# Netguard Nids Eval

> Evaluates a generative active adaptation framework for network intrusion detection under concept drift and class imbalance. It probes the model's ability to select informative samples, generate synthetic minority-class data, and maintain high detection performance across shifting temporal and spatial domains with limited labeling budgets. Use when the user wants to benchmark on CIC-IDS (2017/2018), UGR'16, or asks about evaluating this task. Reports F1-score.

- Skill: `qhjqhj00/netguard-nids-eval` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds add qhjqhj00/netguard-nids-eval`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/qhjqhj00/netguard-nids-eval/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: AI & ML
- Author: qhjqhj00 (https://skillmd.com/u/qhjqhj00)
- Updated: 2026-09-08
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/qhjqhj00/netguard-nids-eval

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# netguard-nids-eval

> Generative Active Adaptation for Drifting and Imbalanced Network Intrusion Detection — Ragini Gupta et al. (2025) (arXiv:2503.03022, 2025)

## What this evaluates

Evaluates a generative active adaptation framework for network intrusion detection under concept drift and class imbalance. It probes the model's ability to select informative samples, generate synthetic minority-class data, and maintain high detection performance across shifting temporal and spatial domains with limited labeling budgets.

## Datasets

- **CIC-IDS (2017/2018)** — total 100000; splits: train (70000), test (30000)
- **UGR'16** — total 100000; splits: train (70000), test (30000)

## Metrics

- `F1-score` **(primary)** — range: percent
  - Harmonic mean of precision and recall: 2 * (Precision * Recall) / (Precision + Recall). Reported as a percentage across all classes and per rare class.
- `FPR` — range: [0, 1]
  - False Positive Rate: FP / (FP + TN). Measures the proportion of actual benign flows incorrectly classified as attacks.
- `FNR` — range: [0, 1]
  - False Negative Rate: FN / (TP + FN). Measures the proportion of actual attacks incorrectly classified as benign.
- `Accuracy` — range: percent
  - Proportion of correctly classified instances: (TP + TN) / Total.
- `AUROC` — range: [0, 1]
  - Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve. Measures the model's ability to distinguish between classes across all classification thresholds.

## Input / output format

**Input**: Tabular network flow feature vectors (e.g., packet counts, protocol types, duration, flags) from CIC-IDS or UGR'16 datasets.

**Output**: Predicted attack class label (e.g., Benign, Bot, DDoS, DoS variants, FTP-BruteForce, Infiltration, SSH-Bruteforce, Web Attack) and confidence scores for uncertainty-based sampling.

## Scoring recipe

```python
from sklearn.metrics import f1_score, accuracy_score
def score(y_true, y_pred):
    f1 = f1_score(y_true, y_pred, average='macro') * 100
    acc = accuracy_score(y_true, y_pred) * 100
    return {'F1': f1, 'Accuracy': acc}
```

## Common pitfalls

- The labeling budget (0.1%, 0.5%, 1%) applies strictly to the *test* dataset size, not the training set.
- The 70/30 split is used for both source and target domains in bidirectional drift scenarios (2017→2018 and 2018→2017), which fundamentally changes the distribution shift direction.
- Synthetic augmentation is applied only to specific rare classes (DoS Slowhttptest, FTP-BruteForce, Infiltration, Web Attack) at 3x/10x ratios, not uniformly across all classes.

## Evidence (verbatim from paper)

> We evaluate NetGuard end-to-end performance (including prior selection and data augmentation) based on F1-score improvement under drift, FPR, FNR, Accuracy, and rare class F1 improvement.

## Citation

```bibtex
@misc{gupta2025generative,
  title={Generative Active Adaptation for Drifting and Imbalanced Network Intrusion Detection},
  author={Ragini Gupta et al. (2025)},
  year={2025},
  note={arXiv:2503.03022}
}
```

- arXiv: 2503.03022