# Attack Ent T1189 Drive By Compromise

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1189 Drive-by Compromise in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1189, Drive-by Compromise, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1189-drive-by-compromise` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1189-drive-by-compromise`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1189-drive-by-compromise/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1189-drive-by-compromise

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1189: Drive-by Compromise

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1189, Drive-by Compromise, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1189
- Technique name: Drive-by Compromise
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189
- Tactics: initial-access
- Platforms: Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)), including:

* A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code
* Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary
* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008))
* Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting)

Browser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). By clicking "allow" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.(Citation: Push notifications - viruspositive)(Citation: push notification -mcafee)(Citation: push notifications - malwarebytes)

Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)

Typical drive-by compromise process:

1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.
2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.
3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.
4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.

Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Application Isolation and Sandboxing
- Exploit Protection
- Restrict Web-Based Content
- Update Software
- User Training

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- 3CX Supply Chain Attack (campaign)
- APT19 (intrusion-set)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT37 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- Andariel (intrusion-set)
- Axiom (intrusion-set)
- BRONZE BUTLER (intrusion-set)
- Bad Rabbit (malware)
- Bundlore (malware)
- C0010 (campaign)
- CURIUM (intrusion-set)
- Daggerfly (intrusion-set)
- Dark Caracal (intrusion-set)
- Darkhotel (intrusion-set)
- Dragonfly (intrusion-set)
- Earth Lusca (intrusion-set)
- Elderwood (intrusion-set)
- Grandoreiro (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
- Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
- Frank Angiolelli