# Security Review > Security review and audit guidance for concrete code, config, docs, and command-surface changes. Use when implemented changes touch authentication, authorization, crypto, certificates, tokens, signatures, secrets, passwords, sessions, session cookies, CORS, CSP, CSRF, OAuth/OIDC/SAML, redirect/callback handling, input validation, file paths, command execution, or other trust boundaries. Pair with code-review for review findings; use threat-modeling for design-time boundary analysis and dependency-supply-chain-review for supply-chain-specific review. - Skill: `nledford/security-review` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add nledford/security-review` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/nledford/security-review/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Security - Author: nledford (https://skillmd.com/u/nledford) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/nledford/security-review --- # Security Review Use this skill to review implemented security-sensitive changes without exposing secrets or overstating unverified risk. It is the broad concrete-change audit skill: pair it with [`code-review`](../code-review/SKILL.md) for review finding format and with [`security-review-evidence`](../security-review-evidence/SKILL.md) for sanitized evidence handling. ## Use When - Implemented authentication, authorization, permissions, roles, tenancy, sessions, session cookies, MFA, recovery flows, or invite flows change. - Cryptography, certificates, TLS, signatures, hashes, password handling, tokens, API keys, OAuth/OIDC/SAML, redirect/callback handling, webhooks, nonces, or key rotation change. - Input crosses a trust boundary: HTTP, forms, GraphQL/RPC, CLI args, environment variables, files, uploads/downloads, archives, plugins, extensions, templates, Markdown/HTML, SQL, shell commands, SSR, browser storage, or network calls. - CORS, CSP, CSRF, SSRF, path traversal, deserialization, sandboxing, logging, telemetry, or secret redaction is relevant. - A Tauri application changes its frontend-to-Rust IPC, registered commands or events, capabilities, WebView/window scope, plugins, filesystem or shell access, deep links, updater, or remote-content policy. Treat these as concrete trust boundaries; load [`rust-desktop-gui`](../rust-desktop-gui/SKILL.md) for native framework context. - Dependency, supply-chain, provenance, SBOM, advisory, install-script, or lockfile evidence is part of a broader concrete security audit. For photo/video DAM changes involving media parsing, imports, sharing, metadata, derivative caches, or retention, compose with [`digital-asset-management`](../digital-asset-management/SKILL.md). Treat GPS, face/person tags, camera identifiers, timestamps, captions, and audio as potentially sensitive data. Do not use this skill as a generic style review for code with no trust boundary, secret, identity, privilege, untrusted input, or security control. Use ordinary code review instead. Do not use it as the primary workflow for design-time security modeling or supply-chain-only review; route those surfaces as below. ## Routing and Handoffs - Use [`threat-modeling`](../threat-modeling/SKILL.md) for preparatory design work: actors, assets, data flows, trust boundaries, STRIDE/abuse cases, mitigations, security requirements, assumptions, and residual risk before controls are implemented. Return to this skill when implemented controls or reportable findings need evidence. - Use [`dependency-supply-chain-review`](../dependency-supply-chain-review/SKILL.md) when the primary question is dependency, SBOM/SCA, CVE/GHSA, package or binary provenance, registry trust, lockfile churn, install/postinstall hooks, generated or vendored code, CI actions, containers, base images, checksums, or signatures. Bring confirmed supply-chain risk back here only when it affects a wider concrete security audit. - Use [`csharp-dotnet-engineering`](../csharp-dotnet-engineering/SKILL.md) for ordinary C# source, .NET project, NuGet, SDK/MSBuild, restore/build, and test mechanics. Load this skill and [`security-review-evidence`](../security-review-evidence/SKILL.md) when .NET, ASP.NET Core, or EF Core code implements or changes a concrete trust boundary; route executable package or build inputs through [`dependency-supply-chain-review`](../dependency-supply-chain-review/SKILL.md) before execution. - Use [`ci-release-engineering`](../ci-release-engineering/SKILL.md) for CI and release workflow implementation, and [`container-engineering`](../container-engineering/SKILL.md) for Docker/OCI and Compose implementation. Add this skill when permissions, secrets, OIDC, untrusted events, command injection, mounts, ports, capabilities, sockets, or other trust boundaries need concrete security review. - For OAuth/OIDC/SAML, identity-provider, session-cookie, CSRF, redirect URI, token lifetime, scope/audience, signature, or key-rotation changes, inspect repository policy first and then current provider/protocol documentation before judging compliance. Consult current official documentation for provider SDKs, libraries, CLIs, and APIs when needed; cite only sanitized, review-relevant facts instead of turning the review into a protocol tutorial. - Use [`api-design`](../api-design/SKILL.md) for API-contract shape: resources, operations, request/response/error envelopes, versioning, compatibility, public docs, and generated specs. Load this skill for API work only when the contract or implementation touches auth, authorization, scopes, CORS/CSRF/CSP, redirects/callbacks, input validation, webhooks/signatures, sensitive