# Attack Ent T1204 004 Malicious Copy And Paste

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1204.004, Malicious Copy and Paste, or enterprise ATT&CK. An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-004-malicious-copy-and-paste` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-004-malicious-copy-and-paste`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-004-malicious-copy-and-paste/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-004-malicious-copy-and-paste

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1204.004: Malicious Copy and Paste

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1204.004, Malicious Copy and Paste, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1204.004
- Technique name: Malicious Copy and Paste
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/004
- Tactics: execution
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions—such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs—that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Malicious websites, such as those used in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), may present fake error messages or CAPTCHA prompts that instruct users to open a terminal or the Windows Run Dialog box and execute an arbitrary command. These commands may be obfuscated using encoding or other techniques to conceal malicious intent. Once executed, the adversary will typically be able to establish a foothold on the victim's machine.(Citation: CloudSEK Lumma Stealer 2024)(Citation: Sekoia ClickFake 2025)(Citation: Reliaquest CAPTCHA 2024)(Citation: AhnLab LummaC2 2025)

Adversaries may also leverage phishing emails for this purpose. When a user attempts to open an attachment, they may be presented with a fake error and offered a malicious command to paste as a solution, consistent with the "ClickFix" strategy.(Citation: Proofpoint ClickFix 2024)(Citation: AhnLab Malicioys Copy Paste 2024)

Tricking a user into executing a command themselves may help to bypass email filtering, browser sandboxing, or other mitigations designed to protect users against malicious downloaded files.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Execution Prevention
- Network Intrusion Prevention
- Restrict Web-Based Content

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- Contagious Interview (intrusion-set)
- Havoc (malware)
- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)
- MuddyWater (intrusion-set)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Ale Houspanossian
- Fernando Bacchin
- Gabriel Currie
- Harikrishnan Muthu, Cyble
- Menachem Goldstein
- ReliaQuest
- SeungYoul Yoo, AhnLab