# Attack Mob T1629 001 Prevent Application Removal

> Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1629.001 Prevent Application Removal in the mobile matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1629.001, Prevent Application Removal, or mobile ATT&CK. Adversaries may abuse the Android device administration API to prevent the user from uninstalling a target application.

- Skill: `santosomar/attack-mob-t1629-001-prevent-application-removal` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 11 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add santosomar/attack-mob-t1629-001-prevent-application-removal`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/santosomar/attack-mob-t1629-001-prevent-application-removal/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Integrations & APIs
- License: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See h
- Author: santosomar (https://skillmd.com/u/santosomar)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/santosomar/attack-mob-t1629-001-prevent-application-removal

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# MITRE ATT&CK T1629.001: Prevent Application Removal

## When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1629.001, Prevent Application Removal, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

## Technique context

- ATT&CK domain: mobile
- ATT&CK ID: T1629.001
- Technique name: Prevent Application Removal
- Type: sub-technique
- ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629/001
- Tactics: defense-evasion
- Platforms: Android
- Required permissions: Not specified
- Effective permissions: Not specified
- Defenses bypassed: Not specified

## ATT&CK description

Adversaries may abuse the Android device administration API to prevent the user from uninstalling a target application. In earlier versions of Android, device administrator applications needed their administration capabilities explicitly deactivated by the user before the application could be uninstalled. This was later updated so the user could deactivate and uninstall the administrator application in one step.

Adversaries may also abuse the device accessibility APIs to prevent removal. This set of APIs allows the application to perform certain actions on behalf of the user and programmatically determine what is being shown on the screen. The malicious application could monitor the device screen for certain modals (e.g., the confirmation modal to uninstall an application) and inject screen input or a back button tap to close the modal. For example, Android's `performGlobalAction(int)` API could be utilized to prevent the user from removing the malicious application from the device after installation. If the user wants to uninstall the malicious application, two cases may occur, both preventing the user from removing the application.

* Case 1: If the integer argument passed to the API call is `2` or `GLOBAL_ACTION_HOME`, the malicious application may direct the user to the home screen from settings screen 

* Case 2: If the integer argument passed to the API call is `1` or `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK`, the malicious application may emulate the back press event

## Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use `references/technique-profile.json` for structured metadata, `references/detection-and-mitigation.md` for triage and telemetry guidance, `references/known-threat-context.md` for ATT&CK relationship context, and `templates/` for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

## Bundled resources

- `references/technique-profile.json`: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
- `references/detection-and-mitigation.md`: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
- `references/known-threat-context.md`: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
- `templates/detection-brief.md`: detection engineering brief template.
- `templates/hunt-plan.md`: threat hunt plan template.
- `templates/incident-response-note.md`: incident response note template.
- `templates/coverage-assessment.md`: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
- `scripts/render_brief.py`: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from `technique-profile.json`.
- `assets/output-schema.json`: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run `python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md` from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

## Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

## Useful telemetry and data sources

- Not specified in the STIX object.

## Mitigations to consider

- Enterprise Policy
- Use Recent OS Version
- User Guidance

## Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

- Anubis (malware)
- Chameleon (malware)
- Crocodilus (malware)
- FluBot (malware)
- GodFather (malware)
- Gustuff (malware)
- Mandrake (malware)
- OBAD (malware)
- S.O.V.A. (malware)

## Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

- Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
- Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
- Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
- Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
- Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
- References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

## ATT&CK contributors

- Shankar Raman, Gen Digital and Abhinand, Amrita University