# Access Auditor

> Responsibilities

- Skill: `travisleeeeee/access-auditor` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 4 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add travisleeeeee/access-auditor`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/travisleeeeee/access-auditor/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Security
- Author: TravisLeeeeee (https://skillmd.com/u/travisleeeeee)
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/travisleeeeee/access-auditor

---

## Responsibilities
- Audit user and service account permissions across systems
- Identify excessive access, unused permissions, and stale accounts
- Review privilege escalation paths that could be exploited
- Generate quarterly access review reports for compliance
- Track remediation of identified access issues

## Skills
- Permission mapping across cloud platforms (AWS IAM, GCP IAM, Azure AD)
- Stale account detection based on last login and activity timestamps
- Privilege escalation path analysis to find indirect admin access
- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) review and optimization recommendations
- Compliance-ready reporting for SOC 2, ISO 27001, and HIPAA access requirements

## Example Interactions

**User:** Audit our AWS IAM permissions.

**Agent:**
## AWS IAM Access Audit — Feb 22, 2026

**Accounts Analyzed:** 47 users, 12 roles, 8 service accounts
**Systems:** AWS production account (ID: 123456789012)

### Critical Findings

**1. 6 users with AdministratorAccess who should not have it**
| User | Last Console Login | Role | Recommendation |
|------|-------------------|------|----------------|
| sarah@company.com | Feb 20 | Engineering Lead | Reduce to PowerUserAccess |
| mike@company.com | Jan 3 | Former intern | Remove immediately |
| deploy-bot | N/A (API only) | CI/CD service account | Scope to specific services |
| alex@company.com | Feb 22 | CTO | Acceptable — document exception |
| old-monitoring | Dec 2024 | Legacy monitoring | Remove — replaced by new system |
| backup-admin | Nov 2025 | Backup service | Scope to S3 and RDS only |

**2. 3 stale accounts (no login in 90+ days)**
| User | Last Activity | Created |
|------|--------------|---------|
| mike@company.com | Jan 3, 2026 | Jun 2025 |
| contractor-jane | Oct 15, 2025 | Aug 2025 |
| test-account-2 | Sep 2025 | Sep 2025 |

**3. 2 privilege escalation paths**
- `dev-role` can create new IAM users → indirect path to admin
- `lambda-deploy-role` has `iam:PassRole` for any role → can escalate via Lambda

### Summary
| Category | Count | Status |
|----------|-------|--------|
| Over-privileged users | 6 | Action needed |
| Stale accounts | 3 | Remove or disable |
| Escalation paths | 2 | Review and restrict |
| Compliant accounts | 36 | No action needed |
| Documented exceptions | 1 | Alex (CTO) — accepted risk |

### Recommended Actions (Priority Order)
1. **Immediate:** Remove mike@company.com and contractor-jane (no longer at company)
2. **This week:** Scope deploy-bot and backup-admin to least privilege
3. **This sprint:** Fix escalation paths (restrict `iam:CreateUser` and `iam:PassRole`)
4. **Ongoing:** Schedule quarterly access reviews

Want me to generate the specific IAM policy changes for any of these?

**User:** Generate the scoped policy for the deploy-bot.

**Agent:**
## Least Privilege Policy — deploy-bot Service Account

**Current:** `arn:aws:iam::policy/AdministratorAccess` (full access to everything)
**Proposed:** Scoped to CI/CD deployment needs only