# Prove The Setting Works > Use when about to tell someone a config change will (or will not) do what they want — hide a UI element, disable a provider, silence a channel, pin a new model version. Copies the config to a throwaway profile, changes one setting, re-runs the real code path, and reads the actual output. Prevents promising a fix that silently does nothing, and prevents calling something impossible when a different setting would have worked. - Skill: `technickai/prove-the-setting-works` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 16 files) - Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add technickai/prove-the-setting-works` - Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/technickai/prove-the-setting-works/raw - Safety review: pending - Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex - Category: AI & ML - License: MIT - Author: TechNickAI (https://skillmd.com/u/technickai) - Updated: 2026-09-17 - Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/technickai/prove-the-setting-works --- # Prove the Setting Works ## Overview A config key's NAME is not evidence of its BEHAVIOR. Neither is its docstring, nor a rule you wrote in memory six months ago. Two symmetrical failures keep recurring: - **False positive:** "Set `enabled: false` and the row disappears." It loads without error, looks applied, and silently does nothing. - **False negative:** "That can't be done with config." Said after reading one code path, when a different lever would have worked. Both are cured by the same three-minute move: **mutate a throwaway copy, run the real code path, read the real output.** The rule: _never describe a config change's effect you have not observed._ ## When to Use - Before promising a config-only fix ("I can hide that with a setting"). - Before declaring a limit ("that needs an upstream change"). - Before removing a config block that something else might reference. - When a standing rule in memory would block an approach — test whether the rule is actually as broad as it was written. - After any config edit, to confirm the observable behavior changed. ## The sandbox probe Never edit the live config to find out what a key does. 1. **Copy the config into a throwaway home.** ```python TMP = pathlib.Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="probe_")) shutil.copy(SRC / "config.yaml", TMP / "config.yaml") ``` 2. **Mutate exactly one lever** with a round-tripping parser so unrelated formatting is preserved: ```python y = ruamel.yaml.YAML(); y.preserve_quotes = True; y.width = 4096 ``` 3. **Run the REAL code path** — the same function the product calls, not a reimplementation — pointed at the sandbox: ```bash HERMES_HOME=$TMP probe.py ``` Use the application's own interpreter. A system `python3` will not have the package importable and its failure will look like a config problem. 4. **Read the output, not the exit code.** Exit 0 proves it ran, not that the lever worked. 5. **Diff against an unmutated run.** Without a baseline you cannot tell a working lever from a coincidence. Package the probe as a `scripts/` file in the governing skill so the next session runs it instead of rewriting it. **Ready-made harness: `scripts/probe_config_lever.py`.** Provides `baseline()`, `probe(mutate, code, note=...)`, and `matrix([...], code)` — the last probes several levers at once and prints a `NO-OP (same as baseline)` / `changed` summary, so a silently-ignored setting is impossible to miss. Run the file directly for a self-check of the interpreter and profile paths. ## Capability-coupled levers: turning a thing OFF can disable what you wanted ON Before reaching for the obvious "disable it" lever, ask what ELSE that flag gates. Platforms, integrations and providers routinely bundle two independent concerns behind one boolean: - **wiring** — is this transport configured and usable for OUTBOUND work? - **admission policy** — what happens when an UNKNOWN party contacts us inbound? Operators reach for `enabled: false` to fix an inbound problem and silently destroy the outbound capability they were relying on. Verified in one case: an agent was texting **pairing codes to a real owner's real contacts** over iMessage. The local remedy set `bluebubbles.enabled: false`, which stopped the codes AND made the send path refuse (`tools/send_message_tool.py` bails on `not pconfig.enabled`). The agent lost outbound iMessage entirely, and nobody noticed for over a week, because the reported symptom had gone away. **Probe BOTH properties as a pair.** A lever matrix with one column is how you ship a fix that quietly breaks the feature: | configuration | inbound: pairs with strangers? | outbound: can send? | | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------ | | credentials only (the incident) | **yes** | yes | | `enabled: false` | no | **NO — capability lost** | | `extra.unauthorized_dm_behavior: ignore` | no | yes ✅ | | per-platform allowlist env var | no | yes ✅ | The two bottom rows are the real fix; row two is the trap. Write the harness so each case reports a tuple, never a single boolean. ### `extra:` is a second floor of silent no-op Nesting failure has a sub-level. Even at the correct `gateway.platforms.