# En > Full security audit of the ENTIRE the-platform repository (all backend services, the-frontend, embeddable widgets/extensions, shared libraries libs/*, infrastructure configs helm/k8s/docker) — three independent passes (automated scanning SCA/SAST/secret-scan/IaC, line-by-line code review by zone, architectural review), a detailed 14-category checklist (auth/authz, multi-tenancy, websocket, internal API, injections, SSRF, XSS, secrets/PII, files, dependencies, docker, k8s/helm, error handling, CI/CD), findings with file:line and an exploitation scenario, and a final report for leadership. Use when asked to run a full security audit of the whole codebase/repository/platform, to find vulnerabilities across the entire project, to re-verify the status of findings from a previous security audit, or to assess the platform's overall readiness to handle customer personal data from a security standpoint — even if the user doesn't say the word "audit" literally, but says "let's check the whole project for security holes - Skill: `smirnovalex-qa/en-22` (Agent Skill) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add smirnovalex-qa/en-22` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/smirnovalex-qa/en-22/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: Web & Frontend - Author: smirnovalex-qa (https://skillmd.com/u/smirnovalex-qa) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/smirnovalex-qa/en-22 --- # Full repository security audit For the-platform project: a microservices CRM platform that processes customer personal data. Security is a critical priority, not a formality. The audit must find real, exploitable problems tied to file:line, not produce a generic checklist without verification. Every finding must be confirmed by hand, not merely mentioned in a scanner's output. ## INPUT `$ARGUMENTS` — optionally a path to the previous audit report for a "before → after" comparison. If not passed, look for it yourself: the registry of past findings lives in `docs/bugs/security_audit/` (each finding records a verdict: confirmed / false positive / already fixed), and the regression check over it is `scripts/verify_audit_fixes.py`, if present in the repository. This is an audit of the WHOLE repository. If the task actually concerns only one feature/branch/PR/YouTrack task, use `security-audit-feature` instead of a full review of the entire codebase (otherwise the scope will be excessive and the findings will not be tied to what really needs checking before a specific release). ## KEY PRINCIPLE: VERIFICATION, NOT TRUST The main reason security audits fail is taking it on faith that "the fix was written" is equivalent to "the vulnerability is closed". It is NOT. Verify every fix adversarially: 1. If a check was added (a flag, an HMAC signature, escaping, authorization), make sure it is ENABLED by default and active in all environments (dev/staging/prod), not merely implemented in code and turned off by a flag. 2. If input escaping was added, verify COMPLETENESS: are all special characters escaped (single quote, double quote, backslash, null byte, unicode bypass), not just the obvious case? A single unclosed hole in the escaping = the vulnerability is not closed. 3. If a protection (an auth secret, middleware, an RBAC filter) is applied to one endpoint/service, check the ENTIRE class of same-type endpoints/services. A pinpoint fix without covering the whole class is not a fix but an illusion of one. Hunt for the "siblings" of the vulnerable pattern across the whole codebase (grep by the signature, not by the function name). 4. If the code has RBAC/switch/if-else on roles, always check the "else" branch (default case). The absence of an else branch with an explicit access denial is an allow-by-default, i.e. a hole. 5. Do not accept the explanation "that's an outdated version" or "that's already fixed" without independently verifying the current state of the repository. If there was a prior report of found risks, re-verify each item against the current code, regardless of what the team claims. Start the reconciliation from `docs/bugs/security_audit/`, not from a blank page, and run `scripts/verify_audit_fixes.py` for the regression check, if present. If a new finding effectively coincides with a risk already tracked and deliberately accepted there (e.g. a disabled networkPolicy, a single replica for an HA component), reference the existing file instead of a duplicate, and note it separately only if the current change makes the risk worse than it was recorded. 6. State the difference between statuses explicitly: "not fixed" / "fixed on paper (code exists, no protection)" / "fixed selectively (part of the class covered)" / "fully fixed" / "new finding". ## METHODOLOGY: THREE INDEPENDENT PASSES Run the audit by three independent methods and do not let one pass substitute for another — they have different blind spots. ### PASS 1 — Automated scanning - **Dependencies (SCA)**: pip-audit/safety for Python services, npm audit for the frontend and Node services, grype and/or trivy fs/image for all dependency manifests and Docker images. Record the critical/high/medium/low breakdown and package versions. - **Secrets in the repository**: gitleaks or trufflehog over the FULL git history (not just HEAD — secrets, once committed, remain in history even after the file is deleted), plus the trivy secret-scanner on the working tree. Explicitly state which directories/paths the scanner did NOT cover (exclusions in the