# Attack Ent T1070 004 File Deletion

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1070.004 File Deletion in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1070.004, File Deletion, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1070-004-file-deletion` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1070-004-file-deletion`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1070-004-file-deletion/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1070-004-file-deletion

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1070.004: File Deletion

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1070.004, File Deletion, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1070.004
- Technique name: File Deletion
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004
- Tactics: stealth
- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include <code>del</code> on Windows, <code>rm</code> or <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS, and `rm` on ESXi.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)
- APT18 (intrusion-set)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- APT3 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 DUST (campaign)
- APT5 (intrusion-set)
- AcidPour (malware)
- Anchor (malware)
- Apostle (malware)
- AppleJeus (malware)
- AppleSeed (malware)
- Aquatic Panda (intrusion-set)
- ArcaneDoor (campaign)
- Aria-body (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Walker Johnson