` depth, some keys are only read from an `extra:` sub-map. One level up — the obvious, human-looking place — the key parses, persists, round-trips through the config reader, and is **never consulted**: ```yaml # SILENTLY IGNORED — parses fine, reads back fine, does nothing platforms: bluebubbles: unauthorized_dm_behavior: ignore # ACTUALLY READ platforms: bluebubbles: enabled: true extra: unauthorized_dm_behavior: ignore ``` This is a prime reason a working config lever gets misdiagnosed as "impossible, needs a source patch." Before concluding a framework must be forked, probe the key at **every** plausible depth — top-level, platform-level, and `platform.extra` — and read the value back through the product's own getter. ### Find the carve-out that already exists When arguing a default is wrong for your case, search the resolver for a sibling that already got an exception. Upstream had already special-cased email: _"inboxes may contain arbitrary unread human messages, so replying with pairing codes is not a safe platform default"_ — verbatim the argument for iMessage. An existing carve-out is the strongest upstream evidence available: maintainers already accepted the principle, so you are extending settled reasoning rather than proposing new policy. ### "I refuse to believe the fix is to hack the source" Treat that instinct as correct until a full lever matrix disproves it. A local source patch to a framework is a liability: it silently reverts on every upgrade, it hides in `git status` as "dirty tree" that a future rollout will reset, and — as above — it can encode a workaround that disables real functionality. When someone insists a config path must exist, the probe is the cheap way to find it, not the expensive way to prove them wrong. Order of preference, always: **config lever → upstream PR changing the default → local patch (last resort, with an expiry plan).** Full probe harness, end-to-end reproduction with positive control, and the outbound-send gate: `references/platform-enable-vs-inbound-policy.md`. ## Test the matrix, not one hypothesis When the goal is "make X not appear," enumerate every plausible lever and test them together. A single failed attempt is not proof of impossibility. Worked example — hiding a UI row, all four attempts probed before reporting: | attempt | result | | -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | | add it to the exclusion list | still shown | | `enabled: false` on the feature | still shown | | `enabled: false` on the sub-item | still shown | | delete the whole config block | still shown, AND fell back to stale defaults | Only after that matrix is the claim "this needs an upstream change" honest — and it now comes with the evidence attached. Note the fourth row: the most aggressive option was the most _harmful_, because deletion triggered a synthesized default rather than absence. Probing found that; reasoning would not have. ## Config shapes that look right and silently no-op Parsers are forgiving in ways that hide mistakes. Two live examples: - **A key stripped by a normalizer.** An unknown key can be dropped during load while everything still "works." Verify by reading the _loaded dict_, not the file you wrote. (Inverse also happens: a warning that a key was ignored can be cosmetic while the key survives — check, don't assume either way.) - **A field parsed as something other than a label.** A shape like `[{id: "x", name: "Friendly Name"}]` can look like a display-name mechanism while `name` is really an _ID fallback_ consulted only when `id` is missing. The friendly name never renders and nothing errors. - **The right key at the wrong NESTING LEVEL.** The name is correct, the value is correct, `hermes config set` prints `✓ Set …`, the line is visibly in `config.yaml` — and nothing reads it, because the consumer only looks under one specific parent. Three "successful" writes in a row can all no-op. Also covers the `--` argument trap for leading-dash values, and the way a leftover empty parent block after `unset` can silently DISABLE a subsystem: `references/config-key-nesting-and-silent-noop.md`. Heuristic: **if a change produces no error AND no visible effect, assume it was ignored** until you have read it back out of the loaded structure. ### The writer itself can corrupt the value's TYPE Worse than a dropped key: the official write path stores your value in the wrong _shape_, so the reader parses it into something harmless-looking and wrong. Verified on `hermes config set`, which takes a scalar and serializes a list argument as a **quoted string**: ```bash hermes config set skills.disabled '["alpha","beta","gamma"]' # ✓ Set skills.disabled = ["alpha","beta","gamma"] in /config.yaml ``` ```yaml # what actually landed — a string, not a list skills: disabled: '["alpha","beta","gamma"]' ``` ```python get_disabled_skills({'skills': {'disabled': '["alpha","beta","gamma"]'}}) # -> {'["alpha","beta","gamma"]'} ONE bogus entry; nothing is disabled ``` The CLI prints a success line. `config get` echoes the value back. The file contains your text. And the feature is off. This is the local-tooling twin of "readback is not proof on a third-party API" — **the writer is part of the system under test.