# Attack Ent T1561 002 Disk Structure Wipe

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1561.002, Disk Structure Wipe, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network r…

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1561-002-disk-structure-wipe` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1561-002-disk-structure-wipe`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1561-002-disk-structure-wipe/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1561-002-disk-structure-wipe

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1561.002: Disk Structure Wipe

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1561.002, Disk Structure Wipe, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1561.002
- Technique name: Disk Structure Wipe
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002
- Tactics: impact
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. 

Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) if all sectors of a disk are wiped.

On a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `format`.(Citation: format_cmd_cisco)

To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Data Backup

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- APT37 (intrusion-set)
- APT38 (intrusion-set)
- BFG Agonizer (malware)
- CaddyWiper (malware)
- DEADWOOD (malware)
- Diskpart (tool)
- Ember Bear (intrusion-set)
- HermeticWiper (malware)
- HomeLand Justice (campaign)
- KillDisk (malware)
- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
- MultiLayer Wiper (malware)
- RawDisk (tool)
- Sandworm Team (intrusion-set)
- Shamoon (malware)
- ShrinkLocker (malware)
- StoneDrill (malware)
- VOID MANTICORE (intrusion-set)
- WhisperGate (malware)
- ZeroCleare (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Austin Clark, @c2defense