scanner config, submodules, generated artifacts) — "0 findings" on an uncovered directory is not proof that no secrets are present. - **SAST**: semgrep (rules for Python/JS/TS: injection, ssrf, insecure deserialization, hardcoded secrets, weak crypto) and/or bandit for Python. - **IaC/Kubernetes**: checkov and/or kube-linter on all helm charts and manifests — networkPolicy, securityContext, resources, readOnlyRootFilesystem, capabilities, image tags (:latest forbidden), privileged containers, hostPath/hostNetwork. - **Container security**: trivy image on every built image — CVEs in the base image, missing USER (root by default), unnecessary packages. ### PASS 2 — Manual line-by-line code review Split the codebase into independent zones and review EACH line by line (not diagonally, not relying only on grep patterns): - Each backend service separately (gateway, all `*-service` directories in `services/`). - Frontend/SPA (`the-frontend` and any other client applications). - Browser extensions/embeddable widgets (chat-widget, etc.) — the code runs on the client side OUTSIDE your perimeter, and any XSS there is visible to the end users of your customers; this is a reputational and regulatory risk, not merely internal tech debt. - Infrastructure configs (`helm/`, k8s manifests, docker-compose, CI/CD pipelines). - Shared libraries (`libs/shared_auth`, `libs/shared_metrics`, and analogues) — check whether they are wired in as a single package or copied across services (if copied, record it as an architectural risk: a security patch does not propagate automatically). For each zone, look for (detailed checklist below) and for each finding record: file:line, vulnerability type, a concrete exploitation scenario (not an abstract "there may be a vulnerability", but "request X with parameter Y yields result Z"), severity, status (see above). ### PASS 3 — Architectural review Independently of the line-by-line review, assess whether the current architecture can HOLD security over time, not just be free of holes today: - File size and layer mixing (HTTP + SQL + business logic + RBAC in one file — reviewing and testing that is practically impossible, and defects systematically slip through). - The number of inter-service communication mechanisms (the more different ways to make a call, the lower the chance of a single point to enforce an authorization policy). - Duplication of shared security libraries across services instead of a single package. - Presence/absence of a process: mandatory code review before merge, a blocking security gate in CI, an independent verification that previous findings are closed (not by the team's self-report). - Insecure defaults as a systemic pattern (if one flag is off by default, check whether this is a systemic practice: are other security flags/features in the project also off by default?). ## DETAILED CATEGORY CHECKLIST 1. **Authentication and authorization** - Do all endpoints that require authentication actually verify it (are there "forgotten" open routes, especially /public/*, /internal/*, /health, /debug)? - Self-registration: which role is granted by default? is_active=True immediately or via confirmation (email/admin approval)? Can an external person gain access to someone else's data through self-registration? - RBAC/role-based filtering: for EACH role branch — what happens for a role that falls into no explicit branch (default/else)? Does this lead to data leakage (e.g. no filter by assigned_user_id/owner_id)? - User context headers (X-User-Context and analogues): are they cryptographically signed? Is the signature verified on receipt, and is this verification ENABLED by default in all services that trust the header? - IDOR/BOLA: can you access someone else's objects (contacts, deals, files, dialogs) by changing an ID in the URL/body? - Broken function level authorization: are admin operations (bulk delete, export, wipe-data) accessible without a role check? - Session/token management: where are tokens stored (localStorage vs httpOnly cookie), is there invalidation on logout/password change, is there a lifetime limit? - Password storage: the hashing algorithm (bcrypt/argon2 vs md5/sha1), presence of a salt, work factor. Is there MFA/2FA at least for admin roles? - CORS: `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` not equal to `*` together with `Allow-Credentials: true`; the request Origin not reflected into the response without checking against an allow-list. - Rate limiting/brute-force protection on login, password reset, OTP/2FA codes — is there a limit on attempts and a lockout/delay on exceeding it? - Mass assignment/over-posting: does the API accept arbitrary request-body fields (role, is_admin, company_id, balance, etc.) on create/update, or is the list of allowed fields an explicit whitelist? 2. **Multi-tenancy (isolation between customer companies)** — this is a SaaS CRM with several customer companies on shared infrastructure; a data leak BETWEEN companies is heavier in consequences than an IDOR within one company (a regulatory risk, the trust of all platform customers at once), so review it separately from the generic IDOR item above, not as a special case of it. - For EACH data read/write point (REST handler, WebSocket subscription, cache key, search index, event queue, export/report) — is it filtered by company_id/tenant_id at the DB-query level (WHERE company_id = ...), not only checked at the UI/router level? - Is the company_id match checked explicitly (comparing the value from the token/context against the record's own company_id), rather than assumed because "the request comes from an authorized session anyway"? - Bulk operations, exports, analytics/dashboards — do they recompute aggregates across all companies instead of just their own? - Shared resources between services (Redis keys, RabbitMQ queues, file storage) — can a key/name collide between different companies given identical internal IDs (e.g. contact_id is unique within a company but not globally)? 