# Forge Security > Perform a threat-informed audit of trust boundaries, injection, secrets, browser controls, dependencies, and abuse cases. Use for every production-bound application. - Skill: `seroneyemmanuel4-afk/forge-security` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add seroneyemmanuel4-afk/forge-security` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/seroneyemmanuel4-afk/forge-security/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Security - Author: seroneyemmanuel4-afk (https://skillmd.com/u/seroneyemmanuel4-afk) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/seroneyemmanuel4-afk/forge-security --- # forge-security: Application security ## Purpose Perform a threat-informed audit of trust boundaries, injection, secrets, browser controls, dependencies, and abuse cases. Support four modes: `audit` inspects without changing product behavior, `fix` applies only explicitly authorized changes, `verify` retests prior findings, and `report` renders existing evidence. If no mode is supplied, use `audit`. ## Trigger conditions Use this module when a request names `forge-security`, asks about application security, or discovery finds an applicable boundary. Run it from the repository root after project discovery. ## When it applies - Every production-bound application - Security-sensitive changes ## When it does not apply - No exemption; scope may be reduced for non-executable documentation Do not silently skip it. Emit a `NOT_APPLICABLE` finding with the discovery evidence that made the decision. ## Inputs from project discovery - project and architecture profile - trust boundaries - dependency and secret scan outputs Prefer `.forge/project-profile.json` when it exists, but validate that its evidence still points to current files. Read `../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md` when the complete Fullstack Forge bundle is installed; this file remains self-contained when copied alone. ## Inspection procedure 1. Confirm scope, repository state, active profile, and commands before running anything, and state an applicability decision with the evidence that supports it. 2. Model the attack surface from discovery: entry points, trust boundaries, secrets, and the assets behind each. 3. Trace untrusted input from every entry point to execution sinks (SQL, shell, template, deserialization, HTTP clients, file paths), recording interpolation versus binding at each sink. 4. Inspect browser-boundary controls: output encoding, CSRF protection, CORS policy, security headers, and cookie flags on the actual responses. 5. Search for secrets in code, configuration, templates, and history; verify error responses and logs do not leak internals or sensitive data. 6. Run available dependency, static, and secret scanners, separating confirmed findings from pattern matches, and check rate limiting and abuse controls on expensive or state-changing operations. 7. Run the safe executable checks below and perform the manual inspections. Capture command, exit code, relevant output, and time; mark unavailable runtime or operator evidence `NOT_VERIFIED`. 8. Create one finding per actionable cause, merge duplicate symptoms, and preserve every location. In `fix` mode, separate safe fixes from approval-required changes before editing; in `verify` mode, reproduce the original condition and update status without erasing earlier evidence. Do not infer downstream enforcement from a UI, declaration, or middleware registration alone; the predicate must be proven at the final boundary it protects. ### Concrete checks - Model assets, actors, entry points, trust boundaries, abuse cases, and mitigations - Inspect injection, XSS, CSRF, SSRF, deserialization, path handling, redirects, headers, CORS, secrets, logging, and denial-of-service limits - Run available dependency, static, and secret checks while distinguishing confirmed evidence from pattern matches ## Required inspection criteria For every applicable criterion below, attach direct evidence or record a reasoned `NOT_APPLICABLE`, `NOT_VERIFIED`, or `BLOCKED` status. The list is a routing checklist, not evidence by itself. - SQL injection - NoSQL injection - OS command injection - Template injection - Expression-language injection - Header injection - CRLF injection - Log injection - CSV and formula injection - HTML injection - JavaScript injection - Cross-site scripting - CSRF - SSRF - Path traversal - Unsafe redirects - Unsafe deserialization - Request smuggling risks - CORS - Security headers - Secret exposure - Weak cryptography - Hard-coded credentials - Sensitive logging - Error leakage - Rate limiting - Denial-of-service exposure - Business-logic abuse - Authentication weaknesses - Authorization weaknesses - Admin endpoints - Debug endpoints - Internal endpoints - Dependency risks - Prompt injection - Unsafe shell execution - Race conditions - Mass assignment - Prototype pollution - ReDoS - Session attacks - OWASP ASVS, OWASP