data exposure, rate limits, abuse controls, or other trust-boundary behavior. - Use [`observability-engineering`](../observability-engineering/SKILL.md) for log, trace, metric, dashboard, alert, SLO, or runbook design. Load this skill for telemetry work only when signals can expose secrets, credentials, PII, tenant data, auth/session artifacts, exploit payloads, or when they serve as security monitoring controls or report evidence. - Use [`security-review-evidence`](../security-review-evidence/SKILL.md) whenever raw artifacts, exploit proof, browser state, auth traces, scanner output, or other sensitive evidence must be captured, sanitized, retained, or cleaned up. ## Workflow 1. Inspect repository policy first: `SECURITY.md`, `AGENTS.md`, threat models, auth docs, deployment docs, CI security jobs, dependency policy, and review templates. For auth protocols or providers, also inspect current provider/protocol docs relevant to the changed repository behavior. 2. Scope the implemented boundary: actors, assets, entry points, trust levels, data classes, permissions, storage, external services, and attacker-controlled inputs. If this becomes design-time modeling, route to `threat-modeling`. 3. State the intended security property before judging code: who may do what, which data must remain confidential/integral, what must be authenticated, what must be rate-limited, and what must be auditable. 4. Read the full path: caller, middleware, validation, business rule, storage, logging, error handling, tests, config, docs, and deployment assumptions. 5. Verify controls with tests, policies, config checks, dependency or protocol evidence from the routed specialist skill, or concrete code evidence. Do not report speculative vulnerabilities. 6. Keep raw browser and security artifacts local and ignored by default. Share or retain only sanitized artifacts when repository policy or explicit approval allows it, and capture the security evidence for that exception. 7. Sanitize evidence and clean temporary security artifacts. Never print secrets, cookies, tokens, private keys, raw credentialed URLs, `.env` contents, or private host paths. 8. Report findings through the code-review format with severity calibrated to exploitability, blast radius, data sensitivity, and existing mitigations. ## Review Checklist - **Authn/authz:** identity is established by trusted middleware; authorization is checked server-side at the object/action boundary; tenant and role checks cannot be bypassed by direct IDs, cache hits, background jobs, or client-only guards. - **Auth protocols and sessions:** OAuth/OIDC/SAML, identity-provider, and session-cookie changes follow repository policy and current provider/protocol docs; redirect/callback URIs are exact and environment-appropriate; CSRF, state/nonce, replay, and request-correlation controls are not disabled; token lifetimes, refresh behavior, scopes, audiences, issuers, subjects, tenant claims, signature algorithms, JWKS/certificates, and key rotation expectations are verified from local config, code, tests, and sanitized docs evidence. - **Secrets and sessions:** tokens, cookies, credentials, key material, and session IDs are generated with secure randomness, scoped, rotated where needed, revoked or destroyed when no longer valid, stored safely, redacted from logs, kept out of backups and artifacts, and cleaned up after fixture/test use. - **Crypto:** use vetted libraries and current repository conventions; do not invent algorithms, modes, padding, key derivation, signing formats, or random sources. Compare signatures and tokens with constant-time APIs when relevant. - **Input validation:** untrusted input is parsed, bounded, canonicalized, and validated before use. Validation errors are safe externally and actionable internally. - **Filesystem containment and races:** define an explicit symlink policy rather than assuming every link is safe or forbidden. Check for TOCTOU between path validation and open/use: an attacker may swap a link or replace its target after a lexical check. Enforce containment at open/use time with descriptor-/handle-relative, no-follow, or equivalent APIs where available; concrete APIs remain language-owned. Lexical path resolution is not proof of symlink-safe containment. Add proportionate link-swap and target-replacement tests for the exposed risk. - **SSRF and outbound requests:** parse and canonicalize request targets before policy checks; allow only intended schemes and destinations. Revalidate DNS and resolved addresses at connection time to address rebinding, and deny loopback, private, link-local, and provider metadata targets unless explicitly required. Revalidate every redirect, enforce egress where the deployment can enforce it, do not forward credentials by default, and bound response time, size, and redirects. Account for proxies, service meshes, dual-stack DNS, and platform-specific metadata/egress controls in the deployed environment. - **Injection and execution:** SQL, shell, paths, templates, HTML, Markdown, archive extraction, plugin loading, and command arguments use structured APIs or strict allowlists rather than string concatenation. - **Web controls:** CORS, CSP, CSRF, cookies, redirects, SSR, browser storage, uploads/downloads, and cache headers fit the threat model and deployment origin layout. - **Data and logs:** sensitive data is classified, minimized, encrypted where required, retained intentionally, and excluded from telemetry, screenshots, traces, videos, network dumps, downloads, reports, exceptions, and test artifacts. - **Dependencies and