# Attack Ent T1134 001 Token Impersonation Theft

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1134.001, Token Impersonation/Theft, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1134-001-token-impersonation-theft` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1134-001-token-impersonation-theft`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1134-001-token-impersonation-theft/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1134-001-token-impersonation-theft

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1134.001: Token Impersonation/Theft

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1134.001, Token Impersonation/Theft, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1134.001
- Technique name: Token Impersonation/Theft
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001
- Tactics: privilege-escalation, stealth
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`.(Citation: DuplicateToken function) The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

An adversary may perform [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.

When an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002) using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) is also distinct from [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Privileged Account Management
- User Account Management

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- Aria-body (malware)
- BADHATCH (malware)
- BitPaymer (malware)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- Emotet (malware)
- FIN8 (intrusion-set)
- FinFisher (malware)
- Fooder (malware)
- Havoc (malware)
- HomeLand Justice (campaign)
- LP-Notes (malware)
- Okrum (malware)
- Pupy (tool)
- REvil (malware)
- SILENTTRINITY (tool)
- Shamoon (malware)
- Siloscape (malware)
- Stuxnet (malware)
- Tarrask (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Jonny Johnson