# Security Hygiene

> Security hygiene for GSD's self-modifying skill and agent system. Use this skill whenever: creating, editing, or deleting skill files (.claude/skills/, .claude/commands/), modifying agent definitions (.claude/agents/), working with YAML configuration or chipset files, handling JSONL observation data (.planning/patterns/), processing community-contributed skills or chipsets, any file path operations that could involve user input, or when installing/updating project-claude configuration. Also activates for discussions about skill-creator security, trust models, or content hygiene.

- Skill: `tibsfox/security-hygiene` (Agent Skill)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add tibsfox/security-hygiene`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/tibsfox/security-hygiene/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: AI & ML
- Author: Tibsfox (https://skillmd.com/u/tibsfox)
- Updated: 2026-09-10
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/tibsfox/security-hygiene

---


# Security Hygiene

## Security Philosophy

This is a self-modifying system. Security should work like a helpful companion, not an adversarial checkpoint — zen and the art of programming. Tools protect by default, guide by suggestion, block only when there is a real reason.

## Threat Surface

| Vector | Risk | Check |
|---|---|---|
| **Path traversal** | Skill names used in file paths could escape directory | Sanitize all skill names: alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores only. Reject `..`, `/`, `\`. |
| **YAML deserialization** | Unsafe YAML loading executes arbitrary code | Use safe parsing only (`yaml.safe_load` or equivalent). Never `yaml.load` with untrusted input. |
| **Data poisoning** | Append-only JSONL could contain injected entries | Validate entries on read: check schema, reject oversized entries, verify timestamps are monotonic. |
| **Permission bypass** | Automated workflows might skip user confirmation | **Never bypass user confirmation for skill application**, even in YOLO mode. YOLO applies to GSD workflow commands, not skill modifications. |
| **Cross-project leakage** | User-level skills might expose project-specific patterns | User-level skills must be generic. Project-specific patterns stay in project-level skills. |
| **Observation privacy** | Pattern data could leak into shared repos | `.planning/patterns/` must be in `.gitignore`. Verify on any git operation. |

## Content Hygiene Rules

When processing community-contributed content (skills, chipsets, LoRA adapters):
- Check for embedded commands or script execution
- Verify YAML does not contain unsafe tags (`!!python/object`, etc.)
- Validate that skill descriptions match their actual content
- Quarantine new community content for review before activation

## Privacy Tier Taxonomy (4-tier, OOPS-08-P03)

All telemetry, observation data, and skill artefacts are classified into one
of four privacy tiers. Telemetry writers MUST stamp every record with its
tier and MUST NOT mix tiers in a single sink.

| Tier | Name | Description | Examples |
|------|------|-------------|----------|
| **A** | **Public** | No PII, no proprietary content; safe to publish externally. | Open-source skill descriptions, public release notes, anonymised aggregate metrics. |
| **B** | **Internal** | Non-PII operational data; safe to share within the project team. | Phase activity counts, commit-type distributions, hook firing rates, build-time profiles. |
| **C** | **Sensitive** | PII, credentials, authentication tokens, individual session transcripts. | `.env` contents, OAuth tokens, individual user prompts, raw conversation logs. |
| **D** | **Restricted** | Regulated data, proprietary IP, Fox Companies content. | `.planning/fox-companies/` artefacts, `wasteland/` content, customer-identifiable records, anything subject to legal hold. |

Defaults and enforcement:

- New telemetry writers default to **Tier B** unless an explicit tier label
  is supplied at construction.
- **Tier C** data MUST be encrypted at rest and MUST be excluded from any
  artefact published outside the local repository (no `git push` of files
  containing Tier C content; no FTP sync; no inclusion in release notes).
- **Tier D** data MUST never leave the `.planning/` tree or
  `wasteland/` branch. Surface alignments in conversation only; never
  commit Tier D content to a public-facing path.
- Mixed-tier sinks are FORBIDDEN — a writer that mixes Tier A and Tier C
  records loses the ability to safely publish the Tier A subset.

Referenced by C5 W3.P6 tool-tracker (telemetry writer wiring) and the
post-tool-use observation hook.

## Authoring around the leak-scanner — don't re-trip the control (Lesson #10462)

The release-history publisher (`tools/release-history/publish.mjs`, `leakScan`) runs
a hard leak-scan gate over every published chapter. Its effective patterns combine
committed base patterns with operator-private patterns loaded from the gitignored
`release-history.local.json`, so the scan is **operator-machine-specific**: a fresh
CI checkout sees only the base patterns and never the local ones.

Two failure modes recur whenever you DOCUMENT leak-scan or security-hardening work:

1. **The control's own documentation re-trips it.** A retrospective that quotes a
   leak *pattern* verbatim (e.g. v1.49.588 quoting the narrowed private-path regex
   it was describing) matches that pattern and is HARD-BLOCKED — even though it
   contains no real secret.
2. **The recursion trap.** Documenting the *fix* for #1 by enumerating the private
   literals the control guards (company / email / credential-var) embeds those
   values into published content — a genuine leak the scanner correctly blocks.
   The v1.49.916 retrospective re-tripped exactly this way while documenting the
   v916 AC7 allowlist fix.

**Authoring rule: describe the pattern, never quote the literal.** In release notes,
retrospectives, or docs that touch leak-scan work, refer to a pattern by name or
shape ("the company-name local pattern", "the credential-var form") — never paste
the regex source and never paste the private value.

**Allowlist-vs-scrub decision rule:**

- The doc legitimately quotes a leak **PATTERN** (a regex, for self-referential
  documentation) → add a narrow `leak_scan_allowlist` entry in the committed
  `release-history.config.json`, keyed on the EXACT `version` + `file` + `pattern`
  source, with a `reason`. Never widen to a global pattern exemption.
- The content embeds a genuinely-private **VALUE** → **SCRUB the value** from the
  content. Never allowlist a private value into published output — the allowlist is
  for pattern-quoting docs only, never for secrets.

This pairs the loud surface (the leak-scan gate) with the authoring discipline that
keeps it from firing on its own documentation. See
[`docs/failure-mode-contracts.md`](../../../docs/failure-mode-contracts.md) (#10427
silent-vs-loud surfaces) and
[`docs/known-unwired-ledger-discipline.md`](../../../docs/known-unwired-ledger-discipline.md)
(#10461 gate-enforce-every-runnable-surface + drift-guard).

## The Staging Layer Principle

"The user's ability to work should be reasonable. Security should also be reasonable. We strive for the clean intersection." Do not over-alert. Do not create friction for normal operations. Surface findings only when something genuinely warrants attention.