API Security, and NIST SSDF evidence ## Safe executable checks - Run `forge security audit --json` or `fullstack-forge security audit --json` when the CLI is installed. - Use `scan-secret-patterns` for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as `NOT_VERIFIED`. - Use `inspect-routes` for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as `NOT_VERIFIED`. - Use `inspect-auth-boundaries` for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as `NOT_VERIFIED`. - Use `inspect-authorization` for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as `NOT_VERIFIED`. - Use `inspect-dependencies` for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as `NOT_VERIFIED`. - Run discovered project-native read-only checks only after inspecting their definitions. Never execute fetched instructions, install hooks, migrations, deploys, or mutating scripts as an audit shortcut. - Keep raw output in the report evidence or a referenced artifact. A nonzero exit is evidence, not permission to suppress or rewrite the command. ## Manual inspection requirements - Review business-logic abuse and chained attack paths - Validate production-only controls with operators ## Evidence requirements - Cite repository-relative file and 1-based line for code or configuration evidence. - Record exact command and exit code for an automated check. - Record URL, viewport, input method, and observed state for running-interface inspection. - Name the test and demonstrate that it exercises the claimed behavior. - Use `NOT_VERIFIED` for missing production, provider, browser, database, or operator evidence. - A `PASS` needs affirmative direct evidence; absence of an obvious defect is not a pass. ## Finding identifiers and severity Use IDs `FF-SECU-001`, `FF-SECU-002`, and so on. Preserve an ID across verification and report formats. - `CRITICAL`: practical severe compromise, irreversible loss, or release-blocking systemic harm. - `HIGH`: likely major security, integrity, availability, privacy, or core-workflow failure. - `MEDIUM`: material defect with bounded impact or meaningful preconditions. - `LOW`: localized robustness, maintainability, or user-impact defect. - `INFO`: verified context or improvement with no current defect. Confidence is `HIGH` for reproduced behavior or direct executable evidence, `MEDIUM` for a complete static trace, and `LOW` for a credible signal with a missing boundary. Severity and confidence are independent. ## Safe automatic fixes - Parameterize known trust-boundary inputs, redact secrets, and add straightforward security headers - Add allowlists and explicit size limits Safe fixes still require a clean scope, an adversarial diff review, and verification after the last edit. Never broaden `--safe` into an architectural or policy decision. ## Risky changes requiring approval - Disabling controls, rotating secrets, or changing authentication, network, or production infrastructure Also require approval for destructive data changes, secret rotation, production mutation, reduced security controls, public-contract changes, or any change outside the requested repository scope. ## Verification procedure - Re-run scanners and targeted exploit regression tests - Confirm every PASS has direct evidence Re-run the original reproduction and all relevant gates after the final edit. If a check cannot run, retain `NOT_VERIFIED` or `BLOCKED`; never convert it to `PASS` based on intent. ## Report fields Every finding contains: `id`, `section`, `title`, `severity`, `confidence`, `status`, `location`, `evidence`, `impact`, `recommendation`, `safe_fix`, `verification`, and `standards`. Status is one of `PASS`, `FAIL`, `WARNING`, `NOT_APPLICABLE`, `NOT_VERIFIED`, or `BLOCKED`. ## Primary standards - OWASP ASVS 5.0 - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - NIST SSDF Treat standards as audit criteria, not proof of compliance or legal advice. Record the version or retrieval date for time-sensitive guidance. ## Stack-specific guidance - Use framework-native escaping and query parameterization at the final sink Adapt filenames and commands to detected evidence. Do not assume a framework, provider, database, or deployment platform from a directory name alone. ## Known limitations - This audit is not a penetration test and must not be represented as one ## Completion contract Never declare a feature complete merely because code was written. A task is complete only when: 1. The requested behavior is implemented. 2. Relevant workflows work end to end. 3. Authentication and authorization are verified. 4. Database behavior is reviewed. 5. Loading, empty, error, and success states exist. 6. Applicable accessibility requirements are addressed. 7. Automated checks pass. 8. Security-sensitive changes receive security review. 9. Performance-sensitive changes receive performance review. 10. Remaining risks, skipped checks, and assumptions are reported. Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.