3. **WebSocket / realtime** - Is the token/role/company_id checked at connection establishment (connect), AND separately at each subscription to a channel/room/dialog (join), not just once at connect? - Can a client subscribe to someone else's channel by supplying/guessing a room-id, dialog-id, user-id, if the server does not check the channel owner against the current user? - Event broadcast — is the recipient filtered by company_id/role before sending, or does the server rely on the client "just not being subscribed" to someone else's data? 4. **Internal-API between services** - Walk ALL `/internal/*` endpoints in ALL services and build a table: service | endpoint | does it require a shared-secret/mTLS | is the secret actually verified (not merely declared in environment variables). Look for discrepancies — the same class of operation (send-message, delete-by-id, wipe-data, sync) protected in one service and unprotected in a neighboring one is a systemic hole. - Can an internal endpoint be called directly from outside the cluster (is there no additional network-level restriction, if auth is weak)? 5. **Injections (SQL / NoSQL / Command / Template / Deserialization)** - Find all places that build queries by concatenation/f-string/format instead of parameterized queries or ORM. Pay special attention to public query parameters (dashboard filters, search, sorting). - If there is "manual" escaping, verify completeness (backslash, unicode, nested quotes). - Command injection: any subprocess/os.system/exec with interpolation of user input. - Server-side template injection: if user input reaches a template engine. - NoSQL injection: if Mongo/analogues are used — operators ($where, $ne) from user input. - Insecure deserialization: `pickle`, `yaml.load` without `SafeLoader`, `jsonpickle`, `eval`/`exec` over data that came from a queue, a webhook, or an inter-service call, not just directly from an HTTP request. 6. **SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)** - Any code that makes an outbound HTTP request to a URL that came from the user or from an external system (webhooks, media_url, callback_url, integrations with CRMs/messengers) — is there a domain allow-list, blocking of private/internal IP ranges (169.254.x.x, 10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x, 127.x, cloud metadata endpoints)? - Is the webhook's signature/origin verified before the system initiates a response request to a URL from the webhook body? 7. **XSS (including Stored XSS in client widgets)** - Any use of innerHTML/dangerouslySetInnerHTML/document.write with untrusted data. - Widgets embedded on third-party sites are code that executes in the browsers of the end visitors of your customers' sites. A vulnerability there has a wider blast radius than internal XSS — qualify it accordingly when assessing severity. - Is CSP (Content-Security-Policy) configured and sufficiently strict? - Clickjacking: the `X-Frame-Options`/`frame-ancestors` headers — do they prevent embedding the main application (not the widget) in someone else's iframe? 8. **Secrets and PII handling** - Secrets in code/configs tracked by git (values-*.yaml, *-secrets.yaml, committed .env, hardcoded API keys/tokens in source). - Personal-data export scripts (dumps of contacts/customers) sitting in the repository — a risk in themselves regardless of repo access rights. - Storage of integration tokens (Telegram/WhatsApp bots, etc.) in the DB — plaintext or encrypted? - Local messenger client sessions (e.g. TDLib sessions) on disk — are they encrypted at rest? - Check git history with a command like `git log --all --full-history -- ` for files that are currently deleted but may have contained secrets in the past. - Secret masking in logs (redaction) — does it work for all types of secrets (bot_token, api_key, access_token, passwords, PII), not just for some? - `.env.example`/config samples — do they by mistake contain a real value instead of a placeholder; are environment variables not printed in full into CI logs (`env`, `printenv`, debug dump of the config at service startup)? 9. **File upload and storage** - MIME-type and extension validation on upload (do not trust the client's Content-Type without validating the content). - File size limit, protection against zip bombs/decompression bombs for archives. - Public file-serving endpoints (/public/documents, etc.) — do they require authentication if the files contain PII or private data? - Path traversal when building the save/read path of a file from user input. - Object storage (S3/MinIO): bucket publicity, versioning, replication. 