# Attack Ent T1547 001 Registry Run Keys Startup Folder

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1547.001, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1547-001-registry-run-keys-startup-folder` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1547-001-registry-run-keys-startup-folder`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1547-001-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1547-001-registry-run-keys-startup-folder

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1547.001, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1547.001
- Technique name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001
- Tactics: persistence, privilege-escalation
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:

* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>

Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)

Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>.

The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:

* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>

The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:

* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code>
* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code>

Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:

* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code>
* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code>

Programs listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run automatically for the currently logged-on user.

By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.

Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- ADVSTORESHELL (malware)
- ANDROMEDA (malware)
- APT18 (intrusion-set)
- APT19 (intrusion-set)
- APT28 (intrusion-set)
- APT29 (intrusion-set)
- APT3 (intrusion-set)
- APT32 (intrusion-set)
- APT33 (intrusion-set)
- APT37 (intrusion-set)
- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- APT41 (intrusion-set)
- Agent Tesla (malware)
- Amadey (malware)
- AppleSeed (malware)
- Aria-body (malware)
- Astaroth (malware)
- AuTo Stealer (malware)
- Avaddon (malware)
- AvosLocker (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
- Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs
- Harun Küßner