** Rule: for any **list-, dict-, or otherwise non-scalar-valued** key, do not trust a scalar-oriented setter. Write the structure with a YAML round-trip and then re-read it through _the product's own reader function_ (not `yaml.safe_load` alone) before believing it. On Hermes specifically, `Edit`/`Write` refuse `config.yaml` by design, so the safe shape is a script that: 1. backs up the file (and refuses to run if the backup is missing), 2. **merges** into the existing list rather than replacing it, 3. refuses if the existing value is not already the expected type, 4. dumps to a `.tmp`, re-reads it through the real reader, aborts on mismatch, 5. only then moves `.tmp` over the original, and 6. asserts every _other_ key is byte-identical afterwards. Steps 3 and 6 are what stop a "fix" from quietly eating unrelated config. ### Design the verification so it CAN fail Same session, the check itself was the bug. A probe asserted on `get_skill_commands()` assuming a **list**; the function returns a **dict** keyed `"/name"`. The `isinstance(cmds, list)` branch silently yielded `[]`, and the probe reported `active_in_index=0` for all five profiles — a perfect, uniform, meaningless result that looked like a dramatic success. Two guards, both cheap: - **Assert the positive control.** `assert active, "empty index — probe broken"`. A result of "everything vanished" is far more often a broken probe than a working change. - **Check both directions.** Confirm the targets are GONE _and_ that known-good neighbours are STILL PRESENT. Here: `comfyui` absent, and `multi-review`/`deep-dive`/`recall` confirmed still active. An identical number across every profile, or a suspiciously round zero, is a smell — inspect the probe before celebrating. ## Systemd units are a config surface too A unit directive can be accepted, parsed, and echoed back by `systemctl show` while doing nothing. `RequiresMountsFor=` is silently INERT in a systemd USER unit — the user manager cannot depend on a SYSTEM mount unit, so the guard you think protects a service does not exist. Verified by unmounting the volume and watching the service start anyway, after `systemctl show` had confirmed the directive and even resolved it to a real mount unit. Read the field where a dependency must MATERIALIZE (`Requires=`), not the field where you declared it. Then prove it by removing the dependency. Full case, the working `ExecStartPre` guard, and sibling traps (preempted `systemctl stop`, `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` in non-login contexts, systemd-vs-pm2 ownership) in `references/systemd-directives-that-silently-noop.md`. ## Readback is not proof on a third-party API The heuristic above assumes the failure is silent _absence_. A worse shape exists on remote APIs: the service **accepts your write, stores it, and echoes it back on a subsequent GET** — while the field does nothing, because it is not part of the schema the service actually consumes. Every local check passes. `HTTP 200`. Readback shows your exact value. A diff against intent is clean. And the feature is dead. Live case: the base prompt was written to `model.systemPrompt`, a field that appears throughout third-party examples and older docs. The API accepted it, returned it verbatim on `GET /assistant/`, and never delivered it to the model — the real field is `model.messages[{role: "system"}]`. An assistant configured that way places a real phone call to a real human with no persona and no task instructions. Two sibling fields (`backchannelingEnabled`, `silenceTimeoutSeconds`) round-trip the same way while being absent from the schema. **Acceptance is not application, and neither is readback.** On any vendor API, promote the machine-readable schema above prose: ```bash # The schema the service actually validates against, not the docs page about it curl -sS https://api../api-json -o /tmp/vendor_openapi.json # Is the field you are about to rely on real? python3 - <<'EOF' import json d = json.load(open('/tmp/vendor_openapi.json')) schemas = d['components']['schemas'] for name in ['CreateXDTO', 'UpdateXDTO', 'X']: # the write + read DTOs props = set((schemas.get(name, {}).get('properties') or {}).keys()) print(name, '->', 'systemPrompt' in props) # the field in question EOF ``` A field with **zero occurrences** across every relevant DTO, while the live API happily returns it, is a ghost. Prefer the documented request/response schema and confirm the _behavior_ on one real