# hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion

> Hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion activity that indicates ransomware preparation or anti-forensics by monitoring vssadmin, wmic, and PowerShell shadow copy commands.

- Skill: `mukul975/hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 8 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds add mukul975/hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/mukul975/hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion/raw
- Safety review: PASS (external: skill-scanner PASS, skillspector PASS)
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Security, Coding & Dev Tools, Incident Response
- Tags: Edr, Powershell, Ransomware, Shadow Copy, Siem, Sysmon, Vssadmin, Wmic
- License: Apache-2.0
- Author: mukul975 (https://skillmd.com/u/mukul975)
- Updated: 2026-07-06
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/mukul975/hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion

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# Hunting For Shadow Copy Deletion

## When to Use

- When proactively hunting for indicators of hunting for shadow copy deletion in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

## Prerequisites

- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation

## Workflow

1. **Formulate Hypothesis**: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
3. **Execute Queries**: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
4. **Analyze Results**: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
5. **Validate Findings**: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
6. **Correlate Activity**: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.

## Key Concepts

| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery |
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact |
| T1485 | Data Destruction |

## Tools & Systems

| Tool | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |
| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |
| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |
| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |
| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |

## Common Scenarios

1. **Scenario 1**: Ransomware deleting shadow copies before encryption
2. **Scenario 2**: vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet pre-encryption
3. **Scenario 3**: WMIC shadowcopy delete via PowerShell
4. **Scenario 4**: bcdedit disabling recovery mode before impact

## Output Format

```
Hunt ID: TH-HUNTIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1490
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]
```

