# Attack Ent T1547 009 Shortcut Modification

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1547.009 Shortcut Modification in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1547.009, Shortcut Modification, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1547-009-shortcut-modification` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1547-009-shortcut-modification`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1547-009-shortcut-modification/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1547-009-shortcut-modification

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1547.009: Shortcut Modification

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1547.009, Shortcut Modification, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1547.009
- Technique name: Shortcut Modification
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009
- Tactics: persistence, privilege-escalation
- Platforms: Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.

Adversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.(Citation: Shortcut for Persistence ) Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.

Shortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. [Browser Extensions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/001)) to persistently launch malware.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Execution Prevention
- Restrict File and Directory Permissions
- User Account Management

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- APT39 (intrusion-set)
- Astaroth (malware)
- BACKSPACE (malware)
- Bazar (malware)
- BlackEnergy (malware)
- Comnie (malware)
- Empire (tool)
- FELIXROOT (malware)
- Gazer (malware)
- Gorgon Group (intrusion-set)
- Grandoreiro (malware)
- Helminth (malware)
- InvisiMole (malware)
- KONNI (malware)
- Kazuar (malware)
- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
- Leviathan (intrusion-set)
- MarkiRAT (malware)
- Micropsia (malware)
- Okrum (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- David French, Elastic
- Bobby, Filar, Elastic
- Travis Smith, Tripwire