# Attack Ent T1090 003 Multi Hop Proxy

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1090.003, Multi-hop Proxy, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1090-003-multi-hop-proxy` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1090-003-multi-hop-proxy`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1090-003-multi-hop-proxy/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1090-003-multi-hop-proxy

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1090.003: Multi-hop Proxy

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1090.003, Multi-hop Proxy, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1090.003
- Technique name: Multi-hop Proxy
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003
- Tactics: command-and-control
- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations.(Citation: ORB Mandiant) 

In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN).  Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.  

Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Filter Network Traffic

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- AsyncRAT (tool)
- Attor (malware)
- BOLDMOVE (malware)
- CostaRicto (campaign)
- Cyclops Blink (malware)
- Dok (malware)
- Dridex (malware)
- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
- FIN4 (intrusion-set)
- FLORAHOX Activity (campaign)
- FRP (tool)
- Gamaredon Group (intrusion-set)
- GreyEnergy (malware)
- Inception (intrusion-set)
- Industroyer (malware)
- Keydnap (malware)
- Kobalos (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Eduardo Chavarro Ovalle