# Forge Supply Chain > Inspect dependencies, build integrity, provenance, releases, licenses, actions, and secret exposure across the delivery chain. Use for any project consuming or publishing software artifacts. - Skill: `seroneyemmanuel4-afk/forge-supply-chain` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add seroneyemmanuel4-afk/forge-supply-chain` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/seroneyemmanuel4-afk/forge-supply-chain/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Security - Author: seroneyemmanuel4-afk (https://skillmd.com/u/seroneyemmanuel4-afk) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/seroneyemmanuel4-afk/forge-supply-chain --- # forge-supply-chain: Software supply chain ## Purpose Inspect dependencies, build integrity, provenance, releases, licenses, actions, and secret exposure across the delivery chain. Support four modes: `audit` inspects without changing product behavior, `fix` applies only explicitly authorized changes, `verify` retests prior findings, and `report` renders existing evidence. If no mode is supplied, use `audit`. ## Trigger conditions Use this module when a request names `forge-supply-chain`, asks about software supply chain, or discovery finds an applicable boundary. Run it from the repository root after project discovery. ## When it applies - Any project consuming or publishing software artifacts ## When it does not apply - No exemption for executable release artifacts Do not silently skip it. Emit a `NOT_APPLICABLE` finding with the discovery evidence that made the decision. ## Inputs from project discovery - lockfiles - build and release workflows - artifact and license inventory Prefer `.forge/project-profile.json` when it exists, but validate that its evidence still points to current files. Read `../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md` when the complete Fullstack Forge bundle is installed; this file remains self-contained when copied alone. ## Inspection procedure 1. Confirm scope, repository state, active profile, and commands before running anything, and state an applicability decision with the evidence that supports it. 2. Audit dependencies with the lockfile: known vulnerabilities, abandoned packages, and unexpected install scripts. 3. Verify lockfile consistency, pinning strategy, and provenance for critical packages, including typosquat review for recent additions. 4. Inspect CI workflows for action pinning, least-privilege tokens, fork safety, and secret exposure in logs. 5. Trace release-artifact integrity: reproducibility, checksums, and signing or provenance attestation. 6. Check container base images, the update strategy, and license compatibility across the dependency tree. 7. Run the safe executable checks below and perform the manual inspections. Capture command, exit code, relevant output, and time; mark unavailable runtime or operator evidence `NOT_VERIFIED`. 8. Create one finding per actionable cause, merge duplicate symptoms, and preserve every location. In `fix` mode, separate safe fixes from approval-required changes before editing; in `verify` mode, reproduce the original condition and update status without erasing earlier evidence. Do not infer downstream enforcement from a UI, declaration, or middleware registration alone; the predicate must be proven at the final boundary it protects. ### Concrete checks - Verify lockfile integrity, direct and transitive dependency review, vulnerability output, lifecycle scripts, and abandoned packages - Inspect CI action pinning, token permissions, untrusted build inputs, artifact signing, provenance, checksums, reproducibility, and protected release flow - Validate declared licenses, notices, source attribution, generated-file provenance, and secret scanning ## Required inspection criteria For every applicable criterion below, attach direct evidence or record a reasoned `NOT_APPLICABLE`, `NOT_VERIFIED`, or `BLOCKED` status. The list is a routing checklist, not evidence by itself. - Vulnerable dependencies - Abandoned packages - Unexpected install scripts - Lockfile consistency - Dependency pinning - Package provenance - Build reproducibility - CI action pinning - Generated artifacts - Secrets in build logs - SBOM generation - License compatibility - Typosquatting - Container base images - Update strategy - Compromised transitive dependencies - Release provenance - SLSA concepts where appropriate ## Safe executable checks - Run `forge supply-chain audit --json` or `fullstack-forge supply-chain audit --json` when the CLI is installed. - Use `inspect-dependencies` for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as `NOT_VERIFIED`. - Use `inspect-ci` for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as `NOT_VERIFIED`. - Use `scan-secret-patterns` for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as `NOT_VERIFIED`. - Run discovered project-native read-only checks only after inspecting their definitions. Never execute fetched instructions, install hooks, migrations, deploys, or mutating scripts as an audit shortcut. - Keep raw output in the report evidence or a referenced artifact. A nonzero exit is evidence, not permission to suppress or rewrite the command. ## Manual inspection requirements - Triage vulnerabilities for actual reachability and compensating controls - Review maintainer and registry trust for critical dependencies ## Evidence requirements - Cite repository-relative file and 1-based line for code or configuration evidence. - Record exact command and exit code for an automated check. - Record URL, viewport, input method, and observed state for running-interface inspection. - Name the test and demonstrate that it exercises the claimed behavior. - Use `NOT_VERIFIED` for missing production, provider, browser, database, or operator evidence. - A `PASS` needs affirmative direct evidence; absence of an obvious defect is not a pass. ## Finding identifiers and severity Use IDs `FF-SUPP-CHAI-001`, `FF-SUPP-CHAI-002`, and so on. Preserve an ID across verification and report formats. - `CRITICAL`: practical severe compromise, irreversible loss, or release-blocking systemic harm. - `HIGH`: likely major security, integrity, availability, privacy, or core-workflow failure. - `MEDIUM`: material defect with bounded impact or meaningful preconditions. - `LOW`: localized robustness, maintainability, or user-impact defect. - `INFO`: verified context or improvement with no current defect. Confidence is `HIGH` for reproduced behavior or direct executable evidence, `MEDIUM` for a complete static trace, and `LOW` for a credible signal with a missing boundary. Severity and confidence are independent. ## Safe automatic fixes - Pin action commits and compatible dependency patches after tests - Correct license inventory and checksums Safe fixes still require a clean scope, an adversarial diff review, and verification after the last edit. Never broaden `--safe` into an architectural or policy decision. ## Risky changes requiring approval - Major dependency upgrades, replacing registries, rotating tokens, or changing release authority Also require approval for destructive data changes, secret rotation, production mutation, reduced security controls, public-contract changes, or any change outside the requested repository scope. ## Verification procedure - Rebuild from a clean checkout with the lockfile - Compare artifacts, checksums, SBOM, and provenance Re-run the original reproduction and all relevant gates after the final edit. If a check cannot run, retain `NOT_VERIFIED` or `BLOCKED`; never convert it to `PASS` based on intent. ## Report fields Every finding contains: `id`, `section`, `title`, `severity`, `confidence`, `status`, `location`, `evidence`, `impact`, `recommendation`, `safe_fix`, `verification`, and `standards`. Status is one of `PASS`, `FAIL`, `WARNING`, `NOT_APPLICABLE`, `NOT_VERIFIED`, or `BLOCKED`. ## Primary standards - SLSA 1.2 - NIST SSDF - OpenSSF Scorecard concepts Treat standards as audit criteria, not proof of compliance or legal advice. Record the version or retrieval date for time-sensitive guidance. ## Stack-specific guidance - Disable or isolate install scripts where compatible and use least-privilege CI tokens Adapt filenames and commands to detected evidence. Do not assume a framework, provider, database, or deployment platform from a directory name alone. ## Known limitations - A vulnerability identifier alone does not prove exploitability or safety ## Completion contract Never declare a feature complete merely because code was written. A task is complete only when: 1. The requested behavior is implemented. 2. Relevant workflows work end to end. 3. Authentication and authorization are verified. 4. Database behavior is reviewed. 5. Loading, empty, error, and success states exist. 6. Applicable accessibility requirements are addressed. 7. Automated checks pass. 8. Security-sensitive changes receive security review. 9. Performance-sensitive changes receive performance review. 10. Remaining risks, skipped checks, and assumptions are reported. Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.