invocation. Related: the vendor may also lag its own schema in the other direction — a field present in the running service but absent from the published spec. Treat the schema as strong evidence, not gospel; the tiebreaker is always one real call. Full case study, audit query for finding already-damaged resources, and four sibling traps from the same API (wrong success status on a non-idempotent create, defaults mistaken for absence, mutually-exclusive fields, edge-level client rejection): `references/vendor-api-phantom-fields.md`. Docs prose, blog posts, and LLM training data all carry the deprecated field forward long after the API moved. That is precisely why the schema check is cheap insurance on any API you have not personally exercised. ## Source proves what IS; the tracker proves what is INTENDED Reading the code is necessary and not sufficient. Source answers _does this work today_. It cannot tell you whether the gap is an oversight about to be fixed, a deliberate refusal, or a capability that exists somewhere else in the product under another name. Answer those from the **issue tracker and the official docs** before you design around a limitation. Verified in one case, `delegate_task` per-task model override. Source was unambiguous — `creds` resolves once from `delegation.*` and applies to every child (`delegate_tool.py:3622`), and the `tasks[]` schema has no model field. Correct, and it led to the wrong recommendation, because three things were only discoverable outside the repo: - **Issue #17685** — the field is _"silently accepted and discarded — no error, no warning."_ Known, reported, reproducible. - **Five PRs** implemented it (#17718, #23266, #25026, #34773, #36790) and the maintainer closed one with **"We do not want this."** So it is a design position, not a backlog item — planning around its arrival is planning on sand. - **The docs named the supported alternative**: _"hand the task to the kanban board, which does support a per-task model override."_ The capability existed the whole time, in a different subsystem. The cost of skipping this: proposing an elaborate local workaround (temp homes, copied credentials) for a problem the product already solved elsewhere, and implicitly promising a fix that will never merge. Cheap checks, run them before recommending an architecture: ```bash # is the gap known, and what did maintainers decide? gh issue list --repo / --state all --search " " gh pr list --repo / --state all --search "" # read the CLOSING COMMENT on refused PRs — that is the design position ``` Then grep the docs for the feature name; a "you cannot do X here, do it via Y" sentence is common and is the fastest path to the supported answer. **Rule:** before saying _"the product cannot do this"_, confirm (a) no other subsystem does it, and (b) it is not a refused proposal. A refusal is a much stronger and more useful finding than a missing feature — it tells you to stop asking and route around permanently. ### Match the mechanism's SHAPE to the requirement A feature can be adjacent to your need and structurally unable to meet it. Before offering a replacement, state what varies per unit and check the mechanism varies that same thing. Same session: MoA was offered as the replacement for a multi-model review panel. Both "ask several models and combine," so it looked right. It is not — **MoA broadcasts ONE prompt to N models**, while the requirement was **N different prompts to N models** ("Grok, be critical" / "Claude, be empathetic"). Per-model persona was the entire point, and MoA has no slot for it. The user's reply was _"MoA doesn't solve my problem"_ — correctly. Ask explicitly: _what differs between the units — the model, the prompt, the tools, or the context?_ Then confirm the candidate mechanism parameterises that axis. Fan-out ≠ broadcast; parallel ≠ independent. ### Prefer the product's own isolation primitive When a mechanism needs isolation, look for the first-class unit the product already ships before inventing one. In the same session the working answer was an ordinary **profile** (`hermes -z... -p reviewer`) — separate `state.db` by design, credentials intact, nothing copied. The invented alternative (`HERMES_HOME=$(mktemp -d)`) redirected far more than intended and returned `HTTP 401` while exiting 0. Tell: if the workaround requires copying credentials, seeding temp directories, or reconstructing environment the product already assembles, there is probably a native unit — profile, workspace, namespace, project — doing it properly. A rule captured from a specific incident often gets generalized in the writing. When a rule would block an otherwise-correct approach, test the rule. Live case: memory said a given model must never be reached through a particular transport surface. Probing both surfaces showed the rule was true for _proxied_ variants of that model, and false for the bare first-party alias, which the router served natively either way. Both returned HTTP 200, so the distinction was invisible without an explicit two-surface probe. Procedure: 1. Probe both sides of the rule directly (raw request to each surface). 