# Attack Mob T1626 001 Device Administrator Permissions

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1626.001 Device Administrator Permissions in the mobile matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1626.001, Device Administrator Permissions, or mobile ATT&CK. Adversaries may abuse Android’s device administration API to obtain a higher degree of control over the device.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-mob-t1626-001-device-administrator-permissions` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-mob-t1626-001-device-administrator-permissions`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-mob-t1626-001-device-administrator-permissions/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Integrations & APIs
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-mob-t1626-001-device-administrator-permissions

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1626.001: Device Administrator Permissions

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1626.001, Device Administrator Permissions, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: mobile
- ATT&CK ID: T1626.001
- Technique name: Device Administrator Permissions
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1626/001
- Tactics: privilege-escalation
- Platforms: Android
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may abuse Android’s device administration API to obtain a higher degree of control over the device. By abusing the API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1642), factory resetting the device for [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630/002) and to delete any traces of the malware, disabling all the device’s cameras, or to make it more difficult to uninstall the app.

Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Use Recent OS Version
- User Guidance

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- AbstractEmu (malware)
- Asacub (malware)
- Crocodilus (malware)
- Exobot (malware)
- GPlayed (malware)
- Hornbill (malware)
- Red Alert 2.0 (malware)
- Sunbird (malware)
- XLoader for Android (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.