# Attack Ent T1095 Non Application Layer Protocol

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1095, Non-Application Layer Protocol, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1095-non-application-layer-protocol` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1095-non-application-layer-protocol`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1095-non-application-layer-protocol/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1095-non-application-layer-protocol

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1095, Non-Application Layer Protocol, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1095
- Technique name: Non-Application Layer Protocol
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095
- Tactics: command-and-control
- Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).

ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.

In ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host’s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Audit
- Filter Network Traffic
- Network Intrusion Prevention
- Network Segmentation

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- APT3 (intrusion-set)
- Anchor (malware)
- Aria-body (malware)
- AuTo Stealer (malware)
- BITTER (intrusion-set)
- BUBBLEWRAP (malware)
- BackdoorDiplomacy (intrusion-set)
- Bandook (malware)
- Bisonal (malware)
- Brute Ratel C4 (tool)
- C0021 (campaign)
- COATHANGER (malware)
- Carbon (malware)
- Clambling (malware)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- Crimson (malware)
- Cryptoistic (malware)
- Cuckoo Stealer (malware)
- Cutting Edge (campaign)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Ryan Becwar
- Duane Michael