2. Confirm through the real application path, not just `curl`. 3. If the rule is narrower than written, **correct the memory entry in the same session**, preserving the case where it IS true. Do not silently violate a standing rule because it seemed inconvenient, and do not obey it past its evidence. Re-derive, then update. ## Appearing is not working — probe the lane too The sandbox probe answers _does the option show up?_ It does not answer _does the option work?_ Shipping on the first answer produces buttons that fail on tap, which costs more trust than the ugly label you were fixing. Whenever a probe makes an option **newly visible, renamed, or re-pointed**, add a second probe that exercises it for real — a 1-token request on the cheapest model is enough. Three failure modes this catches, all seen live: - **Renaming a built-in row can break its credentials.** The exclude-plus-user-block trick only carries auth the block can _reach_; an OAuth/auth-store credential is invisible to a `key_env:` block, yielding a perfect-looking dead button. - **HTTP 429 is overloaded.** `rate_limit_exceeded` (retry works) and `credit_balance_exhausted` (billing state, retry never works) share a status code. The absence of `x-ratelimit-*` headers is the tell. - **One vendor can have two meters.** A healthy subscription dashboard says nothing about a metered API key's prepaid balance. Also distinguish **pre-existing** breakage from breakage your edit introduced — check whether the prior configuration used the same credential before accepting blame or claiming a fix. Full procedure, disambiguation tables and credential-source check: `references/verifying-a-lane-actually-serves.md`. ## An enum of valid values is a MENU, not an implementation The sibling of "the setting exists, but startup ignores it": the value is _accepted, validated, and offered in the UI_ — and the dispatcher has no branch for it, so it silently degrades to the default. Verified on the router combo routing strategies. `src/shared/constants/routingStrategies.ts` exports **18** strategy values, each with a UI label and icon, including a very on-the-nose `context-optimized` documented as "Maximize context window." The function that actually selects a model — `src/domain/comboResolver.ts::resolveComboModel()` — implements **four**: ```ts switch (strategy) { case "priority": /* first model */ case "round-robin": /* per-combo counter */ case "random": /* weighted */ case "least-used": /* usage counts */ default: return { model: normalized[0].model, index: 0 }; } ``` `context-optimized` falls to `default:` and returns the **first** model unconditionally — plain `priority` under a name that promises the opposite. Worse, the normalizer coerces any unrecognized strategy to `"priority"` too, so a typo'd or aspirational value never errors either. Recommending it would have shipped a config change that looked meaningful, parsed cleanly, produced no error, and did nothing. **Rule:** an enum member, dropdown option, or documented value is a _claim_. Before you set it or recommend it, grep the dispatcher for a branch that consumes it: ```bash # does anything actually BRANCH on this value? grep -rn "case \"\"\|=== \"\"\|\[\"\"\]" src/ --include=*.ts ``` Zero hits outside the constants/UI/i18n files means it is decorative. Presence in a constants list, a UI picker, or a docstring is **not** evidence of wiring — those are the three places an unimplemented feature always still appears. Corollary: a `default:` case that silently returns a sane-looking value is what makes this invisible. Prefer reading the switch over trusting the enum, and be suspicious whenever the option that perfectly solves your problem is the one nobody documented with a code reference. ## The setting exists, but startup ignores it A distinct and easily-missed shape: the feature is _fully built_ — type, default, persistence, API, UI control, applier function — and still the live value is wrong, because **startup applies the compiled-in default instead of the persisted value.** Symptom that gives it away: **three different numbers for one setting.