supply chain:** new packages, binaries, scripts, generated code, lockfile changes, and install hooks route through [`dependency-supply-chain-review`](../dependency-supply-chain-review/SKILL.md) for provenance, checksum/signature, scanner, and install-script evidence before this skill reports broader security impact. - **Auth evidence boundaries:** never paste raw cookies, authorization codes, access/ID/refresh tokens, SAML assertions, CSRF/session values, private keys, signed payloads, credentialed callback URLs, private tenant/user identifiers, or provider console screenshots. Prefer redacted claim names, TTLs, scope/audience names, redirect URI patterns, key IDs/thumbprints, test names, config paths, and current-doc citations allowed by repository policy. - **Security artifacts:** traces, screenshots, videos, storage state, HAR/network dumps, downloads, reports, logs, dependency audit output, temporary databases, export files, and reproduced exploit payloads stay local and ignored by default; sanitized copies are retained or shared only under documented policy or explicit approval with security-review evidence. ## Language and Surface Prompts - **Python:** check subprocess use, path handling, deserialization, template rendering, dependency changes, async blocking at boundaries, and exception logs. - **Ruby:** check process invocation, paths, dynamic loading, deserialization, templates, metaprogramming boundaries, gem sources, and exception/log output. - **PowerShell:** check native-command arguments, `Invoke-Expression`, paths, remoting, credentials, execution policy assumptions, module sources, `SupportsShouldProcess`, and transcript/output exposure. - **JavaScript/TypeScript:** check XSS, SSR, package scripts, HTML/Markdown rendering, cookies, browser storage, CORS/CSRF, and dependency install scripts. - **Rust:** check unsafe boundaries, `unwrap`/panic at trust boundaries, async task leakage, path handling, crypto/random crates, SQLx/SeaQuery binding, and error-to-response mapping. - **C#/.NET/ASP.NET Core/EF Core:** review implemented authentication, authorization, tenancy/data isolation, session and cookie handling, endpoint and request-input validation, CORS/CSRF/CSP, redirects, file paths and uploads, deserialization, outbound requests, secrets/configuration, command execution, logging, and sensitive error exposure. For EF Core data access, verify that authorization and tenant constraints are enforced at the applicable object and data boundary and that query, migration, and connection behavior does not weaken confidentiality, integrity, or least privilege. Capture only sanitized evidence with [`security-review-evidence`](../security-review-evidence/SKILL.md). Route ordinary C#/.NET package and project mechanics to [`csharp-dotnet-engineering`](../csharp-dotnet-engineering/SKILL.md), and route packages, imported MSBuild targets/tasks, analyzers, generators, templates, workloads, `dotnet` tools, and restore/build hooks to [`dependency-supply-chain-review`](../dependency-supply-chain-review/SKILL.md) before execution. - **PHP/Piwigo:** check superglobal, request, and form validation; context-specific template/HTML escaping; sessions and CSRF; authorization for admin/plugin endpoints and event handlers; file/upload/path containment; unsafe deserialization and dynamic loading; parameterized SQL; outbound requests; secrets; and exception/log disclosure. Load [`php-engineering`](../php-engineering/SKILL.md) for PHP mechanics and [`piwigo-plugin-engineering`](../piwigo-plugin-engineering/SKILL.md) for host integration. - **SQL/PostgreSQL/SQLite:** check injection, privileges, RLS/policies, least privilege, migration data exposure, constraints, and auditability. - **Browser tests/artifacts:** use raw screenshots, traces, videos, storage state, HAR/network dumps, downloads, reports, credentialed URLs, cookies, CSRF/session values, or live data only for local ignored debugging. Retain or share only sanitized derivatives when documented policy or explicit approval permits it, and include [`security-review-evidence`](../security-review-evidence/SKILL.md) for the sanitization, access, and cleanup record. ## Verification Expectations - Prefer repository-owned security tests, policy checks, dependency audits, and integration lanes over generic scanner output. - Add or request regression coverage for confirmed vulnerabilities when practical. - When a control cannot be verified locally, report the exact missing evidence and residual risk rather than claiming safety. - When artifact cleanup cannot be verified, report the artifact class, expected cleanup, attempted cleanup, reason verification failed, residual exposure risk, and follow-up owner/process without exposing raw paths or contents. - Security-sensitive randomness and identifiers should follow [`random-data-identifiers`](../random-data-identifiers/SKILL.md). ## Anti-Patterns - Printing secrets while trying to prove they are not exposed. - Treating client-side validation, hidden form fields, or UI routing as an authorization boundary. - Replacing structured APIs with escaped strings for SQL, shell, HTML, paths, or templates. - Adding crypto, auth, or token code without tests or current library docs. - Reporting hypothetical vulnerabilities without a plausible attacker path, affected asset, and evidence from the repository. ## Zod Boundary Review For selected Zod work, load [`zod-engineering`](../zod-engineering/SKILL.md). Parsing is not authorization or sanitization: review coercion, transforms, refinements/codecs, pre-parse size/depth/count limits, and safe stable errors.