# Supplychain Overview

> Supply-chain attack category — dependency confusion, typosquatting, package-registry abuse, build-pipeline poisoning, SBOM manipulation.

- Skill: `purpleailab/supplychain-overview` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add purpleailab/supplychain-overview`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/purpleailab/supplychain-overview/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: DevOps & Infra
- Author: purpleailab (https://skillmd.com/u/purpleailab)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/purpleailab/supplychain-overview

---


# Supply-Chain Exploitation — Category Overview

This is a **routing skill** for supply-chain attack research. Sub-skills cover specific techniques against the dependency, build, and distribution layers.

## Sub-Skills

| Sub-Skill | Covers | When to Load |
|---|---|---|
| **dep-confusion** | Public-registry impersonation of private package names, scoped-package abuse (`@org/pkg`), internal-name OSINT (lockfiles, GitHub Actions, Dockerfiles, error pages) | Target uses private npm/PyPI/RubyGems/Cargo registries and you've discovered internal package names in public artifacts | `load_skill("/skills/standard/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md")` |

## Surface Discovery

```bash
# Lockfiles often expose private package names that aren't on public registry
grep -hE '"name":|"@.+/' package-lock.json yarn.lock pnpm-lock.yaml | sort -u
# pip
grep -E '^[a-z0-9_-]+' requirements.txt
# go.mod
grep '^\s*[a-z0-9./_-]\+\s' go.mod
# Maven
grep -A1 '<artifactId>' pom.xml | grep -v '^--$'
```

## Decision Notes

- Always confirm scope authorization in writing before publishing any package, even a benign one, to a public registry. Some bounty programs explicitly disallow public-registry submissions.
- Use a beacon-only payload (DNS callback, HTTPS GET) for confirmation; never ship code that mutates the target environment without an explicit follow-up authorization.
- Real damage from confusion attacks is usually post-install scripts (`postinstall`, `setup.py install`) — focus PoCs on benign callbacks, not RCE.
- For build-pipeline poisoning (workflow injection, branch protection bypass) see `/skills/standard/exploit/ad/SKILL.md` (CI-as-AD-equivalent paths) and the broader threat-modeling under `/skills/shared/opsec/SKILL.md`.