# Attack Ent T1204 User Execution

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1204 User Execution in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1204, User Execution, or enterprise ATT&CK. An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-user-execution` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-user-execution`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-user-execution/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1204-user-execution

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1204: User Execution

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1204, User Execution, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1204
- Technique name: User Execution
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204
- Tactics: execution
- Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS, IaaS, Containers
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).

While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).

Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:

* Enabling [Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary
* Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)
* Downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)
* Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-execution)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn)

For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
- Execution Prevention
- Limit Software Installation
- Network Intrusion Prevention
- Restrict Web-Based Content
- User Training

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)
- Lumma Stealer (malware)
- Raspberry Robin (malware)
- Scattered Spider (intrusion-set)
- Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution (campaign)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
- Menachem Goldstein
- Harikrishnan Muthu, Cyble
- ReliaQuest
- Ale Houspanossian
- Fernando Bacchin