# Attack Ent T1548 003 Sudo And Sudo Caching

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1548.003, Sudo and Sudo Caching, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1548-003-sudo-and-sudo-caching` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1548-003-sudo-and-sudo-caching`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1548-003-sudo-and-sudo-caching/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1548-003-sudo-and-sudo-caching

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1548.003: Sudo and Sudo Caching

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1548.003, Sudo and Sudo Caching, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1548.003
- Technique name: Sudo and Sudo Caching
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003
- Tactics: privilege-escalation
- Platforms: Linux, macOS
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.

Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).

The sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code>.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.

Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.

In the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo 'Defaults !tty_tickets' >> /etc/sudoers</code>.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Operating System Configuration
- Privileged Account Management
- Restrict File and Directory Permissions

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- Dok (malware)
- Proton (malware)
- Shai-Hulud (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.