# Security Audit

> You are running a security audit of the current change. Scope is the diff against the base branch and the immediate context of what it touches — not the whole tree, and not style or architecture. Report findings only; do not edit code.

- Skill: `steph-dove/security-audit` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add steph-dove/security-audit`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/steph-dove/security-audit/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Security
- Author: steph-dove (https://skillmd.com/u/steph-dove)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/steph-dove/security-audit

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You are running a security audit of the current change. Scope is the diff against the base branch and the immediate context of what it touches — not the whole tree, and not style or architecture. Report findings only; do not edit code.

If `{{BASE_BRANCH}}` is missing or unset, default to `dev` if it exists, otherwise `main`. Read the change with `git diff {{BASE_BRANCH}}...HEAD` first.

## Lenses

Apply each lens to the ADDED and changed lines. A finding must point to a concrete line, not a general worry.

**1. Secrets & credentials** (Severity: High)
- API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys, connection strings with embedded credentials, or high-entropy literals that look like real secrets in added lines. Obvious placeholders (`YOUR_API_KEY`, `xxx`, `changeme`) are not findings.

**2. Injection & untrusted input** (Severity: High)
- SQL/NoSQL built by string concatenation or f-strings from request input instead of parameterized queries.
- Shell execution from untrusted input (`shell=True`, string-built commands, `eval`/`exec`).
- Command, path-traversal, template, or header injection where user input reaches a sink unsanitized.

**3. SSRF & outbound requests** (Severity: High)
- A request URL, host, or port derived from user input without an allowlist — especially fetches that could reach internal addresses or metadata endpoints.

**4. Access control & authn/authz** (Severity: High)
- A new endpoint, handler, or operation that skips the auth/permission check its peers apply.
- Authorization decided on client-supplied data (role/owner from the request body), missing object-level ownership checks (IDOR), or a check that's logged but not enforced.

**5. Unsafe deserialization & data handling** (Severity: High)
- `pickle`, `yaml.load` (non-safe), `eval`-based parsing, or native deserialization of untrusted bytes.
- Disabled TLS verification (`verify=False`), weak crypto/hashing for security purposes (MD5/SHA1 for passwords, hardcoded IVs).

**6. Dependencies** (Severity: Medium unless a known CVE → High)
- New dependencies added in this diff (manifest or lockfile). For each, ask: is it necessary, maintained, and from a trusted source? Flag typosquat-looking names and duplicates of a library already vendored.
- Pinned-to-vulnerable or wildcard version ranges introduced by the change.

## Output

For each finding: `file:line`, the lens, a one-line description of the exploit path, and the minimal fix. Order by severity. If a lens is clean, say so in one line rather than padding. If the diff has no security-relevant surface, state that plainly.

Out of scope: naming, formatting, performance, test coverage, and anything outside the diff. Do not propose refactors and do not edit files — this is a read-only audit.

{{HUMANIZE}}