# Attack Ent T1485 Data Destruction
> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1485 Data Destruction in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1485, Data Destruction, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources.
- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1485-data-destruction` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1485-data-destruction`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1485-data-destruction/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1485-data-destruction
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# MITRE ATT&CK T1485: Data Destruction
## When to use this skill
Use this skill when the task involves T1485, Data Destruction, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.
## Technique context
- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1485
- Technique name: Data Destruction
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485
- Tactics: impact
- Platforms: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified
## ATT&CK description
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).
In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider) Similarly, they may delete virtual machines from on-prem virtualized environments.
## Agent workflow
1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.
## Bundled resources
- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.
To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.
## Detection guidance
No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.
## Useful telemetry and data sources
- Not specified in the STIX object.
## Mitigations to consider
- Data Backup
- Multi-factor Authentication
- User Account Management
## Known threat context
Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:
- 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack (campaign)
- 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks (campaign)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- AcidPour (malware)
- AcidRain (malware)
- Apostle (malware)
- BlackEnergy (malware)
- CaddyWiper (malware)
- DEADWOOD (malware)
- Diavol (malware)
- DynoWiper (malware)
- HermeticWiper (malware)
- Industroyer (malware)
- Kazuar (malware)
- KillDisk (malware)
- LAPSUS$ (intrusion-set)
- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
- LazyWiper (malware)
- Meteor (malware)
- MultiLayer Wiper (malware)
## Recommended output pattern
When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:
- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.
## ATT&CK contributors
- Brent Murphy, Elastic
- David French, Elastic
- Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
- Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
- Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee
- Varonis Threat Labs
- Joey Lei