# Attack Ent T1620 Reflective Code Loading

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1620 Reflective Code Loading in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1620, Reflective Code Loading, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-ent-t1620-reflective-code-loading` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-ent-t1620-reflective-code-loading`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1620-reflective-code-loading/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-ent-t1620-reflective-code-loading

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1620: Reflective Code Loading

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1620, Reflective Code Loading, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: enterprise
- ATT&CK ID: T1620
- Technique name: Reflective Code Loading
- Type: technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620
- Tactics: stealth
- Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)).

Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) For example, the `Assembly.Load()` method executed by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) may be abused to load raw code into the running process.(Citation: Microsoft AssemblyLoad)

Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- No ATT&CK mitigation relationships were present in the source STIX bundle.

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- 3CX Supply Chain Attack (campaign)
- BADHATCH (malware)
- BRUSHFIRE (malware)
- Brute Ratel C4 (tool)
- Cobalt Strike (malware)
- Cuba (malware)
- Donut (tool)
- Emotet (malware)
- FIN7 (intrusion-set)
- FoggyWeb (malware)
- Fooder (malware)
- Gamaredon Group (intrusion-set)
- Gelsemium (malware)
- IceApple (malware)
- Kimsuky (intrusion-set)
- Lazarus Group (intrusion-set)
- Lizar (malware)
- Lokibot (malware)
- Lumma Stealer (malware)
- LunarLoader (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- João Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__
- Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne
- Lior Ribak, SentinelOne
- Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera
- Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics
- Jiraput Thamsongkrah