **Zeek (formerly Bro)**: Network traffic analyzer producing structured logs (conn, dns, http, ssl) suitable for hunting
- **Elastic Security**: EQL (Event Query Language) enables sequence-based hunting for multi-stage attack patterns
- **Sigma**: Detection rule format with translators for Splunk, QRadar, Sentinel, and Elastic

## Common Pitfalls

- **Confirmation bias**: Starting a hunt expecting to find something and interpreting benign data as malicious. Document null results — they validate controls.
- **Insufficient data retention**: Many APT techniques require 90+ days of log history to identify slow-and-low patterns. Default retention periods are often too short.
- **Hunting without baselines**: Cannot identify anomalies without knowing normal. Spend time on baseline documentation before hunting.
- **Query performance impact**: Broad queries against production SIEM during business hours can degrade analyst workflows. Schedule intensive hunts during off-peak hours.
- **Ignoring false positives systematically**: Track false positive rates per query. Queries with >80% FP rate should be refined or retired before operationalization.