# Clickjacking > UI redressing — missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors, frame-buster bypass, drag-and-drop, cursorjacking, double-clickjacking, and sensitive-action framing. - Skill: `purpleailab/clickjacking` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add purpleailab/clickjacking` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/purpleailab/clickjacking/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Security - Author: purpleailab (https://skillmd.com/u/purpleailab) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/purpleailab/clickjacking --- # Clickjacking Playbook Framing a sensitive UI under an attacker page lets a single victim click trigger a privileged action (delete account, transfer funds, grant OAuth scope, confirm 2FA). Severity = severity of the framed action. Pages without `X-Frame-Options` *and* without `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors` are framable. ## 1. Detection — framing controls ```bash # Inspect headers on every sensitive page (settings, transfer, oauth/consent, delete, admin) for path in / /account /account/email /account/delete /transfer /oauth/authorize /admin; do echo "== $path ==" curl -s -D- -o /dev/null "https://$path" \ | grep -iE "x-frame-options|content-security-policy" done # Quick "is it framable?" probe — save to disk, open in a browser cat > /tmp/cj.html <<'EOF' frame test EOF # If the iframe renders the target UI → framing allowed. ``` Server-side allow: - no `X-Frame-Options` header **and** - no `frame-ancestors` directive in `Content-Security-Policy` (or `frame-ancestors *` / overly broad). ## 2. Misconfig matrix | Class | Server behaviour | Exploit | |---|---|---| | No XFO, no CSP frame-ancestors | full framing allowed | classic overlay | | `XFO: ALLOW-FROM` only | ignored by modern browsers | full framing in Chromium/Firefox | | `frame-ancestors *` | explicit allow-all | full framing | | `frame-ancestors 'self' *.target.com` | trusts every subdomain | host PoC on a takeable subdomain | | Frame-buster JS only (`if (top!=self) top.location=self.location`) | client-side defense | `sandbox="allow-forms allow-scripts"` (no `allow-top-navigation`) defeats it | | 204-frame-buster | response replaces self | ` ``` ### 3.1 Drag-and-drop CJ ```html
Drag me to win
``` ### 3.2 Double-clickjacking (browser confirm dialog) ```html ``` ## 4. Chains - **CJ + OAuth consent** → silent scope grant → API takeover. - **CJ + CSRF-token leakage** → click triggers a state change that reads token from the framed page. - **CJ + self-XSS** → coerce victim to paste/drag the payload into a framed input. - **CJ + 2FA confirm** → step-up auth confirmed under a lure click. ## 5. Tools - Burp Suite — *Clickbandit* (point-and-click PoC generator) - **clickjacker.io** / OWASP **Clickjacking Tester** - Manual: any HTML editor + a browser with frame ancestors disabled in dev ## 6. Detection signatures & OPSEC | Indicator | Detection method | OPSEC note | |---|---|---| | Framing from foreign origin | server-side referer logging | Host PoC on in-scope domain during authorized tests | | Sudden spike in sensitive actions w/ short dwell time | UX analytics | Demonstrate impact with a single victim profile | | Browser console CSP report-only violations | CSP report-uri | Validate prod CSP, not staging | ## Decision Gate: clickjacking confirmed → exploitation - [ ] Target lacks `X-Frame-Options` and effective `frame-ancestors` - [ ] Frame-buster (if any) bypassed via `sandbox` / CSP tricks - [ ] A security-relevant action (delete, grant, transfer, confirm) is reachable in one or two clicks - [ ] PoC visually demonstrates the lure → action mapping If all checked, escalate per `finding-protocol`; otherwise downgrade to informational (framable but no sensitive action).