10. **Dependencies and supply chain** - A full breakdown of vulnerabilities by criticality and by service (not a single aggregate number, but per service separately — where the risk is concentrated). - Matching critical libraries used in several services at different versions (e.g. different versions of one framework in different services — meaning a patch has to be rolled out N times). - Docker base images: are outdated/EOL versions used, :latest tags instead of pinning by digest/version? - Lock files (poetry.lock, package-lock.json, uv.lock) — are they committed, do they match the declared versions? - Dependency confusion: internal packages (libs/shared_auth, libs/shared_metrics, and analogues) — are they installed from a private index/by local path, or by a bare name from public PyPI/npm, where a same-named public package could substitute them? 11. **Docker / containers** - USER set (non-root) in every Dockerfile — build a table across all images. - readOnlyRootFilesystem, drop: ALL capabilities, allowPrivilegeEscalation: false in securityContext. - Secrets not passed via ARG/ENV in the Dockerfile (they end up in the layer history). - Multi-stage build to exclude build tools and dev dependencies from the final image. 12. **Kubernetes / Helm** - networkPolicy for databases, caches, queues (Redis, PostgreSQL, RabbitMQ) — are they enabled in prod, do they restrict traffic to trusted pods only? - resources requests/limits set (not an empty {} by default) to prevent noisy neighbor and DoS through resource exhaustion. - liveness/readiness probes for the core business-logic services. - Secrets via Kubernetes Secrets/an external secret manager, not in values.yaml in plaintext. - Single point of failure: the replica count for stateful components (Redis, RabbitMQ, MinIO, DB) in prod — 1 replica for a critical component is an availability risk; record it separately from security findings, but do not ignore it. - DB backup strategy — is it documented and automated? 13. **Error handling and observability** - The "silent swallowing" pattern of errors (a broad except that logs and returns None/an empty result without re-raise/alert) — does this mask security failures (e.g. a failed authorization check that is mistakenly treated as "allowed")? - Are security events (failed authorization attempts, role changes, bulk deletes) logged separately and available for monitoring/alerting? - Leakage of internal information through error messages (stack traces, library versions, DB structure) in API responses to the outside. 14. **CI/CD and process** - Is code review before merge into protected branches mandatory? - Is there a blocking security gate in CI (SCA/SAST/secret-scan) that actually stops the merge on critical/high findings, rather than just printing a warning? - Is there a regression checklist for previously found vulnerabilities that is run before each release? - Who owns the "merge/don't merge" decision when a vulnerability is found — is there an explicit security owner with the right to block? - CI script injection: is unvalidated external input (PR title, branch name, issue title) interpolated directly into a `run:` step of the pipeline — the classic vector for stealing CI secrets that SCA/SAST do not catch? - Public admin/debug endpoints in prod: Swagger/OpenAPI UI, framework admin panels, interactive debug consoles (e.g. Werkzeug) — are they accessible without authentication in the production environment? ## EDGE CASES OFTEN MISSED - Functionality protected at the UI level (button hidden) but accessible directly through the API without a backend check. - A race condition in "check-then-act" checks (e.g. the role check and the subsequent action are not atomic, and you can wedge in between them). - Behavioral differences for "soft-deleted" records — are they accessible through an API that does not account for the deletion flag? - Bulk operations (bulk endpoints) — they often have weaker authorization than their single-item counterparts, because they were added later "quick and dirty". - Webhooks from external systems — is the signature/origin verified, or do we trust any request body that arrives at a public URL? - Security feature flags turned off "temporarily for debugging" and forgotten in that state in the default config. - Differences between environments (dev/staging/prod) — a fix applied in one helm-values configuration may be absent in another. - Data export (CSV/Excel/PDF generation) — is authorization on the exported data volume verified as strictly as on ordinary reads through the UI? - Reuse of the same secret/key across several services — compromise of one service grants access to the rest. - Outdated/unused endpoints left in the code "just in case", undocumented and without auth, because "nobody uses them". ## SEVERITY SCALE A fixed scale is needed so findings are comparable to each other and across re-audits (otherwise the "previous report → current" comparison table loses meaning if severity is assigned anew each time). The same scale is used in the `security-audit-feature` skill. - **Critical**: an unauthenticated external attacker achieves full compromise (RCE, access to all data of all customer companies, full authentication bypass). - **High**: an authenticated user (including one with a minimal role) gains access to someone else's data/privileges — including cross-tenant access (see section 2) — or an unauthenticated attacker gains access to the data of one company/one user. - **Medium**: requires specific conditions (a race, a particular role, MITM, social engineering) or is limited to a limited metadata leak/DoS of a single component without data loss. - **Low**: a best-practice violation with no direct exploitation scenario at the time of the audit (e.g. a missing security header with no known attack vector in the current architecture). For each finding, state not only the final level but also who can exploit it (anonymous / authenticated user / internal network only) and what is lost (read / write / full compromise) — that is the justification for the level. ## REPORT FORMAT 1. Executive summary (for leadership, no technical jargon): what is critical, what is a business/reputational/regulatory risk, what to do first. 