# Attack Ent T1612 Build Image On Host

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1612 Build Image on Host in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1612, Build Image on Host, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1612-build-image-on-host` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1612-build-image-on-host`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1612-build-image-on-host/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1612-build-image-on-host

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1612: Build Image on Host

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1612, Build Image on Host, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1612
- Technique name: Build Image on Host
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612
- Tactics: stealth
- Platforms: Containers
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code> request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)

An adversary may take advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Audit
- Limit Access to Resource Over Network
- Network Segmentation
- Privileged Account Management

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- No group or software uses relationships were included for this technique in the source STIX bundle.

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
- Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
- Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
- Vishwas Manral, McAfee