# Attack Ent T1003 002 Security Account Manager

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1003.002 Security Account Manager in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1003.002, Security Account Manager, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1003-002-security-account-manager` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1003-002-security-account-manager`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1003-002-security-account-manager/raw
- Safety review: pending (external: skill-scanner PASS, skillspector CAUTION)
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Security
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1003-002-security-account-manager

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1003.002: Security Account Manager

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1003.002, Security Account Manager, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1003.002
- Technique name: Security Account Manager
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002
- Tactics: credential-access
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:

* pwdumpx.exe
* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)
* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
* secretsdump.py

Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:

* <code>reg save HKLM\sam sam</code>
* <code>reg save HKLM\system system</code>

Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7)

Notes: 

* RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.
* RID 501 is the guest account.
* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Operating System Configuration
- Password Policies
- Privileged Account Management
- User Training

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
- APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign (campaign)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- APT5 (intrusion-set)
- Agrius (intrusion-set)
- C0017 (campaign)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- CosmicDuke (malware)
- CozyCar (malware)
- CrackMapExec (tool)
- Daggerfly (intrusion-set)
- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)
- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
- FIN13 (intrusion-set)
- Fgdump (tool)
- FrostyGoop Incident (campaign)
- GALLIUM (intrusion-set)
- HOPLIGHT (malware)
- IceApple (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
- Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force