# Coalition Denied Weather Recon And Sortie Risk Cell

> Support coalition warfighter weather-recon fusion and sortie-risk planning in denied environments. Use when sensor degradation and weather volatility drive air/ISR mission risk.

- Skill: `zwright8/coalition-denied-weather-recon-and-sortie-risk-cell` (Agent Skill, multi-file: 2 files)
- Install (CLI): `npx skillmds add zwright8/coalition-denied-weather-recon-and-sortie-risk-cell`
- Raw SKILL.md: https://api.skillmd.com/api/skills/zwright8/coalition-denied-weather-recon-and-sortie-risk-cell/raw
- Safety review: pending
- Works with: Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex
- Category: Coding & Dev Tools
- Author: zwright8 (https://skillmd.com/u/zwright8)
- Updated: 2026-09-10
- Page: https://skillmd.com/skills/zwright8/coalition-denied-weather-recon-and-sortie-risk-cell

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# Coalition Denied Weather Recon And Sortie Risk Cell

## Mission Scope

- Treat this skill as a planning and decision-support aid for U.S. warfighter missions in its domain.
- Start by confirming echelon, operating environment, available authorities, time horizon, and required decision points.
- Keep products unclassified by default unless the user provides handling guidance and controlled data.

## Workflow

1. Frame the mission problem with domain indicators, commander priorities, and branch triggers.
2. Identify assumptions, decision thresholds, and invalidation signals.
3. Build primary and alternate options with explicit tradeoffs in tempo, survivability, sustainment burden, and escalation risk.
4. Integrate dependencies across C2, intelligence, fires/effects, sustainment, protection, legal constraints, and coalition interoperability.
5. Produce commander-facing outputs and a staff-action plan with owners, suspense dates, and triggers.

## Required Output Format

1. Situation snapshot.
2. Recommended option.
3. Alternative options.
4. Decision points now/next/pre-delegated.
5. Staff tasking by owner and suspense.

## Domain Products

Primary products for this skill: sortie weather-risk scorecard, denied-sensor confidence ladder, divert and scrub trigger matrix.

## Domain Toolchain Defaults

- Primary: `tool_suite_id=ts-denied-weather-sortie-risk-v1` with `protocol_stack_id=ps-denied-weather-sortie-risk-stack-v1`.
- Alternate: `tool_suite_id=ts-airlift-lz-viability-v1` with `protocol_stack_id=ps-airlift-lz-viability-stack-v1`.
- Degraded: use authenticated voice/readback + UTC acknowledgment ledger + manual fallback board.

## External Tool Stack and Protocols

- Preferred tools: mission-domain planners, operational dashboards, independent cross-check analytics, and command-approved audit ledgers.
- Preferred protocol families: USMTF, API/JSON, NATO APP-11/ADatP-3 aligned.
- Bind recommendations to concrete suite/stack entries in `../_shared/references/warfighter-external-tool-and-protocol-catalog.md`.
- Use protocol packets in `../_shared/references/tool-protocol-playbooks.md` and `../_shared/references/domain-tool-packet-library.md`.
- Include provenance fields: source system, refresh UTC, confidence, and key gaps.

## Domain Packet Defaults

- Default packet IDs: DPL-DENIED-WX-SORTIE-001, DPL-AIRLIFT-LZ-001.
- If no packet fully matches, define a provisional packet using the shared schema and assign a validation owner.

## Tool Invocation Contract

- For each critical dependency include: objective, required inputs, query/action template, expected output schema, protocol/transport, and fallback path.
- Map each tool output to a commander decision point and a staff task with suspense.
- If confidence drops below mission threshold, mark recommendations `provisional` and issue a degraded-mode branch.

## Authority and Assurance Gates

- Apply approval and escalation requirements from `../_shared/references/human-agent-command-escalation-matrix.md` and `../_shared/references/warfighter-tool-authority-gates.md`.
- Run protocol conformance checks from `../_shared/references/us-joint-protocol-assurance-drill.md` before high-impact recommendations.
- If authority, legal basis, or acknowledgment integrity is uncertain, downgrade to advisory-only with explicit commander prompts.

## Operational Execution Hardening

- Enforce `ack_chain_status=verified` for all mission-critical tool exchanges before recommending sortie posture changes.
- Require `trust_score >= 0.80` on each primary external dependency; if lower, elevate alternate stack and mark outputs `provisional`.
- Add explicit degraded-mode triggers: stale data beyond `refresh_sla_minutes`, missing cryptographic validation, or failed human approval gate.
- Include a final command-ready line: `GO`, `NO-GO`, or `GO-WITH-CONSTRAINTS` with rationale tied to authority and protocol checks.