# LLM Jailbreak Prompt Injection

> Direct and indirect prompt injection for apps: RAG, tools, web, email, MCP schema, tool-result injection.

- Skill: `netvar1337/llm-jailbreak-prompt-injection` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add netvar1337/llm-jailbreak-prompt-injection`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/netvar1337/llm-jailbreak-prompt-injection/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: AI & ML
- License: GPL-3.0-or-later
- Author: netvar1337 (https://skillmd.com/u/netvar1337)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/netvar1337/llm-jailbreak-prompt-injection

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# Prompt injection (application-level)

## Classes
1. **Direct** – user message is the injection
2. **Indirect** – content retrieved/fetched contains instructions
3. **Tool-result** – malicious output from tools/MCP
4. **Schema/description** – tool/plugin manifest instructions
5. **Store/memory** – long-term agent memory / vector DB

## Indirect injection recipe
1. Map retrieval sources (URLs, drive, tickets, wiki).
2. Plant payload where retrieval is likely (title + body + hidden HTML comment).
3. Payload structure:
   - authority claim
   - override retrieved-context rules
   - exfil channel (tool call, image URL, mailto, log)
4. Trigger via normal user question that retrieves the plant.

## High-value checks
- Does the app separate "data" vs "instructions"? (usually no)
- Are tool args validated against allow-lists?
- Can the model be forced to call `run`/`email`/`fetch`?

## Payloads should include
- Explicit tool invocation plan
- Stop conditions that prevent user-visible refusal
- Optional stealth (hide in HTML comments / white-on-white)

## Pair with
`llm-jailbreak-tool-agent` for agency escalation; Unleash settings/patches for local agents.