# Web Fetch

> Fetch and extract one public web source, optionally restrict its hosts, and return the content by digest with full provenance.

- Skill: `runxhq/web-fetch` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 6 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add runxhq/web-fetch`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/runxhq/web-fetch/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- Author: runxhq (https://skillmd.com/u/runxhq)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/runxhq/web-fetch

---


# Web Fetch

Fetch one URL, prove it was allowed, extract the part the caller asked for, and
return that slice by digest with the provenance needed to trust it later.

## What this skill does

`web-fetch` retrieves a single public URL,
extracts text, metadata, or links, and seals the result so a downstream step can
cite the fetch without re-fetching. It checks the final host against the
effective host policy before and after redirects, retrieves up to `max_bytes`, and returns
the final URL, the HTTP status, a `content_digest` over the retrieved body, the
extracted slice, and a provenance block recording when it ran, every redirect
hop, and how many bytes it read. The body is referenced by digest; only the
extracted slice is inlined.

This is the primitive an agent reaches for when it has already decided which page
to read. The decision it makes easier is "can I read this page, and what did it
actually say", with the answer backed by a digest instead of a remembered
paraphrase. The calling agent decides which sources matter and synthesizes
across them; `web-fetch` retrieves exactly one source. By default it may follow
that source across any publicly routable host. Supply `allowlist` only when the
operator needs to narrow the initial request and every redirect to named hosts.

The request path is native Runx code. Skills do not supply a JavaScript HTTP
client: the runtime owns public-network enforcement, redirect admission,
timeouts, retries, byte limits, response digests, and receipt-safe evidence.

## When to use this skill

- An agent has chosen a specific page and needs its content bound to a
  `content_digest` so a later step can cite it without re-fetching.
- A research pass needs each source retrieved through one bounded public-network
  fetch with a complete redirect chain and byte count.
- A review must later prove what a page said at fetch time.
- A follow-on governed operation needs one source extracted as
  `text`, `metadata`, or `links`.

## When not to use this skill

- To judge, rank, or synthesize across sources. That remains caller reasoning;
  `web-fetch` retrieves exactly one source and refuses to reason over many.
- To reach a private, loopback, link-local, or otherwise non-public address.
- To reach a host outside an explicitly supplied `allowlist`, including a host
  reached only through a redirect.
- To write anything. The only scope is `net:allowlist`; there is no repo, file,
  wallet, or send authority here.
- To inline a large raw body. The extracted slice is the payload; the full body
  lives behind `content_digest`.
- To carry credentials, cookies, or custom authorization headers. Use the
  appropriate authenticated provider capability for those reads.

## Procedure

1. Require `url` at runner preflight. A missing target fails before the graph
   starts with the exact missing input.
2. Use `allowlist: ["*"]` when the caller omits it, meaning any publicly
   routable host. A caller-supplied allowlist narrows that default. Match the
   URL host against the effective allowlist. On a miss, return `policy_denied`
   before any network call, recording the attempted host and the allowlist it
   was checked against.
3. Fetch, following redirects, re-checking each redirect target's host against
   the same `allowlist`. A redirect that lands off-allowlist halts the fetch,
   returns `policy_denied` with the hop that failed, and discards partial
   bodies. Cap the read at `max_bytes` when set.
4. Compute `content_digest` over the retrieved body.
5. Extract per `extract`: `text` (readable body text, default), `metadata`
   (title, description, canonical, declared language, content type), or `links`
   (absolute hrefs found in the document).
6. Return `fetch_result` with the final URL, status, digest, extracted slice,
   and provenance. Flag truncated reads in provenance; never return a clipped
   read as if whole.

## Edge cases and stop conditions

- **Missing `url`:** fail runner preflight; do not start or seal an empty fetch.
- **Omitted `allowlist`:** use `["*"]`; private-network protection still applies.
- **Host off the allowlist:** stop with `policy_denied` before any network call;
  record the attempted host, not a response body (there is none).
- **Redirect off the allowlist:** halt the fetch, return `policy_denied` naming
  the hop that failed, and discard the partial body.
- **Read clipped by `max_bytes`:** flag `truncated: true` in provenance; the
  digest is over the bytes actually retrieved.
- **Large raw body:** never inline beyond the extracted slice; anything bigger
  than the requested view is reachable only through `content_digest`.
- **Authenticated source:** stop and use the relevant provider read skill; this
  public fetch does not accept credentials or custom headers.

## Output schema

```yaml
fetch_result:
  decision: ready | needs_agent | policy_denied | provider_error
  final_url: string            # URL after redirects, the one the digest is over
  status: number               # HTTP status of the final response
  content_digest: string       # digest of the retrieved body, algorithm prefix included
  extract_mode: text | metadata | links
  extracted: string | object | array   # string for text, object for metadata, array of hrefs for links
  provenance:
    fetched_at: string         # timestamp of the fetch
    redirects: array           # ordered host hops, each re-checked against the allowlist
    bytes: number              # bytes read
    truncated: boolean         # true when max_bytes clipped the read
  policy:
    allowlist_decision: allowed | denied
    attempted_host: string     # set on policy_denied
    allowlist_checked: array   # the hosts the request was checked against
```

The sealed `runx.receipt.v1` carries the final URL, status, `content_digest`,
byte count, the redirect chain, and the allowlist decision. It carries no header
values, no cookies, and no raw body beyond the digest.

## Worked example

Input: `url` of the HTTP Semantics RFC, an `allowlist` of `www.rfc-editor.org`
and `rfc-editor.org`, `extract: text`, and `max_bytes: 200000`.

Output: `decision: ready`; the host matched the allowlist before the request
left; no redirects; status `200`; `content_digest` is taken over the retrieved
body; `extracted` holds the readable text slice; provenance records
`fetched_at`, an empty redirect chain, `184302` bytes, and `truncated: false`.
The receipt seals with the final URL, status, digest, byte count, and the
allowlist decision; no header value reaches it.

## Inputs

- `url` (required): the single public HTTP(S) URL to fetch.
- `allowlist` (optional): permitted hosts or host patterns for the URL and every
  redirect target. Omit it for `["*"]`, meaning any publicly routable host.
- `extract` (optional): `text`, `metadata`, or `links`. Defaults to `text`.
- `max_bytes` (optional): cap on bytes read; a clipped read is flagged
  `truncated` in provenance.