** ``` source default DEFAULT_SETTINGS.optimization.cacheSize = 65536 (64 MB) live runtime PRAGMA cache_size = -16000 (16 MB) UI fallback parseInt(e.target.value) || 16384 (16 MB) <-- matches live ``` When the live value matches a **fallback literal in the UI** rather than either the declared default or a deliberate choice, someone touched the field once and the `|| ` wrote a value nobody intended. That is two bugs, not one. Trace it as a chain and find which link reads the wrong source: ```bash # 1. the declared default grep -n "" src/types/*Settings.ts # 2. every place the underlying knob is applied grep -rn "" --include=*.ts src/ lib/ # 3. is the persisted value even stored? (key/value or settings row) # "no stored row -> defaults apply" is itself a finding # 4. WHO calls the applier, and WHEN grep -rn "applyXSettings\|setX(" --include=*.ts src/ | grep -v "export function" ``` The failing pattern looks like this — the applier exists and is correct, but the boot path bypasses it: ```ts // startup: hardcoded to the DEFAULT, ignores anything persisted db.pragma(`cache_size = -${DEFAULT_DATABASE_SETTINGS.optimization.cacheSize}`); // the settings-aware applier is only reached from a SAVE handler applyDatabaseOptimizationSettings(nextSettings.optimization); // settings.ts:309 ``` So the configured value applies _only after someone re-saves settings_, and is lost on every restart. **Read the boot path, not just the applier.** An applier that is provably correct tells you nothing about which value reaches it at startup. Related trap in the same family: a setting read from persistence but resolved to a disabled/zero value at runtime (`mmap_size` intending 256 MB, live reporting `0`). Same diagnosis, same fix shape. **Reframe the work before writing code.** "Make X configurable" and "make the configured X actually apply at startup" are different PRs. The second is smaller, more defensible upstream, and is usually the real bug. Say so before building. ## Read the DECLARED value; never derive it from telemetry The inverse of every trap above. Those cover a config value that fails to take effect. This one is the opposite failure: **the declaration was correct and readable the whole time, and it was never read** — the value got reconstructed from output instead, and the reconstruction was wrong. Verified in one case. A scheduled job's cadence was reported as "fires every 90 seconds" and repeated confidently three times, becoming the basis of a remediation plan. The number came from dividing ledger rows by elapsed time. Event ledgers write **several rows per occurrence** (`started`, `finished`, `notified`), so rows-over-time inflates a rate by the rows-per-event factor. The cron expression said `*/5 * * * *` — five minutes. One `grep` of the schedule would have settled it before any analysis began. **Rule:** if a system _declares_ a quantity somewhere — a cron expression, a timeout, a rate limit, a pool size, a retention window — read the declaration. A rate derived from logs is a hypothesis about the log's shape; the declaration is the answer. Derive only when nothing declares it, and label it derived. ```bash # read the declaration, do not infer the schedule from output python3 -c "import json;d=json.load(open('cron/jobs.json')); [print(j.get('name'), j.get('schedule')) for j in (d if isinstance(d,list) else d.get('jobs',[]))]" ``` ### A measurement pinned to a configured limit is the limit, not the world Sibling tell, same incident. Every timeout in that job clocked in at **exactly** 50.0s and 110.0s. Landing on a ceiling to the tenth of a second is the harness clipping the value, not organic behavior: real durations produce a distribution, ceilings produce a spike at the cap. Before interpreting any measurement, check whether it equals a configured limit — a timeout, a page size, a quota, a max-retries product. If it does, you are reading the instrument, and the underlying quantity is unknown and larger. ### Cluster failures BY DAY before calling anything a defect Same session: all 28 of that job's timeouts fell on a single calendar day, with zero the day before and zero the day after. That is an **incident** in a dependency, not a defect in the job. Grouping by day is one line and reframes the entire diagnosis. ### Read the artifact's own comments before proposing to change it The spec being "fixed" already carried a comment from its previous author correctly diagnosing the behavior, naming the real remedy (a per-call deadline), and explicitly describing the timeout as _"a backstop sized above the bounded worst case, not the control."_ The proposed fix would have overwritten a deliberate design decision to solve a problem that did not exist. Config files, specs, and wrapper scripts accumulate hard-won comments. Read them first; they are the cheapest source of intent available, and overriding one without acknowledging it is how a fleet loses knowledge. ## Grep for references before removing anything A config block that looks decorative may be load-bearing somewhere that fails _silently_ rather than loudly. ```bash grep -rn "custom:\|provider: \|:" config.yaml cron/jobs.json ``` Surfaces worth checking in a Hermes profile: `model.provider`, `fallback_providers[]`, `auxiliary.*`, multi-model/panel presets and their aggregators, `delegation.