# Salesforce Permission Model Review Skill

> Salesforce Permission Model Review Skill

- Skill: `vincentchuwaichow/salesforce-permission-model-review-skill` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 5 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds@latest add vincentchuwaichow/salesforce-permission-model-review-skill`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/vincentchuwaichow/salesforce-permission-model-review-skill/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: AI & ML
- Author: VincentChuWaiChow (https://skillmd.com/u/vincentchuwaichow)
- Updated: 2026-09-17
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/vincentchuwaichow/salesforce-permission-model-review-skill

---


# Salesforce Permission Model Review Skill

## Purpose
This skill reviews the Salesforce permission model — profiles, permission sets,
permission set groups, permission set licenses, muting permission sets, sharing
rules, OWD, role hierarchy, IP restrictions, and session policies — for
over-privilege, toxic combinations, and sharing design risk. It flags
combinations that create security or compliance exposure and produces a
structured findings report. It does not access live orgs or authorize changes.

## When to use
- A permission audit is required before a compliance review or certification.
- A new permission set or profile is being designed and needs adversarial review.
- Guest-user access patterns or sharing rule changes need security review.
- A toxic-permission alert has been raised and must be investigated.

## When not to use
- Full org posture assessment — use `salesforce-org-assessment-skill`.
- Metadata quality review (fields, layouts) — use `salesforce-metadata-review-skill`.
- Live permission change proposal — use `salesforce-live-change-approval-protocol`.
- Data exposure event response — use `salesforce-data-exposure-escalation-protocol`.

## Minimum payload (required inputs)
- Sanitized permission exports: profile XML, permission set XML, permission set
  group definitions, sharing rule definitions, OWD settings, role hierarchy
  summary, IP restriction settings, session policy settings.
- Context: approximate user population, key regulated-data objects, industry vertical.

## Workflow

### 1. Profile review
- List all profiles and their base permissions.
- Flag: `ModifyAllData` assigned to any non-system-admin profile.
- Flag: `ViewAllData` on profiles with access to PII-classified objects.
- Flag: `API Enabled` on profiles without corresponding IP restriction.
- Flag: `Customize Application` on profiles outside the designated admin group.
- Flag: `Manage Users` outside HR/IT admin profiles.
- Flag: profiles with direct object-level Create/Edit/Delete on financial or
  regulated-data objects without documented business justification.

### 2. Permission set review
- List all permission sets and their grants.
- Flag: permission sets granting `ModifyAllData` or `ViewAllData` that are
  assigned broadly (> configurable user threshold).
- Flag: permission sets duplicating profile permissions (redundant, adds attack surface).
- Flag: permission sets with no current assignees (orphaned — attack surface if reassigned).
- Flag: `Field Service`
or
  `Experience Cloud`
permission sets
  granting object access beyond their intended scope.

### 3. Permission set groups and muting
- Review permission set group composition.
- Flag: muting permission sets that silently narrow permissions without clear documentation.
- Flag: permission set groups that combine permissions creating toxic combinations.

### 4. Sharing model review
- Review OWD (Organization-Wide Defaults) per object.
- Flag: OWD = Public Read/Write on objects containing PII or financial data.
- Flag: OWD = Public Read Only on regulated-data objects where stricter control is expected.
- Review role hierarchy: flag roles that grant data access beyond job function.
- Review sharing rules:
  - Flag: criteria-based rules that are effectively always-true.
  - Flag: sharing rules on objects classified as regulated data.
  - Flag: sharing rules granting Edit access where Read is sufficient.

### 5. Guest user review
- Review guest-user profile permissions (Experience Cloud
).
- Flag: guest-user profile with any object-level Read access to records containing PII.
- Flag: sharing sets that grant guest users access to records via lookup relationships
  that could expose unintended records.
- Flag: public-site access (Sites
) with
  Apex REST endpoints lacking CSRF protection.

### 6. IP restrictions and session policies
- Flag: named credentials or connected apps without IP allowlisting in production.
- Flag: session timeout > configurable threshold for privileged user groups.
- Flag: `Lock sessions to the IP address from which they originated` disabled
  for profiles with sensitive permissions.

## Toxic combination registry
These specific combinations always produce a Critical or High finding:

| Combination | Risk | Rating |
|---|---|---|
| `ModifyAllData` + broad assignment (> threshold users) | Mass data destruction or exfiltration | Critical |
| `ViewAllData` + PII object access + no IP restriction | PII exposure | Critical |
| `API Enabled` + no IP restriction + sensitive object access | API-based data exfiltration | High |
| `Customize Application` + non-admin profile | Privilege escalation via metadata change | High |
| `Manage Users` + no IP restriction | Account takeover / privilege escalation | High |
| Guest user + sharing set + PII object | Unauthenticated PII exposure | Critical |
| `ModifyAllData` + `Manage Users` on same profile | Full org compromise posture | Critical |

## Evidence requirements
- Sanitized permission exports; no credentials, session tokens, or customer data.
- OWD settings and role hierarchy summary are required for sharing model review.
- User assignment counts (not names) are required for broad-assignment checks.

## Output format
```
permission_model_findings:
  profile_findings:
    - finding: [description]
      severity: Critical | High | Medium | Low
      combination: [which toxic combination, if applicable]
      evidence: [what in the export supports this]
      recommendation: [brief]
  permission_set_findings: [same structure]
  sharing_model_findings: [same structure]
  guest_user_findings: [same structure]
  ip_session_findings: [same structure]

toxic_combinations_detected: [list from registry]
escalation_gates_fired: [from salesforce-risk-taxonomy, or "none"]
summary:
  critical_count: [count]
  high_count: [count]
assumptions: [list]
missing_evidence: [what would improve the review]
```

## Redaction rules
- Never request secrets, credentials, OAuth tokens, refresh tokens, session IDs, MFA seeds, customer PII.
- Sanitize org IDs, user IDs (replace with placeholders) before sharing in outputs.
- Do not include actual user names; use role and count references only.

## Privilege / data handling rules
- Permission review findings involving regulated data must be flagged for compliance specialist review.
- Guest-user findings involving PII must trigger salesforce-data-exposure-escalation-protocol.

## Handoff rules
- Hands off to: salesforce-org-assessment-skill (full posture context),
  salesforce-data-exposure-escalation-protocol (if guest-user PII exposure confirmed),
  salesforce-case-capsule (structured handoff for any Critical finding).
- Required handoff fields: matter_id, toxic_combinations_detected, escalation_gates_fired,
  critical_count, assumptions.

## Audit log fields
- matter_id, skill_id, skill_version, invoked_by, input_hash, evidence_quality, output_verdict, escalation_fired, timestamp

## Stop conditions
- Export contains live credentials or session tokens — stop and ask for sanitized version.
- Guest-user PII exposure is confirmed — stop, output ESCALATE, invoke salesforce-data-exposure-escalation-protocol.
- Critical toxic combination detected in a production org — stop and require human review before continuing.

## Security notes
- Read-only static review; never requests live org access or runs SOQL queries.
- Sanitized inputs only; any input containing credentials must be refused.
- Toxic combinations are objective findings; remediation requires human-authorized change management.
- Guest-user exposure is always escalation-grade regardless of record count.