2. KPI table: number of critical/high/medium/low findings, number of dependency vulnerabilities by criticality, % of containers running non-root, number of unclosed risks from the previous report (if this is a re-audit). 3. If this is a re-audit — a comparison table "previous-report item → current state (file:line) → status (not fixed / on paper / selectively / fixed)". Do not accept past explanations without re-verification. 4. A "fixed but not working" section separately — this is the most telling signal of process maturity; call it out explicitly. 5. Full list of findings tied to file:line, with a concrete exploitation scenario, severity (a CVSS-like score or critical/high/medium/low), and a recommendation. 6. A "what was done well" section — strong patterns in the codebase worth replicating rather than redoing. An audit without balance loses trust and is harder to use to motivate the team. 7. Action plan by timeframe: 24-48 hours (vectors exploitable today), 1 week (the remaining critical), 2-4 weeks (process and architecture), leadership-level decisions (a security owner, independent re-verification, architectural decisions that cannot be solved with pinpoint patches). 8. A "methodology and coverage limitations" section — which tools were used, which directories/services were NOT scanned and why, so the absence of findings in an uncovered zone does not read as "everything there is clean". ## FINDING FORMATTING RULES For each finding, the following are mandatory: - A stable finding ID (e.g. `SEC-2026-08-04-001`) — so that at re-audit you can reference a specific finding by ID rather than retelling it in your own words (a retelling can quietly "drift" from the original wording and break the status mapping between audits). - The file path and line number (or range). - The vulnerability name and category (may reference OWASP Top 10 / OWASP API Security Top 10 / CWE). - A concrete exploitation scenario: "if you make request X with parameter Y, the system will return/do Z" — not abstract wording like "there may be a vulnerability". - Severity with justification (who can use it: authenticated user / any external / internal network only; what is lost: data read / write / full compromise). - Status relative to the previous audit, if applicable. - A remediation recommendation — concrete (not "improve security", but "add an else branch with an explicit denial", "enable flag X by default", "replace the f-string with a parameterized query"). ## RUNNING THE AUDIT (practical instructions) 1. Determine the scope: list all services (top-level directories in `services/`), frontend applications, embeddable widgets/extensions, infrastructure configs. 2. Read the registry of past findings in `docs/bugs/security_audit/` BEFORE starting the manual review, if it exists — it is a ready source of already known problems; don't duplicate work, just check whether they are fixed. 3. Run the automated tools of PASS 1 on each service/image/chart where possible in the current environment, and save the raw output for report appendices. Filter out obvious false positives (test fixtures, placeholder values like "changeme"/"example_key") with an explicit list in the limitations section, not silently — so it is visible that they were considered, not skipped. 4. Split the manual review of PASS 2 into independent chunks (by service/zone) — if the Agent tool is available, launch several independent subagents on different zones in parallel (in foreground, if the result is needed immediately in this dialogue), so as not to miss volume and not to let one agent "cut corners" across the whole codebase at once. The codebase is large (a dozen+ services) — give each subagent a concrete list of files/directories for its zone and the applicable sections of this skill (checklist, severity scale, finding format), not a retelling in your own words. Record confirmed findings in an intermediate file as you review each zone, rather than keeping them only in context until the final report: otherwise, when a long dialogue is compacted, earlier findings can be lost. 5. Perform the architectural review of PASS 3 separately, independently of the PASS 2 results. 6. Consolidate all three passes into a single report per the format above, remove duplicates, but do not merge findings of different natures (a secret-scanner found a file ≠ manual review confirmed the secret is real and active — record both facts if both exist). 7. If this is a re-audit — be sure to re-verify EACH item of the previous report against the current state of the code, rather than relying on the status claimed by the team. 8. Explicitly state which checks were NOT performed (environment limitations, no access to prod secrets, no access to runtime logs, etc.) — this is part of an honest report, not its weakness. 9. Save the final report as a file in `docs/bugs/security_audit/` (e.g. `full-audit-.md`) — this is the same place where the registry of past findings is kept, and the next re-audit should find it during reconciliation. This is an audit, not implementation: the developer makes the changes based on the report, not you within this skill.