*`, and every cron job definition. Panel-style configs are the dangerous ones — a dropped slot degrades into a fluent, plausible single-model answer with no error at all. ## Report the boundary honestly After probing, say which layers accept the change and which do not. "Provider rows are relabelable; individual item buttons render a raw identifier" is a useful, actionable answer. "I'll clean up the labels" — when half of them cannot change — is a promise that breaks on delivery. Separate cheap reversible changes from risky wide-blast-radius ones and let the user sequence them, rather than bundling both behind one approval. For the naming/labeling side of this — what a surface should _say_ once you know what can change, and why presentation should be curated per-audience while routing stays fleet-uniform — see `references/naming-ui-surfaces-for-non-technical-users.md`. ## Pitfalls - **Editing the live config to find out what a key does.** Always sandbox first; a `.bak-` copy is not a substitute for not breaking it. - **Trusting exit 0 or absence of a warning.** Read the observable output. - **Reimplementing the logic in the probe.** Call the real function, or the probe validates your assumption instead of the system. - **Stopping at the config dict for a config→env bridge.** Some levers don't act through the loaded config at all — a startup/preamble bridge copies a config key into an env var (e.g. `agent.max_turns` → `HERMES_MAX_ITERATIONS`) that the real reader consumes. Reading the loaded dict "proves" the key is set while the live behavior never changes. Exercise the bridge AND the downstream reader (e.g. call `_current_max_iterations()`, not just `load_config()`). - **Reporting one failed lever as impossibility.** Test the matrix first. - **Using the system interpreter.** Use the app's own; import errors masquerade as config errors. - **Deleting a block because the UI stopped needing it.** Grep for references — panel/preset slots fail silently. - **Leaving a disproven rule in memory.** If probing narrows a standing rule, correct the entry the same session or the next agent re-applies it. - **Skipping the baseline run.** Without before/after you cannot attribute the change to your edit. - **Treating a clean readback on a vendor API as proof.** A service can accept, store, and echo a field it never consumes. Check the machine-readable schema (`/api-json`, `/openapi.json`, `/swagger.json`) for the field in the write DTO _and_ confirm behavior on one real invocation. See "Readback is not proof on a third-party API." - **Copying a field name out of docs prose, blog posts, or memory.** Deprecated fields outlive their removal in every non-schema source, including model training data. The schema is the only artifact the service validates against. - **Assuming a wrong live value means the feature is missing.** Check whether it is already built and merely bypassed at startup. Proposing to "add" a setting that already has a UI control is an embarrassing PR; the real fix is usually a one-line boot-path change. - **Comparing a local checkout against a live host without checking versions.** A local tree 43 releases behind (v3.8.7 vs v3.8.50) will show different defaults, different file layouts, and functions that moved to new modules — every conclusion drawn from it about production is unsound. Confirm `git log -1` / `package.json` version on BOTH sides before reading source to explain live behavior. - **Branching a fix off a version tag instead of the deployed commit.** The owner's instruction was to base the fix on what was actually running in production, not on a version number. The version string is not the base. On one host the checkout HEAD was at the version the tag claimed, while the **running build** was a different release directory reporting the NEXT patch version — and that commit did not exist in the checkout at all; it lived only on a release branch. Resolve the deployed commit before branching: ```bash ls -la current # symlink -> releases/standalone- cat releases//BUILD_SHA # or grep version in the standalone bundle curl -s localhost:PORT/api/.../health | grep version git branch -a --contains # find which branch actually carries it git checkout -b # branch from the SHA, never the tag ``` Then confirm `git rev-parse --short HEAD` equals the deployed sha before writing a line of code. ## Applying a verified change safely Once a lever is proven live, editing it across many fleet configs must stay a one-line, reviewable change. ruamel.yaml will try to churn the file in ways that hide your edit: - **Global sequence re-indent.** ruamel applies one `y.indent(sequence=…)` to the whole doc; the default turns indentless lists (`- item`) into indented (` - item`) or vice-versa. Detect from the backup: if any line starts with ` -` use `y.indent(mapping=2, sequence=4, offset=2)`, else `y.indent(mapping=2, sequence=2, offset=0)`. - **Folded-scalar unfolding.** Even with `width=4096`, ruamel collapses a multi-line `system_prompt` / quoted string onto one line; `y.fold_pos = 4096` does NOT preserve it. Guard with a **diff-gate**: after dumping, the unified diff vs backup must be exactly one `-`/one `+` line containing the key (present-value case) or zero `-`/one `+` (absent-key case). If it's larger, **restore and fall back to text-surgical**: find the parent block, replace only the ` key:` value line (preserve trailing ` # comment` and EOL), rewrite, re-parse. Full implementation + readback verification: `scripts/surgical_scalar_edit.py`. Run it per profile; it backs up, gates, falls back, and asserts the value landed. See `references/safe-scalar-edit.md` for the reproduction recipe. ## A version bump is a config lever too — probe the new value before pinning "Latest X shipped, update our setup" reads like find-and-replace. It is not. A new version string is an unverified lever: the config will parse, the call will return 200, and the behavior can still be worse. Newest is frequently worse on a specific capability during launch week. Verified in one case (grok-4.6, one day post-release). Probing the real code path before pinning found a **reproducible defect**: through the xAI `x_search` Responses tool, grok-4.6 leaked raw control tokens into user-facing prose — `<|eos|>`, and literally `show render_inline_citation with citation_id is 23` — on **2 of 4 trials**, while the incumbent grok-4.5 was clean 4 of 4. It was also **~4x slower** (35-64s vs 2.6-15.5s, identical prompts). Every call returned HTTP 200. A single-probe check would have passed it 50% of the time. **Classify each reference before editing: DORMANT vs LIVE.** The same version string in two places has completely different blast radius. A capability declaration under `providers.

.models` that nothing dispatches through is cosmetic; a setting like `x_search.model` calls the vendor API directly. In that session the bump shipped to the dormant catalog pin and was **withheld** from the live execution setting — same release, opposite decisions, because each was tested separately instead of swept. Partial application with a stated reason is a better outcome than an all-or-nothing sweep. **Probe requirements for a model/version swap:** - **n≥4 trials per version**, alternating old and new on identical prompts. One clean trial proves nothing about an intermittent defect. - **Assert on output content, not status.** Scan for `<|`, `|>`, and any tool-internal directive (`render_inline_citation`, `citation_id`) appearing in prose. A 200 carrying corrupted text is the actual failure mode. - **Record per-trial latency.** Vendor or practitioner reports of "slower TTFT" only become actionable when measured on your own workload. - **Use the app's own credential resolver and request shape**, not a hand-rolled HTTP call — import the same helper the product uses so the probe exercises the real path. Reusable harness: `scripts/probe_model_release.py`. Transcript, leak samples, and the dormant-vs-live classification worked example → `references/model-release-regression-probe.md`. Corollary: **rolling aliases self-update with no config change and no probe.** `~x-ai/grok-latest` silently became 4.6 the day it shipped. When a new version lands, check what your `-latest` pins quietly adopted — a fallback rung can take on an untested model with nobody editing anything. ### After the upgrade lands: auditing what you got The mirror question — _"we're several releases ahead now, what should we enable, what silently got better?"_ — is the same discipline pointed backwards. Anchor on the deployed BUILD pair (not the version string, which can be identical across hundreds of commits), grade every candidate feature against your own call telemetry rather than its commit message, read the failure path before adopting a resilience feature, and **verify the subsystem is actually running before crediting a fix** — a "fixes 0% hit rate" commit is worthless against a cache that stopped writing twelve days earlier. Includes the matched-baseline measurement shape and the rule against crediting a change that had not yet run: `references/post-upgrade-capability-audit.md`. ## The edit list in a work order is rarely the whole inventory A change order naming "profiles X, Y, Z" is a starting point, not a census. Verified in one case: the order named three profiles; a filesystem sweep found the pin in **four**. Enumerate from disk before editing, excluding backup and test trees so the count is honest: ```bash cd ~/.hermes/profiles for d in */config.yaml; do case "$d" in *opus5-ab*|*backups*|*home/.hermes*) continue;; esac grep -nE '' "$d" && echo " ^ $d" done ``` Report the discrepancy — the requester's model of the fleet is stale, and that is useful to them. **Hermes refuses agent writes to its own profile's `config.yaml`**, returning `Refusing to write to Hermes config file … Agent cannot modify security-sensitive configuration`. That is the self-config guard working as designed, not a broken tool. A fleet-wide edit that includes the profile you are running as completes N-1 automatically; name the remaining manual step (`hermes config` or a hand edit) instead of reporting the batch as done. ## A steward's authorization does not lift the principal's freeze When a delegated work order says a class of change …(truncated)